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1. Introduction 
In the United States, President Barack Obama introduced an immigration reform which 
“would provide undocumented immigrants with a legal way to earn citizenship,” and make 
the “immigration system easier and more efficient” for “foreign entrepreneurs,” “promising 
foreign graduate students,” and family members of U.S. citizens or residents (“Comprehen-
sive”). At the same time, this reform would also strengthen the U.S. borders and “stop busi-
nesses from exploiting the system by knowingly hiring undocumented workers” (“Compre-
hensive”). President Obama’s immigration reform seems quite liberal despite the proposal to 
reinforce border control. 
On the contrary, Donald Trump, who was elected the forty-fifth president of the United 
States in November 2016, proposed another immigration reform during his campaign which 
would overrule Obama’s immigration reform. Trump claimed that “[t]he Obama Administra-
tion has released 76,000 aliens from its custody with criminal convictions since 2013 
alone” (“Immigration Reform”). Therefore, he suggested that “[a]ll criminal aliens must be 
returned to their home countries, a process which can be aided by canceling any visas to for-
eign countries which will not accept their own criminals, and making it a separate and addi-
tional crime to commit an offense while here illegally” (“Immigration Reform”). Also, he 
proposed to cut off “federal grants to any city which refuses to cooperate with federal law 
enforcement [sanctuary cities]” on illegal immigration, and he even advocated to end 
birthright citizenship (“Immigration Reform”), which would completely alter the jus soli 
principle of the United States. 
In Germany, the jus sanguinis principle, which had been embedded in the nation’s identi-
ty for a very long time, was changed to a semi jus soli principle in the twenty-first century, 
giving birthright citizenship to some foreign children born in Germany. This change in immi-
gration policy is not the only issue about immigration in Germany. The world is currently fac-
ing a refugee crisis, and Germany finds itself in a dilemma. After several shipwreck incidents, 
German politicians still refused to open its gates to refugees in the first half of 2015. Howev-
er, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced in September 2015 that Germany would admit ap-
proximately one million refugees “because it is part of the identity of this country to do great 
things” (Smale and Homola). Her decision was criticized by many politicians and even by 
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those in her own cabinet, and with this pressure, she promised three months later to “substan-
tially reduce the number of migrants entering Germany” (Barkin). In addition to this promise, 
Chancellor Merkel also emphasized that refugees should learn to integrate, because “multi-
culturalism ‘leads to parallel societies’ rather than integration and is therefore ‘a 
sham’” (Smale and Homola). 
The issues above all indicate that policies on immigration are still essential in politics and 
they more or less affect a nation’s economy, culture, and stability. Therefore, it is important to 
study immigration. I choose to compare the United States and Germany, because they are 
both democratic and federal states, but their immigration policies stem from two completely 
different models (heterogeneous vs. homogeneous, jus soli vs. jus sanguinis) due to different 
cognitions of national identity. Moreover, immigration policies in the two countries have be-
come similar throughout the years for economic and political reasons, but policymaking still 
shows signs of the influences of different national identities. Through the comparison of im-
migration policies between the United States and Germany and their consequences, I intend 
to demonstrate that the national identity approach of immigration policy theory is the basis of 
policymaking in regard to immigration, and I expect to see if similar economic and political 
needs will result in similar immigration policies in the two countries, and if similar immigra-
tion policies have similar receptions in public or have similar impacts on societies which are 
based on different immigration policy models. I would like to categorize my research into 
cultural studies, because, for one thing, I study immigration based on the national identity 
approach of the immigration policy theory, which understands immigration from a cultural 
perspective (I will introduce this theory in the next chapter); and for another, I study the phe-
nomenon of immigration through literature, statistics, public polls, etc., which add literary 
and sociological aspects to this seemingly political and legal topic, and these aspects are 
closely related to some main consequences of immigration such as assimilation of immi-
grants and paranoia of undocumented immigrants. Although some descriptions of immigra-
tion policies may have a touch of political science and law, the laws and acts of immigration I 
will use in this dissertation are only meant to provide a cultural background and to explain 
the cultural influences of the immigration situation at a specific time. 
To better explain the function and necessity of literature in the study of immigration 
(since I will use literature to support my arguments), and to make the connection between 
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immigration and Cultural Studies clearer, I would like to briefly introduce the relation be-
tween literature and history through the (old) Historicism (as compared to the New Histori-
cism) and new ways to understand literature and history through the New Historicism. Tradi-
tionally, the relation between literature and history is linear, and literature can be seen as a 
representation of history. It explains what happened in history, and readers learn history by 
understanding what events described in the narratives “tell [them] about history” (Brizee et 
al.). For example, a non-fictional narrative about the Second World War tells the history of 
this war, and readers learn this history through the narrative. A fictional narrative taking place 
in the Second World War would also be read as a representation of some kind of historical 
facts of the war, because it contains true historical events such as battles and bombings, al-
though not necessarily accurate, and more importantly, the emotions and feelings of the peo-
ple experiencing these events. However, “New Historicists argue that earlier literary histori-
ographers tended to use totalizing or atomizing methods — a Tillyard might read one Shake-
spearean speech as exemplifying views embraced by every Elizabethan, a Lukács might read 
the demise of feudalism in the death of Hamlet” (Veeser xii). For New Historicists, texts and 
history are reciprocal, which is described by Stephen Greenblatt as “negotiation and ex-
change” (12–13) — “[n]ot only is history itself only accessible as text [literary or non-liter-
ary], the text itself is also the result of certain non-discursive forces (highly-material determi-
nants such as printing, performance conditions, distribution, etc.)” (Colebrook 26). Therefore, 
the relation between literature and history becomes more complex, and interpretation is put to 
the center of the relation between literature and history. Even the author of a non-fictional 
history book is influenced by the historical background of that time, and he or she might use 
certain language as a result of history to describe history. Thus, this book is an interpretation 
of history, but not history itself. Moreover, readers make up their own interpretations as a re-
sult of the historical background of the readers’ time, and the understanding of history is, 
hence, an interpretation of an interpretation. In other words, as Allen Brizee et al. put it, 
“New historicists do not believe that we can look at history objectively, but rather that we in-
terpret events as products of our time and culture and that ‘. . . we don’t have clear access to 
any but the most basic facts of history [,] . . . our understanding of what such facts mean . . . 
is . . . strictly a matter of interpretation, not fact.’” 
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I think readers need to be extremely careful when reading non-fictional literature, because 
they should not take it as historical facts based on the New Historicism, but rather interpreta-
tions of historical facts. However, most literary works I select to support my arguments in this 
dissertation are fictional, and thus the fictional nature of these works is already clear. There-
fore, I do not want to choose sides to support either the (old) Historicism or the New Histori-
cism, and my analysis of literary works has traces of both theories — I see literary works as a 
representation of historical facts (even though they cannot represent the whole truth), and 
since I cannot include every literary work on the same subject, I only analyze a few to exem-
plify the general impacts of immigration, knowing that this could be criticized as a totalizing 
method by New Historicists; and at the same time, I am aware that these works are interpreta-
tions of immigrant experiences, and that my analysis is also an interpretation of these inter-
pretations. The function of literature in the study of immigration, based on either theory, is 
that it is one of the only few ways to access immigration history. It is necessary to look at lit-
erature when studying immigration history, especially because the interpretation of emotions, 
feelings, and thoughts in literary works is also one of the only few ways to understand the 
psychological, sociological, and cultural impacts of the immigration situation on people, or in 
other words, to understand the consequences of immigration policies. 
There are many more studies of immigration of the United States than that of Germany, 
including studies on naturalization, assimilation, and illegal immigration, probably because 
Germany only becomes a country of immigration at the turn of the twenty-first century, 
whereas the United States has been a nation of immigrants since the nation’s founding. 
Moreover, the official census of the United States includes more comprehensive statistics by 
race and ethnicity than that of Germany. One exception is the studies on guestworker pro-
grams. Many researchers of German immigration focus on guestworker programs, because 
they are of great significance to the German immigration history. The idea of comparing the 
United States with Germany is not new, because scholars often use the United States and 
Germany as typical examples (usually as two poles) to demonstrate the two types of immi-
gration models — nations of immigrants and countries of immigration, or jus soli and jus 
sanguinis. However, these comparisons seldom consider the changes in the German immigra-
tion policy in the past twenty years. I want to add these changes to my research, and there-
fore, it will give a more comprehensive spectrum of the current immigration situation, and 
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the comparison becomes less black and white. Also, with the changes in German immigration 
policy, associated consequences such as effects of the changes on natives and immigrants can 
emerge. As a result, it is also necessary to include these associated consequences in the com-
parison. 
Also different from many studies on immigration policies, this dissertation will focus on 
the cultural perspective of immigration, as the national identity approach suggests. I will use 
some legal texts to show the changes in immigration policies in history and explain how these 
policies affect both natives and immigrants. Since literature is a cultural representation or in-
terpretation of real-life issues, as I explained earlier in this introduction, the analysis of liter-
ary works plays a large role in this dissertation as a means to demonstrate the impacts and 
consequences of such policies. The authors of these literary works all have an immigrant 
background except for the author of Bracero, Eugene Nelson. However, Nelson had worked 
on a farm with Mexican immigrants, and thus all of their works are written from an authentic 
point of view, most of which are from the immigrant’s point of view. Besides literary works, I 
will also use newspaper articles, statistics, and public polls to support my arguments. 
The basic structure of this dissertation is that I will discuss several aspects of the immi-
gration situation in the United States and Germany separately, then I will compare the situa-
tions and reflect on the meanings of such similarities or differences. I will include the follow-
ing aspects in the comparison of immigration policies. 
First, as the basis of this research, I will introduce several theories of immigration policy. 
I consider the theories applicable in both the United States and Germany, because both coun-
tries are democratic federal nation-states, and these theories were developed universally 
rather than specifically in each country. Therefore, this chapter does not contain a compari-
son, but a general introduction of different theories. The main questions surrounding immi-
gration policies are: Who formulates immigration policies? What influences policymaking? 
What are the problems in immigration? What may cause conflicts and what steers public atti-
tudes toward immigration? Associated with these questions, there are different approaches to 
and models of immigration policy theory, and I choose to introduce the Marxist approach, the 
national identity approach, the domestic politics model, the institutional and bureaucratic pol-
itics model, and the realist and neorealist approaches, with an explanation of what circum-
stances I may apply these theories to in the following chapters. 
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Second, I will compare the notions and the formations of national identity between the 
United States and Germany, which can be seen as an in-depth explanation of the national 
identity approach. Since I want to demonstrate that the national identity approach is essential 
in the policymaking process, this chapter also serves as a support of this argument. The for-
mations of national identity are very different between the United States and Germany, which 
results in the difference in immigration policy and the public’s or the natives’ reception of 
immigration policy. 
Third, I will elaborate on legal immigration, which is the core of immigration policy. I 
will further divide this part into three sub-chapters, namely, guestworkers and guestworker 
programs, permanent residency, and citizenship and naturalization, because these three com-
ponents of legal immigration are most likely to reflect the purpose of individual provisions of 
immigration policy and to affect a country’s culture. Although immigration laws include pro-
visions of temporary visit as well, I will not include this in my dissertation, because tempo-
rary visitors do not have a strong impact on the decisions in policymaking or natives’ attitude 
toward immigrants. However, guestworkers are an exception. Although they should only be 
working in the receiving country temporarily, many stay permanently instead. Guestworkers 
may also be intertwined with illegal immigration, which I will discuss in the next chapter. An 
important element in legal immigration is assimilation, which is also a cultural aspect of one 
of the consequences of immigration. In this chapter I intend to see if assimilation is necessary 
and unavoidable in the two countries, if policies are made to require immigrants to assimilate, 
and if natives expect immigrants to assimilate. 
Fourth, as I have already pointed out above, I will discuss illegal immigration. Illegal 
immigration is often deemed as a problem, but undocumented immigrants may contribute to 
the country economically. In this chapter, I will look through the citizens’ attitude toward un-
documented immigrants, the living conditions of undocumented immigrants, and how the 
United States and Germany deal with illegal immigration. Illegal immigration is still under 
heated discussion, as Trump proposed extreme solutions to control illegal immigration in the 
2016 presidential campaign, and as the world is facing a refugee crisis due to war and perse-
cution in some of the countries in the Middle East. Since it is still unknown whether or in 
how far Trump will implement his extreme immigration policies during his presidency and 
since the refugee crisis are still ongoing, I cannot include every aspect of the events, and 
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some decisions on illegal immigration or refugees may still change. Therefore, my study is 
based on the immigration situation before December 2016.  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2. Immigration Policy: A Theoretical Approach 
“If individuals move over long distances, leaving their 
families and communities behind and crossing national, 
ethnic, or cultural boundaries, then there must be some 
extraordinary forces compelling them to do this.” 
— James F. Hollifield (“The Politics”) 
Compared to the world’s population, the number of people living outside their country of 
origin (immigrants) is very small. However, immigration studies is not an unknown nor an 
unpopular field. James F. Hollifield explains that the contrast is because immigration “pro-
vokes a sense of political crisis” and “has been steadily increasing in the industrial democra-
cies of Europe, North America, Asia, and Australia as a result of social and economic forces 
that seem to be beyond the control of states and communities” (“The Politics” 132). The Cold 
War resulted in an increase in east-to-west migration, “but without slowing or stopping south-
to-north migration flows” (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 7; emphasis in original). There-
fore, the Cold War enlarged the range of migration movements. Consequently, “international 
migration has moved from the realm of ‘low politics’ (i.e., problems of domestic governance, 
especially labor market and demographic policies) to the realm of ‘high politics’ (i.e., prob-
lems affecting relations between states, including questions of war and peace” (Cornelius, 
Martin, and Hollifield 7). 
The topic of immigration is important in politics because it can cause problems and con-
flicts. Problems and conflicts caused by immigration are, for example, brain drain for the 
sending countries if immigrants are well-educated, and burden or resource scarcity for the 
receiving countries if immigrants are less educated (Hollifield, “The Politics” 132). It also 
poses “fundamental psychological threats to groups and individuals in societies. . . . These 
threats may be material, in terms of perceived challenges to one’s well-being, or symbolic, in 
terms of social identity” (Esses et al. 390). Material threat is associated with resource scarci-
ty, where “perceived group competition for resources produces efforts to reduce the access of 
other groups to the resources” (Esses et al. 390), because “within a society, access to a de-
sired resource is limited” (Esses et al. 394). In the case of immigration, the existence of im-
migrants produces a psychological threat that they will compete for economic, educational, 
and social resources with natives. Resource scarcity is one of the main reasons xenophobia 
occurs (as explained later in figure 2.2), which puts political pressure on the government. 
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Symbolic threat is related to one’s social identity and the sense of belonging (Esses et al. 
390), and the inclusion of immigrants may distort the original understanding of group or na-
tional identity. Immigration might also lead to overpopulation, which “can strain urban infra-
structures and cause environmental damage” (Hollifield, “The Politics” 133). Furthermore, 
for the immigrants themselves, they face the difficulty of integration into the new society and 
questions of belonging and self-identification. 
Rafaela M. Dancygier further divides immigrant conflict into two “theoretically and em-
pirically distinct phenomena: immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict” (21). Immi-
grant-native conflict refers to “the sustained confrontation between members of the immi-
grant and the native populations in a given locality” (Dancygier 21; emphasis in original), 
and it does not need to be violent (Dancygier 22). The “formation of social movements that 
campaign for anti-immigrant policies” (Dancygier 22) and the support of right-wing anti-im-
migrant parties are part of immigrant-native conflict. These non-violent acts can lead to vio-
lent acts such as xenophobic attacks. On the other hand, “immigrant-state conflict involves 
the sustained confrontation between immigrant communities and state actors in a given local-
ity” (Dancygier 23; emphasis in original). Immigrant-state conflict includes, for instance, “the 
dissemination of views opposing the state’s actions and expressing distrust in state institu-
tions” and anti-state violence such as vandalism of public buildings by immigrant-origin resi-
dents (Dancygier 23). 
Dancygier also points out “two key independent variables” of the cause of immigrant 
conflict, namely, “economic scarcity and immigrant political power” (21). Economic scarcity 
not only includes local goods, job, and social welfare scarcity, but also education, housing, 
and healthcare scarcity. Immigrant political power is related to whether immigrants have ac-
cess to “participate in local elections or to naturalize as citizens of the destination 
country” (Dancygier 24). To give an overview of how immigrant conflict occurs, Dancygier 
summarizes the relationship between the two variables and immigrant conflict in figures 2.1 
and 2.2, which show that economic scarcity is the main cause of immigrant conflict, because 
when economic scarcity is high, the only scenario in which immigrant conflict does not occur 
is when the economic need of immigrants is low. However, as immigrant population grows, it 
is unlikely that their economic need stays low. 
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Immigration Regime — 
Supply: Goods Provision
No Conflict
Immigration Regime — 
Demand: Immigrant 
Economic Need
Locality: 
Shortage of State- 
Provided Goods
No Conflict
Immigrant 
Political Power
No Conflict
Immigrant- 
Native Conflict
Immigrant- 
State Conflict
high
high
high
high
low
low
low
low
Fig. 2.1. Immigrant Conflict: National Immigration Regimes and Local Political Economies
Fig. 2.1. Rafaela M. Dancygier, Immigration and Conflict in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010; print; 
41).
Fig. 2.2. Immigrant Conflict: The Local Level
Immigrant 
Political Power
Low High
Economic 
Scarcity
Low No Conflict Immigrant Mobilization; No Conflict
High Immigrant-State Conflict
Immigrant-Native 
Conflict
Fig. 2.2. Rafaela M. Dancygier, Immigration and Conflict in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010; print; 
41).
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Because of the problems, it is essential for states, from their point of view, to put into 
practice an immigration policy that can minimize the threat and maximize economic benefits 
from immigration. According to Hollifield, “politics involves ‘control, influence, power, or 
authority’” (“The Politics” 133). Therefore, immigration policy determines the living condi-
tions of immigrants and if there is a possibility to immigrate at all. The main concern in im-
migration policy is the question about whose interest matters more to policymakers. Scholars 
think that “the more liberal and democratic a state is, the greater the likelihood that immigra-
tion control will be an issue, and that there will be some level of ‘unwanted migration’” (Hol-
lifield, “The Politics” 134). Therefore, apart from the national interest, democratic states may 
also have to consider the interest of immigrants, residents or citizens of the same society, and 
employers. 
Due to the consideration of different beneficial groups — that is to say, whether the state, 
natives, or immigrants are the main concern or main beneficiary — immigration policy can-
not be arbitrary, and there is usually a “gap between the goals of national immigration policy 
(laws, regulations, executive actions, etc.) and the actual results of policies in this area (poli-
cy outcomes),” which scholars refer to as the “gap hypothesis” (Cornelius, Martin, and Holli-
field 3; emphasis in original). The analysis and explanation of this gap is significant, because 
the wider the gap is, the “greater public hostility toward immigrants in general (regardless of 
legal status)” it will provoke (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 3). Equally important is to 
understand the costs and benefits of immigration, because from the “cost-benefit distribu-
tions” (Hollifield, “The Politics” 135), policymakers may be able to narrow down the gap 
between the goals and the outcomes. 
Immigration policies never seem to be adequate. For example, the political definition of 
states regulates immigration policies. As Hollifield points out, “liberal states in particular 
must be attentive to the (human or civil) rights of migrants; if migrant rights are ignored or 
trampled upon, then the liberal state risks undermining its own legitimacy and raison 
d’être” (“The Politics” 151; emphasis in original). The rise of rights-based liberalism influ-
ences immigration policy, for rights-based liberalism “expand[s] rights for marginal and eth-
nic groups, including foreigners,” and their rights are secured “in legislative acts” and even 
“in judicial rulings” (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 9). 
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Moreover, policymakers usually set up rules to let temporary guestworkers come to the 
country out of economic interest, but these guestworkers may decide to stay in the country 
for a longer term, bring their families to the new country, and become immigrants. Sending 
temporary workers back home is a challenge for policymakers, because “rights that accrue to 
migrants come from the legal and constitutional protections guaranteed to all ‘members’ of 
society. Thus if an individual migrant is able to establish some claim to residence on the terri-
tory of a liberal state, his or her chances of being able to remain and settle will 
increase” (Hollifield, “The Politics” 150). This phenomenon is also known as the economic 
push-pull factors. Western Europe’s guestworker programs and the United States Bracero 
Program suggest that economic growth in Europe and the United States in the 1950s and 
1960s “stimulate[d] large-scale migrations from the poorer economies of the ‘periphery,’” 
which can be described as “demand-pull” (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 7). At the same 
time, the increase in population in those periphery countries resulted in the “supply-push mi-
gration,” and “migration networks” further helped more people from periphery countries mi-
grate (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 8). The problem of illegal immigration will also oc-
cur with any legal immigration movement, and a nation’s immigration policy has relatively 
little control over illegal immigration, for “[e]ven though all states have the right to expel 
unauthorized migrants, deportation is not a very attractive policy instrument, and it is used 
sparingly and largely for its symbolic and deterrent effect” (Hollifield, “The Politics” 147). 
Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield found in their study that 
“[d]espite significant increases in immigration control efforts . . . and the tightening of entry 
restrictions and monitoring of unauthorized immigrants already working in other 
countries . . . , [scholars] found less confidence today among officials that they could effec-
tively regulate immigration flows and employment of unauthorized foreign workers than 
there was fifteen years ago” (4). 
Although there are differences between the U.S. and European immigration policy con-
cepts, factors that influence the policymaking process are similar, because both the United 
States and European immigrant-receiving countries have labor demands, economic needs, 
different political parties with different political positions, main labor-sending countries, etc., 
as mentioned in policy inputs in table 2.1. Gallya Lahav and Virginie Guiraudon mention 
several policymaking input factors and policy outcomes in European receiving countries (see 
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table 2.1), and most of these factors can apply to the United States as well (the exception is 
“shifting up to European level” in policy choices). Institutional filters (column 2) are features 
that have an impact on the effectiveness of input factors and actors. Policy choices (column 
3) are government choices that intend to balance the pressures from different interest groups. 
Policy implementation constraints (column 4) show the “capacity and willingness” of agents 
to “perform in accordance with stated policy goals” (Lahav and Guiraudon 209). The table 
shows the factors that cause the gap and “suggests that policy outcomes are a product of (a) 
the struggles between actors in different fields (economy, politics, law), (b) the trade-offs 
made by elected leaders that face varying pressures depending on the institutional character-
istics of each field, and (c) implementation structures” (Lahav and Guiraudon 209). 
Generally, immigration policy includes immigration control policy and immigrant policy 
(Meyers 1246). “Immigration control policy concerns the admission and selection of perma-
nent immigrants, temporary migrant workers and refugees, as well as attempts to restrict ille-
gal immigration” (Meyers 1246). Therefore, immigration control policy, to a large extent, is 
formulated in the interest of the migration state. Through its immigration control policy, the 
state decides which types of immigrants or migrants could be beneficial to the state’s eco-
Table 2.1 
From Policy Inputs to Outcomes: Factors and Trends
Source: Gallya Lahav and Virginie Guiraudon; “Actors and Venues in Immigration Control: Closing the Gap 
between Political Demands and Policy Outcomes”; West European Politics 29.2 (2006): 201–23; Web; 13 
February 2014; table 1.
Input factors and 
actors
Institutional 
filters (vary X-
nationally) Policy choices
Policy 
implementation 
constraints Policy outcomes
Labour demands 
[business/labour 
actors] 
Public opinion 
[political parties, 
media] 
Liberal legal norms 
[courts, NGOs, 
immigration 
bureaucracies]
Labour market 
institutions and 
industrial relations 
system 
Electoral and party 
systems, size of 
extreme right, 
government type 
Protest culture, 
Judicial system
Labour recruitment 
away from public 
eye 
Shifting up to 
European level 
Externalisation of 
control to third 
parties
Attractiveness of 
the economy 
Ties between 
migrants and 
destination 
countries 
Capacity of local 
state agents 
Willingness of non-
state agents to 
comply
Rise of illegal 
migration 
Rise of temporary 
labour migration 
and intra-company 
transfers 
Family reunion and 
asylum remain 
main legal 
categories with 
much cross-
national variation
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nomic situation and political beliefs. Immigrant policy, on the other hand, concerns “the con-
ditions provided to resident immigrants” (Meyers 1246). Although policymakers also consid-
er the interest of the state for economy and security reasons, they have to formulate and im-
plement immigrant policy in the interest of immigrants primarily for humanitarian reasons 
and democratic ideology. 
There are many immigration theories deriving from different perspectives. Caroline B. 
Brettell and James F. Hollifield summarize the major theories in table 2.2. Although every 
Source: Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield; “Introduction: Migration Theory: Talking across Disci-
plines”; Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines; 2nd ed; ed. Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hol-
lifield; New York: Routledge, 2008; 1–29; print; table 1.1.
Table 2.2 
Migration Theories across Disciplines
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“discipline” listed in the table has an impact on the receiving state as well as the immigrants 
themselves, one discipline might seem more important than another to different interest 
groups. State officials tend to have more use for macro-perspectives, while the micro-per-
spective seems more attuned to the needs and rights of immigrants. For example, receiving 
states may be more concerned with economics and political science than history, while immi-
grants seem to be more involved in anthropology than demography, for they, for instance, of-
ten face problems of cultural change and identity, but are less worried about the change in 
population or ethnic demography in the country. However, different disciplines may have a 
common outcome. Brettell and Hollifield point out that for most disciplines (anthropology, 
economics, geography, history, and sociology), “one of the dominant paradigms in migration 
theory is the assimilation model” (16). They also point out that more recent studies introduce 
“new models that predict a range of outcomes,” which can be seen from “Portes and Rum-
baut’s . . . complex model of incorporation” (16): 
This model, formulated in relation to the United States, postulates outcomes for different groups ac-
cording to contexts of reception that vary with reference to (1) U.S. government policy that passively 
accepts or actively supports; (2) labor market reception that is neutral, positive, or discriminatory; and 
(3) an ethnic community that is nonexistent, working class, or entrepreneurial/professional. (16) 
Although the complex model of incorporation is based on the situation in the United States, it 
is suitable to explain the differences of immigration policy outcomes between the United 
States and Germany — for instance, different public receptions of immigrants lead to differ-
ent integration levels of immigrants — which I will clarify in the following chapters. More-
over, assimilation according to the assimilation model, though embedding a negative conno-
tation nowadays, still exists in the context of immigration. I will discuss assimilation in chap-
ter four. 
The leading economic theory concerning immigration is the Marxist approach, where la-
bor market and “a class-based political process” (known as “the capitalists/bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat/working class”) influence immigration policies (Meyers 1247–48). Karl 
Marx’s example of the length of a working day points out that “[i]f one working hour be em-
bodied in sixpence, and the value of a day’s labour-power be five shillings, the labourer must 
work 10 hours a day, in order to replace the value paid by capital for his labour-power, or to 
produce an equivalent for the value of his daily necessary means of subsistence” (Capital 
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270). Therefore, if employers lower “the wages of the labourer below the value of his labour-
power,” they profit from the surplus value (Marx, Capital 271). 
The Marxist theory on immigration is based on the win-win deal for both capitalists and 
guestworkers — it solves the problem of labor scarcity for the receiving states, capitalists 
“exert a downward pressure on wages” (Meyers 1247), and the guestworkers are likely to 
earn more than they do in their home countries. Moreover, Marx notes that “[c]apital by its 
nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus, the creation of the physical conditions of 
exchange — of the means of communication and transport — the annihilation of space by 
time — becomes an extraordinary necessity for it” (The Grundrisse), and one result of the 
annihilation of space through time (die Vernichtung des Raums durch die Zeit) is the expan-
sion of market or the development of new markets. Guestworkers are needed by capitalists, 
because “surpluses of capital and shortages of labor are fixed by the movement of capital to 
areas of labor surpluses and weak labor organization, or by importing cheap labor into centers 
of capitalist development” (Hernandez). The theory “argues that labor immigration is a struc-
tural part of capitalism and serves the capitalist ruling class” (Meyers 1248). Consequently, 
labor immigration largely depends on the economic situation — namely, immigration flow 
appears during a boom economy, while “[g]overnments halt or even reverse immigration dur-
ing times of economic recessions” (Meyers 1248). Furthermore, Marxists believe that the 
capitalists are divided into “monopoly capital” and “capital invested in industries with lower 
rates of profit,” and the latter is likely to (secretly) encourage illegal immigration to further 
reduce the wages of undocumented immigrants (Meyers 1248). In fact, wage reduction is the 
key point of immigration according to the Marxist approach, for “immigrant labor enters the 
society at the lowest tier of the socioeconomic ladder” (Meyers 1249). However, this theory 
can only apply to low-skilled guestworkers such as those who work in the fields of agricul-
ture and construction. In chapter four I will discuss guestworker programs based on this theo-
ry, but I will also deal with other means of employment-based immigration that cannot be 
explained by the Marxist approach. 
Another important theory is the national identity approach. Jeannette Money notes in her 
book Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigration Control that “[t]he na-
tional culture, the national economy, and the tensions between the economic benefits and cul-
tural costs of immigration are the primary explanatory variables proposed by immigration 
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analysts to explain the level of openness to immigration” (21). Helga Leitner points out that 
“[d]ominant racial and national ideologies, defining who belongs and who does not belong to 
a national community, . . . influence who is admitted” (262). This ethnic homogeneity or het-
erogeneity is “measured as the proportion of the population that shares racial (phenotypical), 
religious, or linguistic characteristics” (Money 28; emphasis in original). Eytan Meyers ar-
gues that “national identity” explains how states formulate immigration policy (1251). He 
notes that “the unique history of each country, its conceptions of citizenship and nationality, 
as well as debates over national identity and social conflicts within it, shape its immigration 
policies” (1251). 
A basic idea of the national identity approach is the understanding of “we,” those who are 
included in a community, and “they/the Other,” those who are excluded from a community, 
which brings out the term “nativism.” Nativists, who are very defensive of their own culture, 
fear that immigration may erase national identity, and this concern affects policymakers, 
pressuring them to consider what the fundamental factors of national identity are and how far 
migrants are allowed to influence the nation’s culture. Sometimes, nativists use extreme 
methods to protest against “the Other.” Therefore, nativism is very often considered to be 
equal to racism. However, John Higham distinguishes these two terms in his book Strangers 
in the Land and argue that 
[r]acism and nativism were different things, though often closely allied. Racism, the older and more 
categorical of the two, divided the whole of creation into hierarchized types. It was more consistently 
concerned with horizontal distinctions between civilization and barbarism than it was with boundaries 
between nation-states. In contrast, nativism always divided insiders, who belonged to the nation, from 
outsiders who were in it but not of it. Although always a species of nationalism, nativism could incor-
porate racism because both were militantly defensive of a cherished heritage. Racism, however, sought 
not only to exclude alien races but also to enforce indelible differences of status within one’s own soci-
ety, thereby preventing defilement by an allegedly inferior descent group. Nativism signalled danger; 
racism spelled degradation. Nativism could espouse assimilation. Racism could not. (333) 
To some extent, the perception of national identity determines whom nativists protest against, 
although this representation of belonging is very extreme and radical. 
Rogers Brubaker uses the terms “insiders” and “outsiders” to explain the “we” and “they/
the Other,” and links them with citizenship. He notes, 
[o]utsiders may be defined and identified residually, as nonmembers, or directly, as bearers of some 
disqualifying attribute. If insiders are defined positively — as members of a family, clan, association, 
organization, or state — outsiders are defined negatively and residually. They are excluded not because 
of what they are but because of what they are not — because they are not recognized or acknowledged 
as insiders. On the other hand, outsiders may be defined directly, and insiders residually. Shunning, 
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blacklisting, and quarantining are directed against directly defined outsiders. Ethnocultural closure may 
be structured either way: it may be exercised against ethnic or religious outsiders defined residually 
(non-European, nonwhite, non-Christian, non-Anglophone), or directly (Asian, Black, Jew, Spanish-
speaking). The noncitizen is a residually defined outsider. Every modern state defines its citizens posi-
tively, in accordance with explicit, formally articulated criteria, and its noncitizens residually. 
. . . 
Insiders and outsiders may be defined formally or informally. Formal techniques include the elabo-
ration of explicit and unambiguous criteria of insiderhood or outsiderhood (such as criteria for inclu-
sion in Medicaid, or Food Stamp programs or criteria for exclusion on medical grounds from the armed 
forces); exhaustive enumerations of individual insiders or outsiders (guest lists, registers, rosters, 
membership rolls, blacklists); and formally administered identification routines in which a particular 
person is identified as an insider or outsider through the application of general criteria or through 
matching against enumerative lists. On the other hand, insiders and outsiders may be defined and iden-
tified informally through the use of tacit, uncodified, internalized classificatory schemes, the practical 
mastery of which is distributed among participants in an interaction rather than monopolized by spe-
cialized administrators. 
. . . 
Citizenship is an abstract formal construct. In principle it has nothing to do with ethnocultural na-
tionality or with any other immediately interpretable markers and identifiers of everyday life. Yet for-
mal closure against legal noncitizens may overlap in practice with informal closure against ethnocul-
tural nonnationals. Enforcement of closure against the former may be biased against the latter. (Citizen-
ship 29–30) 
The understanding of national identity is the informal closure against “the Other,” regardless 
of legal citizenship, and this informal closure influences the formal closure of “the Other.” 
Brubaker also argues that “contextual features that will strengthen positive or negative ‘folk-
loric’ representations of immigrants and immigration” are not only linked “to the differing 
and deeply rooted historical experiences of immigration,” but also “to more particular and 
rapidly fluctuating historical moments reflecting both the particular stage in the immigration 
cycle and broader political and cultural ‘period effects’” (“Comments” 907). Therefore, the 
definition of “the Other” and public attitudes toward immigration and immigrants are related 
to history and culture, and they may change from time to time and differ from country to 
country. 
Meyers points out three “different conceptions of national identity” — “1) between settler 
societies, which accept large-scale immigration, and ethnic states, which tend to reject such 
immigration; 2) between homogeneous and heterogeneous countries; and 3) between coun-
tries whose citizenship laws tend towards jus sanguinis [Latin for right of blood] and those 
countries whose citizenship laws tend towards jus soli [Latin for right of soil]” (1253–54). 
Settler societies, heterogeneous countries, and jus soli countries tend to be more tolerant of 
immigration than the opposite categories of states. For example, Australia, Canada, New Zea-
land, and the United States belong to “settler societies of primarily British origin,” and 
“[i]mmigration was integral to their founding and development as nations” (Freeman 887). 
As a result, these countries have formed an ethnically heterogeneous society and are familiar 
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with mass immigration. Even today, their immigration policies tend to include the encour-
agement of “mass immigration for permanent settlement” (Freeman 887). In contrast, many 
European states such as Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland 
are regarded as ethnic states, because ethnicity is an important feature in their national identi-
ty, and mass immigration only “occurred when they were already fully developed national 
states” (Freeman 889). In addition, the migration “was narrowly economic and, for certain 
states, a largely unintended aftereffect of colonialism” (Freeman 889). National identity is 
also the main reason why the U.S. and German immigration policies are different. I will elab-
orate on the U.S. and German national identity in the next chapter. 
My thesis is based on the national identity approach, although there are criticisms of this 
theory. One criticism is that it is not able to “explain the fact that various countries have 
adopted similar immigration policies at the same time” (Meyers 1255). This criticism is true, 
as the United States and Germany do have many similar immigration policies, although they 
are of different immigration models. However, in the case of the United States and Germany, 
this similarity is only gradually formed as a consequence of the countries’ economic or politi-
cal needs, and the similar policies may be the result of a bargain or compromise after an eval-
uation of the cost-benefit distributions, which I will discuss in the following chapters. 
Another criticism is that the national identity approach is vague “as regards identifying 
social conflicts and debates over national identity” (Meyers 1256). It means that there is 
sometimes no public consensus on what national identity is. For example, during the Civil 
War, the public could not agree on whether blacks should be insiders or outsiders of Ameri-
can society. This can be explained by Benedict Anderson’s theory of imagined community. 
He argues that community “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will 
never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds 
of each lives the image of their communion” (6; emphasis in original). Also, “[c]ommunities 
are to be distinguished . . . by the style in which they are imagined” (Anderson 6). Based on 
this theory, it is evident that everyone’s understanding of nation cannot be the same, because 
a nation is also a community and thus imagined. I also note this deficiency, as the general un-
derstanding of national identity does not apply to everyone. Yet, there is usually a more popu-
lar and general understanding of national identity, and this understanding may change after 
some historical events. Accordingly, immigration policies may also change, and it is very 
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likely that there is a link between the general understanding of national identity and the poli-
cies. In the case of the Civil War, although Americans could not agree on whether being black 
should be part of their national identity, the voice that it should became stronger. With the 
victory of the Union (a historical event), the law changed (though not immigration law) to 
include blacks. 
Scholars cannot agree on what role the state plays in the policymaking process. Some 
scholars such as Aristide R. Zolberg and James F. Hollifield believe in a domestic politics 
model that eliminates the state from decision-making in immigration policy, as Zolberg ex-
plains the interest of labor migration: 
It is . . . rational, . . . , for the more fortunate countries to seek to preserve their favorable endowment 
by prohibiting or at least severely restricting entry. In practice, the self-interest of the core in obtaining 
labor has functioned to provide a break in what would otherwise be an extremely well protected wall; 
and labor migration has therefore been the major mechanism whereby individuals from deprived coun-
tries have gained access to desirable conditions. (26) 
Hollifield points out the phenomena that “even in those states where public opposition to 
immigration has been high, . . . , immigration has continued to play an important role in soci-
ety and the economy,” and “despite efforts to restrict illegal immigration [in the United 
States], undocumented aliens have continued to enter at historically high levels” (Immigrants 
6). Supporters of the domestic politics model think that “[p]olicymaking is the result of bar-
gaining as well as of compromises between [interest groups and parties], or sometimes it re-
flects the fact that one or more of these actors has succeeded in capturing the state” (Meyers 
1257). In this sense, immigration policy is the product of compromises between “employers 
and ethnic groups, which tend to support immigration, and unions and nationalist groups, 
which tend to oppose it” (Meyers 1258). However, this theory seems too extreme. I would 
not refer to this theory when I compare the U.S. and German immigration policies, because I 
see interest groups and parties as influential factors in the decision-making process, but they 
are not decision-makers. In addition, it is impossible to separate the party in office from the 
state or to distinguish between immigration acts passed by different parties, and the state, as a 
political unity, should be considered as an active actor in the policymaking process. More-
over, citizenship, a very important component in the immigration policy, is negotiated and 
handled on the state level and should meet the need of the state. 
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Another theory is the institutional and bureaucratic politics model, where the state can be 
autonomous and can “remain unaffected by societal or interest group pressures,” or it “pro-
mote[s] certain societal interests” (Meyers 1261), but the focus of the theory is on “state-level 
interactions” (Meyers 1260). The state has its own concerns in making immigration policy 
such as “economic security” and “continued legitimacy” (Meyers 1261). Within the institu-
tional and bureaucratic politics model, there is an important variant of the theory which even 
to some degree contradicts the autonomous state approach. This variant acknowledges the 
state as an actor in policymaking, but it also considers the influence of societal or interest 
group pressures. More precisely, it “differentiates between ‘strong’ states, where state institu-
tions are relatively unaffected by social pressures and shape public policies according to the 
‘national interest,’ and ‘weak’ states, where societal pressures successfully penetrate state in-
stitutions and influence public policies” (Meyers 1262). In this dissertation, I will compare 
the U.S. and German immigration policies based on this variant of institutional and bureau-
cratic politics model, because national security, economy, and continued legitimacy are inter-
ests of the state, and the state will certainly be an active actor in making immigration policies, 
but at the same time, it is injudicious to overlook the influence of other actors in democratic 
states, for table 2.1 demonstrates that they are all part of the decision-making process. 
The realist and neorealist approaches of immigration policy lie on the macro level or in 
the realm of high politics, which focus on “international relations” and “actual or potential 
conflicts among states” (Meyers 1263). Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi point out four pre-
requisites of this theory. “First, states are the principal or most important actors in an anarchi-
cal world lacking central legitimate governance,” and “[s]tates represent the key unit of 
analysis” (42). “Second, the state is viewed as a unitary actor,” and it “faces the outside world 
as an integrated unit” (42). Third, “the state is essentially a rational (or purposive) actor” (43). 
Fourth, “within the hierarchy of issues facing the state, national or international security usu-
ally tops the list” (43). This theory is suitable for analyzing immigration policy especially 
during a national security crisis. For example, two months after Japan’s attack on Pearl Har-
bor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Executive Order 9066, “authorizing the Sec-
retary of War to prescribe military areas” in order to protect “against espionage and against 
sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utili-
ties” (“Executive” 1). “This order led to the assembly [,] . . . evacuation and relocation of 
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nearly 122,000 men, women, and children of Japanese ancestry on the west coast of the Unit-
ed States” (Relocation”). These people could take “only what they can carry” to “relocation 
centers,” which were infamously known as “relocation camps” or “concentration 
camps” (“Relocation”). This discriminating immigration policy against the Japanese set up by 
the United States during the Second World War can be explained as the desire to eliminate a 
“potential security crisis” based on the realist and neorealist approaches. 
Once an immigration policy is passed, it becomes the law, and everyone is expected to 
obey it. Peter H. Schuck states that “[m]ost fundamentally, law defines individuals’ rights to 
property and economic activity, political participation, physical security, religious and cultur-
al identity, and family relationships” (“Law” 241). The law builds up a certain societal at-
mosphere that shapes individuals’ decision whether to migrate or to which country to migrate. 
With the migration flow, the receiving states devote perhaps more time to immigration con-
trol policy than to immigrant policy. However, one should note that immigration control poli-
cy does not only intend to eliminate unwanted immigrants, but it is also a tool to select immi-
grants. As Schuck explains, “some states use the law to ‘compete’ for immigrants — at least 
for those who possess valuable skills, investment resources, and attractive political attributes” 
(“Law” 242). For example, the United States “still favors those fleeing certain countries for 
certain reasons (such as China’s one-child policy or Russia’s treatment of Jews and evangeli-
cal Christians),” even though the Refugee Act of 1980 forbids the bias (Schuck, “Law” 242). 
Schuck further divides the understanding of law into three levels. The first two are 
brought to attention by Roscoe Pound and are named as “law on the books” and “law in ac-
tion” (Schuck, “Law” 242). The “law on the books” is the law that is “formally enacted,” 
while the “law in action” is the law that is “actually implemented” (Schuck, “Law” 242). 
Schuck points out a third level, namely, the “law in their minds,” because “many groups of 
actors in the immigration system see different aspects of the system or see the same aspects 
differently” (“Law” 243). Therefore, contrary to the expectation of the accuracy of the law, 
immigration laws are sometimes “ambiguous and open-ended on many crucial points, leaving 
considerable room for interpretation and specialized judgment by the officials who administer 
the law in the first instance, and, in the event of appeal, by appellate administrative tribunals 
and federal judges” (Schuck, “Law” 244), because the states use immigration policy as a fil-
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ter for desired immigrants, but at the same time, they should also consider other factors such 
as humanitarianism and liberal ideology. 
The public’s attitudes toward an immigration policy are another important aspect in im-
migration, because they may cause immigrant-native conflicts. These attitudes toward an 
immigration policy, together with all their related actions, are the consequences of that immi-
gration policy. According to Thomas J. Espenshade and Katherine Hempstead, there are sev-
eral theories on what might influence public attitudes toward immigration. The first theory is 
the “labor market competition” theory (541). This theory is generated from the complaint that 
immigrants “take jobs away from native workers, contribute to higher unemployment, and 
reduce the wages and working conditions in selected occupations,” and this competition will 
mostly affect “low-skill and low-wage native workers” (Espenshade and Hempstead 541). 
Also according to this theory, people with different levels of income and education are likely 
to have different views on the acceptance of immigration. 
The second theory is the “cultural affinity” theory (Espenshade and Hempstead 542). This 
theory points out that individuals “who have close cultural and ethnic ties to their home coun-
tries and who have relatives whom they would like to bring to [the receiving country]” are 
more likely to support a more tolerant immigration policy (Espenshade and Hempstead 542). 
This theory may be suitable for the United States, but it does not apply to Germany much, 
because the traditional understanding of native Germans has a strong ethnic sense. Therefore, 
I want to extend this theory to the requirements of assimilation of immigrants — we may also 
understand the cultural affinity theory in the way that people are more likely to accept immi-
gration when immigrants have more cultural similarities to the natives or have a high level of 
integration. This can also be explained by Samuel P. Huntington’s “clash of civilization” — 
he believes that “[t]he great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of con-
flict will be cultural” (“The Clash” 22), and “[t]he most important conflicts of the future will 
occur along the cultural fault lines separating [eight] civilizations from one another” due to 
different views of these civilizations, which “include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, 
Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American [,] and . . . African civilization” (“The Clash” 25). 
Therefore, if immigrants fail to integrate, natives will be aware of the difference between the 
two civilizations, and if they can hardly accept the immigrants’ civilization, conflicts may 
occur. 
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The third one is the “generalized cost-benefit considerations” theory (Espenshade and 
Hempstead 542). This theory is generated from the labor market competition theory, ac-
knowledging that labor market competition, or the resulting unemployment, is a cost of im-
migration. However, at the same time, there is “a much broader set of material concerns” re-
lated to “cost-benefit calculations” (Espenshade and Hempstead 542), and it is more possible 
for those who benefit from immigration (for example, employers of low-wage migrant work-
ers) to support a tolerant immigration policy. 
The “health of the economy” theory points out that the acceptance of immigration is re-
lated to the country’s economy (Espenshade and Hempstead 543). It means that if the econo-
my is good enough to provide abundant jobs, people are likely to accept immigration. From 
this point of view, those who “have the most optimistic assessments of the current and future 
state of . . . economy will also be the most receptive to current or even higher levels of immi-
gration” (Espenshade and Hempstead 543), and public attitudes toward immigration may 
change from time to time in accordance with the state of economy. 
The “social and political alienation” theory is related to the insecure feelings of individu-
als. These individuals are categorized as “the anxious class” who are on the margin of a soci-
ety economically (Espenshade and Hemstead 543). Again based on the labor market competi-
tion theory, immigrants compete for jobs with native workers. Therefore, those who feel inse-
cure about their “jobs and incomes” are likely to oppose immigration (Espenshade and 
Hempstead 543). It is important to note, however, that the feeling of insecurity is abstract. A 
person who feels insecure about his/her job will not necessarily lose his/her job, and thus 
immigration does not really affect his/her social status. Yet, this person needs to find a scape-
goat for these feelings of insecurity and problems, and the blame on immigration seems to be 
the solution. 
Finally, the “isolationism” theory suggests that individuals who see a country from a 
more global perspective are more likely to support a high level of immigration (Espenshade 
and Hempstead 543). In this perspective, a country is only a component of a whole, and thus 
it is responsible for the development of other countries. On the contrary, it is more possible 
for those who see a country as an isolated unit to oppose immigration. 
Espenshade and Hempstead’s “empirical analysis has found support” for each of these 
theories (Espenshade and Hempstead 555). Therefore, influencing factors in each theory 
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function together, and public attitudes toward immigration are the result of every single influ-
encing factor. Also, the behavior of immigrants may be an influencing factor that those theo-
ries above fail to include. For example, if some immigrants break the law and upset the pub-
lic, voices of anti-immigration will rise even if those unlawful acts are only exceptional cas-
es. In this dissertation, I will use some polls to show public attitudes toward immigration in 
the United States and Germany, and the change in attitudes after some specific events demon-
strate the consequences of such events. 
Besides public attitudes toward immigration, migrant literature also shows the conse-
quences of immigration. Through migrant literature, people usually sense problems, hard-
ships, and even discrimination that immigrants face, and Madelaine Hron defines these ob-
stacles as “immigrant suffering.” Hron theorizes that “pain, and even socioeconomic hard-
ships or racial discrimination, are structured as ‘languages,’ and as such, may be translated 
into the symbolic language of words” (xvi). Based on William Boelhower’s definition of the 
immigrant novel, Hron summarizes the generic immigrant narrative as follows: 
“An immigrant protagonist(s), representing an ethnic world-view, comes to America [or a new country] 
with great expectation, and through a series of trials is led to reconsider them in terms of his final sta-
tus.” The immigrant novel bears several key components: a hero, a journey, and a series of trials. Each 
of these informs our general understanding of the immigrant experience, in particular, the hardships of 
immigration. (15) 
It is important to note that the protagonists in immigrant narratives should not be read as “in-
dividuals,” but as “representatives of a foreign ethnic collective,” as “the Other” (Hron 15). 
“A series of trials” usually refer to the encounter with “cultural differences” and the separa-
tion of “former values” (Hron 16). Therefore, all trials in immigrant narratives can be read as 
a clash between two different cultures, and the “final status” is often assimilation, estrange-
ment from one’s ancestry, realized when an immigrant returns to his/her country of origin, or 
the protagonist’s loss of identity. In some cases, the protagonist may also rediscover a con-
cealed identity. 
Hron also points out that “[a]s a result of being a necessary part of the immigrant story, 
the hardships, difficulties, and sufferings of immigration risk being essentialized, banalized, 
or relativized” (17). This, on the one hand, emphasizes the obstacles that every immigrant 
may face and criticizes the existing hostility in the receiving country, but on the other hand, it 
cannot silence the arguments that “[i]t was their choice to come here” and “[i]f they don’t like 
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it here they can just go back were [sic] they came from” (Hron 18). “Immigrant suffering” in 
immigrant narratives, although missing some levels of reality, is a reflection of immigrants’ 
real life, and it includes “social suffering” such as “poverty,” “discrimination,” and “structur-
al violence,” as immigrants “have little voice in the social sphere,” “immigration changes” 
such as “cultural disparity” and language barriers, and “traumatic memories” (Hron 28). 
The immigrant narratives I select as examples in the following chapters all reflect some 
difficulties immigrants encounter, and these difficulties represent some consequences of im-
migration policies. Also, protagonists in these examples are not all poorly educated or at the 
bottom of a society, as the stereotypes of a low-skilled immigrant would suggest. On the con-
trary, many of them are smart and well-educated. Therefore, the difficulties described in these 
immigrant narratives are obstacles a middle-class immigrant may face, and they are not firm-
ly related to the immigrants’ level of education. 
One thing to note in regard to migrant literature is that it is not written by immigrants 
alone (Fatemeh and Abdolali 687). On the contrary, “a writer can be accounted as a migrant 
artist in his own homeland, because what distinguishes the migrant writers from the non-mi-
grant is not the geographical borders and places, but the hybrid nature of their works” (Fate-
meh and Abdolali 687). Therefore, “even nonimmigrant writers who portray characters cross-
ing the geographical boundaries and cultures, and who demonstrate the formation of a hybrid 
selfhood from the heart of cultural conflicts, could be producers of immigrant fiction” (Fate-
meh and Abdolali 687). The literary works I select for this research belong to migrant litera-
ture in this sense, and I do not distinguish migrant literature by immigrants from that by non-
immigrants.  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3. The “Born” Identity: The Formation of National Identity 
“Are we a ‘we,’ one people or several? If we are a ‘we,’ 
what distinguishes us from the ‘thems’ who are not us? 
Race, religion, ethnicity, values, culture, wealth, politics, 
or what?” 
— Samuel P. Huntington in Who Are We? 
The title is derived from the 2002 action film The Bourne Identity (directed by Doug Li-
man). The film tells the story of a wounded man who is saved by fishermen. The man has no 
memory of who he is and what has happened, and he begins to try to recollect his memory 
and identity based on clues around him. With a little wordplay, I use this title to imply the 
formation of a country’s national identity and a person’s gaining of this identity. 
According to the national identity approach I introduced in the previous chapter, the per-
ception of national identity strongly influences immigration policy. Considering the differ-
ences between the formations of the U.S. and the German national identities, it is easy to un-
derstand why the U.S. and German immigration policies, especially their citizenship and nat-
uralization laws, belong to two different models. To a great extent, the national identity ap-
proach explains the reasons for the differences in the U.S. and German immigration policies. 
National identity may be determined by different factors such as ascriptive, cultural, terri-
torial, political, economic, and social factors (Huntington, Who 27). The ascriptive factor 
means a person’s physical description including age, gender, race, and ethnicity. The cultural 
factor represents a person’s lifestyle and is related to language and religion. The territorial 
factor defines a person’s identity geographically. This geographical area can be as large as a 
continent or as small as a neighborhood. The political factor differentiates people based on 
their political beliefs, ideologies, factions, etc. The economic factor is associated with a per-
son’s occupation, employment, salary, and even class. The social factor is connected to a per-
son’s social circle — friends, colleagues, and status (Huntington, Who 27). 
3.1. National Identity in the United States 
Books on U.S. history usually start with Christopher Columbus’s discovery of the Ameri-
can continent in 1492, even though evidence shows that the land had been touched by other 
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settlers such as the Vikings long before Columbus’s time. Moreover, this starting point of 
U.S. history also undermines the fact that Native Americans, possibly settlers from Asia, had 
been living on the continent from the beginning. Therefore, the Americas, or the New World, 
is the European sense of the American continent, and the settlement history of the New World 
is more or less told from a European perspective. However, notwithstanding the acknowl-
edgement of such flaws, I will still use mainstream history to explain U.S. national identity in 
this chapter, because 1) rewriting history from a broader perspective itself could probably re-
sult in a completely different research which has nothing to do with immigration policies; 2) 
the mainstream is more effective in influencing the decisions of policymakers; and 3) most of 
the policymakers belong to mainstream society, so the policies are based on mainstream 
thinking. 
Columbus’s men did not stay in the New World. The first successful European settlement 
was established in Jamestown in 1607 by the British. Between 1607 and 1776, settlers, main-
ly from England, were beginning to form their American identity. During this period, the An-
glo-Protestant culture dominated America, despite the fact that settlers from other parts of 
Europe made an effort to maintain theirs. For example, German settlers in Pennsylvania, also 
known as the Pennsylvania Dutch, failed to make German an equal language to English 
(Huntington, Who 60), which symbolizes the expansion of the Anglo culture. However, al-
though their culture had been highly influenced by the English culture, settlers in America 
started to distinguish themselves from the British. American newspapers “contained far more 
words such as ‘American’, ‘continental’ and ‘united colonies’ — than symbols implying 
membership of the Empire” (Bonwick 47–48). The formation of this American identity, 
which is to a large extent known as the American Creed, reached its climax when Thomas 
Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence. 
The American Creed, as Gunnar Myrdal notes, “is the cement in the structure of this great 
and disparate nation” (3). It embodies “a social ethos [and] a political creed” that “Americans 
of all national origins, classes, regions, creeds, and colors” share (Myrdal 3). In other words, 
the American Creed represents Americans’ “commitment to the political principles of liberty, 
equality, democracy, individualism, human rights, the rule of law, and private 
property” (Huntington, Who 46). As it states in the Declaration of Independence, “[w]e hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
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Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness.” The “we” in this sentence refers to Americans, which not only separates Ameri-
cans from the British, but also serves as the first written principle that only those who believe 
in the same values can be Americans. The accusations against the British Empire in the later 
part of the Declaration of Independence further emphasize how the King of Great Britain vio-
lates American values, and, therefore, “the good People of [the] Colonies” should absolve 
“from all Allegiance to the British Crown” and fight for their own rights. The American 
Creed, sublimed in the Declaration of Independence, functioned “as a political convenience 
and a device of strategy during the long struggle with the English Crown, the London Parlia-
ment and the various British powerholders in the colonies” (Myrdal 7). It also “served as the 
rallying center for the growing national unity that was needed . . . [, and] was a necessary de-
vice for building up a national morale in order to enlist and sustain the people in the Revolu-
tionary War” (Myrdal 7). Although criticism argues that the notion of the American Creed as 
the American identity is only from the European point of view, it is undeniable that the domi-
nance of European culture in America, especially before the United States was founded, made 
the American Creed mainstream and placed it at the center of American identity. 
When Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776, this date be-
came the landmark to separate America as a colonized continent from the sovereign United 
States of America. Therefore, the United States has a clearcut starting point as a sovereign 
state. Adopting Independence Day as the starting point of the United States implies that the 
founding of the United States was rather political than cultural, because even though the An-
glo culture dominated America, it was the colonists’ common political will, or the American 
Creed, that united the colonies and reached for independence. Also for this reason, American 
identity is more political than cultural. 
Besides the American Creed, another characteristic of American identity is that it has “no 
attachment to place” (Huntington, Who 50). Americans, again considering the mainstream, 
have a non-American ancestry. As Samuel P. Huntington notes, in contrast to natives of other 
nations who are united by culture or territory, “Americans have been settlers, immigrants, and 
their descendants, all of whose forefathers ultimately came from elsewhere, and hence, how-
ever patriotic they may be, they have not called America their fatherland or 
motherland” (Who 51). Even within the United States, Americans constantly move from one 
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place to another, more frequently than any other nation in the world (Huntington, Who 50). 
The Westward Movement was the epitome of this lack of territorial attachment. Frederick 
Jackson Turner also gives credit to the Westward Movement, as he believes that it shaped 
American characteristics, adding “coarseness and strength,” “acuteness and inquisitiveness,” 
practicality, inventiveness, “dominant individualism,” and “freedom” to the American identi-
ty (37). Similarly, the lack of attachment to place also makes American identity less cultural 
or territorial, reinforcing the political sense of one’s national identity. 
People today would like to categorize the United States as a nation of immigrants. How-
ever, cultural and racial diversities were not part of the intentions of the founding of the Unit-
ed States, because for one thing, “America was a highly homogeneous society in terms of 
race [white], national origin [80 percent British], and religion [Protestant]” in the second half 
of the eighteenth century (Huntington, Who 44), and for another, Native Americans and 
African slaves were not considered to be Americans or to be part of American society. More-
over, in a technical sense, although the settlers were from another continent, they were not 
considered immigrants, because these two terms have a fundamentally different meaning. 
Huntington distinguishes settlement from immigration, saying, “[s]ettlers leave an existing 
society, usually in a group, in order to create a new community, a city upon a hill, in a new 
and often distant territory” (Who 39–40), while immigrants “move from one society to a dif-
ferent society . . . [,] because they [want] to become part of the society the settlers [have] cre-
ated” (Who 40). In this sense, colonial America was not yet an immigration society, even if 
people take Native Americans out of the picture. 
Although the word “immigrant” already came into the English language in the 1780s to 
distinguish later arrivals from the founding settlers (Huntington, Who 40), it was not until the 
1820s that immigration became part of American identity. In 1820, the number of immigrants 
to the United States began to increase, and, therefore, the United States started to form its sta-
tus of what people call “a nation of immigrants” in the 1820s. Figure 3.1 shows the immi-
grant population from 1820 to 2001. At first, at least until 1880, most immigrants came from 
Northern and Western Europe, and assimilation was not considered to be a problem. As Hunt-
ington notes, those immigrants “were partially assimilated and their children and grandchil-
dren almost totally assimilated into American society and culture” (Who 181). Because of this 
high assimilation rate and level and their identical race to Anglo-Americans (white), the 
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American Creed was not challenged. In this sense, although the number of immigrants in-
creased between 1820 and 1880, American identity remained unchanged, and the Anglo cul-
ture kept dominating the United States. 
In contrast to immigrants before 1880, immigrants to the United States between 1880 and 
1914, right before the First World War started, were mainly from Southern and Eastern Eu-
rope. These immigrants shared the same race with Anglo Americans, but their cultures and 
religions (Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish) were somewhat different. However, despite the cultur-
al and religious differences, they were deemed to be assimilable, and therefore, the United 
States, though reluctantly, accepted these immigrants. At the same time, immigrants from 
Asia also came to the United States as laborers. These people were considered to be so differ-
ent from Anglo-Americans that assimilation was not possible. Consequently, they could by 
no means naturalize to become American citizens. 
Fig. 3.1. Philip Martin and Elizabeth Midgley, “Immigration: Shaping and Reshaping America” (Population 
Bulletin 58.2 [2003]; Web; 12; PDF file).
Fig. 3.1. Immigration to the United States, 1820 to 2001
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The flow of immigration from countries whose cultures were very different from the An-
glo culture threatened the dominance of Anglo culture in the United States. Therefore, Con-
gress passed various laws to maximize Anglo dominance. For example, the two Quota Acts 
of 1921 and 1924 were meant to expand the population advantage of people with Western 
European ancestry. More extremely, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act demonstrates America’s 
intolerance to accept a completely different culture. Yet, since people born in the United 
States have the birthright to gain American citizenship, Asian was still part of the American 
racial composition. From this point of view, racial and cultural diversity started to grow in the 
United States after 1880, but only those who accepted or were considered to be capable of 
accepting American values could become Americans. This phenomenon still exists today, 
which I will discuss in detail in chapter 4.2.1. 
Possibly because of America’s intention to convert every immigrant to the Anglo culture, 
the United States was and still is very well aware of immigrants’ “difference,” either cultural, 
religious, or racial. Despite the government’s effort to make every immigrant adopt Anglo-
American values and culture, difference could not be fully eliminated. The new immigrants, 
those from Southern and Eastern Europe, “are . . . responsible for the fact that even recent 
community surveys, undertaken decades after the end of the mass immigration, give a picture 
of American class stratification which closely corresponds to the differentiation in national 
groups” (Myrdal 52). In other words, since the new immigration, the United States have been 
collecting statistics and analyzing American society based on national and cultural differ-
ences and race. Also, the new immigration considerably led to the formation of the United 
States as a heterogeneous country in every sense, and it is inevitable that the United States 
gradually tolerated racial diversity in the country, and, though to a limited degree, the coexis-
tence of different cultures. Consequently, cultural and racial diversities truly became part of 
American identity following the new immigration. These diversities make American identity 
even more political, because since then, Americans do not share the same culture anymore, 
and the only thing they may have in common is their political beliefs — liberty and equality 
of opportunity — which are noted as the American Creed. 
In the nineteenth century, American nationhood, although formed, was still not deemed to 
be ideally strong. Robert Wiebe still sees the United States as “a society without a core” (qtd. 
in Higham, Send 183), and Henry James considers it as 
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[n]o State, in the European sense of the word, and indeed barely a specific national name. No sov-
ereign, no court, no personal loyalty, no aristocracy, no church, no clergy, no army, no diplomatic ser-
vice, no country gentlemen, no palaces, no castles, nor manors, nor old country houses, nor parsonages, 
nor thatched cottages, nor ivied ruins; no cathedrals, nor abbeys, nor little Norman churches; no great 
universities nor public schools — no Oxford, nor Eton, nor Harrow; no literature, no novels, no muse-
ums, no pictures, no political society. . . . (qtd. in Higham, Send 183) 
Yet, however loose American nationhood was, the American people were held together by a 
common ideology, as John Higham points out, 
this almost disembodied state lived as an idea — resonant, compelling, and universally espoused. . . . 
Although nationalism everywhere in the nineteenth century acquired an ideological thrust, it seems 
unlikely that any other country defined itself so preeminently as a community of belief, a nation gath-
ered around a creed. . . . A national ideology enabled Americans to do without — and even told them 
why they did not need — the unitary state, the imposing monuments, and the dense social fabric that 
James observed in Europe. (Send 184) 
Because of this mass immigration, nativist voices rapidly increased in the nineteenth cen-
tury in the United States with the fear that other cultures would take over the Anglo-Saxon 
culture. In response to this mass immigration, the country set up legislative barriers to limit or 
even stop “unwanted” immigration. Nativists believed that the Anglo-Saxon race was superi-
or to any other races, and they even cited Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859) 
to justify and demonstrate that the United States would always be Anglo-Saxon (Schrag 48). 
The rapid growth of nativism indicated that the formation of a heterogeneous nation and the 
establishment of multiculturalism were not in the principles of the American nation, contra-
dicting the connotation nowadays that the United States is associated with multiculturalism. 
The abolition of slavery also plays a large role in the racial diversity of the United States. 
Although Africans came to America as early as in the seventeenth century, either as free men, 
indentured servants, or slaves, they did not have the chance to pose a danger to the Anglo cul-
ture, for slavery eliminated human rights of many black slaves and negatively affected free 
blacks.  Also due to slavery, the American Creed did not apply to African Americans, because 
many of them did not come to America by free will but by force. After the Civil War, the 
Thirteenth Amendment (1865) was ratified to officially outlaw slavery throughout the United 
States, and the Fifteenth Amendment (1870) finally gave male African Americans the right to 
vote. The abolition of slavery made black slaves citizens of the United States and consider-
ably changed the ratio of black to white Americans. Also because of the newly gained politi-
cal rights of African Americans, the Anglo culture, or the white culture in a broader sense, 
could be challenged. Therefore, the white population’s discrimination against blacks and the 
 39
racial segregation carried out after the abolition of slavery demonstrate white Americans’ fear 
that the acceptance of a completely different race into American society might overturn white 
supremacy, and thus white Americans tried to suppress black Americans to maintain their su-
premacy. From this viewpoint, African Americans only gained their national status politically 
after 1865, which makes their national identity political, because they had nothing in com-
mon with white Americans other than the same nationality. 
Like African Americans, Native Americans have no attachment to the American Creed 
either. They are the only racial group that is rooted in America, and thus one criticism on the 
United States being a “nation of immigrants” is that the claim overlooks Native Americans. 
However, ever since their defeat by Europeans and Europeans’ deadly diseases, Native Amer-
icans have been a minority in American society, and for a long time, the United States had not 
acknowledged them as citizens. In 1817, “300 Cherokees (Heads of families) . . . made an 
election to become American citizens,” which became “one of the first efforts to test the fed-
eral government’s ‘civilization program,’ started in 1789 under President Washing-
ton” (McLoughlin 3). But it was not until the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 that all Native 
Americans born within the United States and its jurisdictions were granted citizenship. Very 
often, the government only granted citizenship to Native Americans who were “civilized” 
from the European perspective, and citizenship was a tool to “separate the acculturated from 
the unacculturated” (McLoughlin 4). For example, the Dawes Act of 1887 (or the General 
Allotment Act) encouraged Native Americans to separate from their tribes and live individu-
ally. In exchange of their acceptance of allotments and separation from the tribes, Native 
Americans were allowed to gain citizenship. The Burke Act (or the Forced Fee Patenting Act) 
in 1906 amended the Dawes Act, allowing government to break up communal land of the 
tribes and distribute the lands to individual tribe members. Also, it established a probationary 
period to examine whether Native American individuals were competent to become U.S. citi-
zens. In this way, the law restricted citizenship only to those Native Americans who were 
seen fit to assimilate into Anglo-Saxon culture. Therefore, historically, the American identity 
of Native Americans was only possible when they gave in to Anglo-Saxon culture, and this 
new national identity was recognized politically, which reinforces the political factor of 
American identity. 
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The act that finally ended barriers to immigration based on ethnicity or national origin is 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965. It is very possible that the enactment of 
this act was driven by the condemnation of racism caused by the Second World War, and 
racial inequity became a very sensitive topic and was deemed to be politically incorrect. The 
INA of 1965 offers “visa preferences with a commitment to family reunification,” leading to 
“an unanticipated explosion of immigration, most of it from Asia and Latin America” (Citrin 
and Sears 11). Therefore, it was only after 1965 that the United States reached racial hetero-
geneity. Figure 3.2 shows the ethnic change in the United States from 1980 to 2010. The con-
tinuous decline in the white population and the radical increase in the Latino population 
demonstrate the formation of a heterogenous nation in the sense of ethnicity. 
A 2000 census map (fig. 3.3) shows Americans’ largest ancestry by county. It demon-
strates that the United States has achieved ethnic diversity, although European countries still 
have a dominating proportion. It is also to note that the category “American,” marked in 
bright yellow, indicates that for these people, national origin is concealed by American identi-
ty, and the notion of ancestry is either unimportant or forgotten. 
However, a nation of immigrants and racial heterogeneity does not necessarily mean mul-
ticulturalism. Multi-culture in the United States is more a consequence of immigration rather 
than a political intention. In the national motto e pluribus unum (Latin for “out of many, 
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Fig. 3.2. Jack Citrin and David O. Sears, American Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism (New York: 
Cambridge UP, 2014; print; 14).
Fig. 3.2. Ethnic Change in the United States from 1980 to 2010
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Fig. 3.3. Largest Ancestry 2000, by County
Fig. 3.3. Angela Brittingham and G. Patricia de la Cruz, Ancestry: 2000: Census 2000 Brief (census.gov; U.S. 
Census Bureau, Jun. 2004; Web; 8; 9 Dec. 2015; PDF file).
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one”), unum — one — is what the United States intends to emphasize. According to Jack Cit-
rin and David O. Sears, the “conceptions of nationhood are crafted by elites rather than 
springing forth spontaneously from mass publics” (27). Therefore, the United States makes 
efforts to forge a single common national identity in the ethnically heterogenous country. 
Through history, a common national identity was 
forged in the crucible of the War of Independence and then remade in the wake of crises such as the 
Civil War and World War II. Reinforced by socialization at home and in school, and buttressed by the 
repeated performance of civic rituals like the Pledge of Allegiance, honoring the flag, and singing the 
national anthem. (Citrin and Sears 27) 
Fighting against a mutual enemy in various wars helps create a “we-feeling” of people with 
different national origins, and responding to a mutual crisis such as a natural disaster can also 
reinforce people’s national identity (Citrin and Sears 27). Even international sporting contests 
can help unite immigrants’ national loyalty (Citrin and Sears 40). Consequently, Americans, 
although having different countries of origin, formed a unified national identity through a 
top-down reinforcement. At the 2004 Democratic National Convention in Boston, Barack 
Obama, not yet President, delivered a speech that further highlighted the importance of e 
pluribus unum. He addressed the audience: “there is not a black America, and a white Ameri-
ca, and a Latino America, and an Asian America; there is the United States of 
America” (“Transcript”). The positive reaction of the audience also symbolizes people’s con-
sent and support of the e pluribus unum principle, indicating a strong American national iden-
tity. 
In Edwidge Danticat’s story “Caroline’s Wedding,” there is a scene where a Haitian 
woman, Gracina Azile, becomes a naturalized citizen. This scene demonstrates how a person 
finds her belonging and identity through official papers. The story begins: 
It was a cool September day when I walked out of a Brooklyn courtroom holding my naturaliza-
tion certificate. As I stood on the courthouse steps, I wanted to run back to my mother’s house waving 
the paper like the head of an enemy rightfully conquered in battle. 
. . . 
[Gracina calls her mother.] 
“I am a citizen, Ma,” I said. 
. . . 
“The paper they gave me, it looks nice,” I said. “It’s wide like a diploma and has a gold seal with 
an official-looking signature at the bottom. Maybe I will frame it.” 
“The passport, weren’t you going to bring it to the post office to get a passport right away?” she 
asked in Creole. 
“But I want you to see it, Ma.” 
“Go ahead and get the passport. I can see it when you get it back,” she said. “A passport is truly 
what’s American. May it serve you well.” 
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At the post office on Flatbush Avenue, I had to temporarily trade in my naturalization certificate 
for a passport application. Without the certificate, I suddenly felt like unclaimed property. (Danticat 
157–58) 
The feeling of belonging with her naturalization certificate suggests that American identity is 
political, and the insecure feeling without the certificate further demonstrates that Gracina 
can feel American as long as she holds these papers. Here, the naturalization certificate and 
the American passport are symbols of American identity that have nothing to do with culture. 
When her passport arrives, Gracina finally feels secure living in America. Therefore, for 
Gracina, her American national identity is proven authentic through official papers politically, 
not culturally. 
To conclude, America’s national identity is mainly political, and it still largely embodies 
the American Creed principles established by the Anglo-Saxon colonists. In other words, 
American identity is based on Anglo-Saxon identity, but it is different from British identity 
because of the political values created in the New World. Due to America’s immigration his-
tory and its racial and ethnic change, American identity is not limited to a certain racial and 
ethnic group or a single cultural background. However, strong common political and cultural 
values are essential to the American national identity, for the Anglo-Saxon, or better put, the 
Anglo-American, values are reinforced through a top-down system throughout history. Ac-
cording to Citrin and Sears, “the formation of modern nation-states included the triumph of a 
core ethnic group over peripheral minorities. The English incorporated the Scots, and the 
Spanish absorbed the Catalan” (26). In the case of the United States, despite racial and ethnic 
diversity, the Anglo-American culture marginalizes other cultures, and immigrants cannot be 
accepted to American society unless they show their ability to assimilate. Therefore, e 
pluribus unum, which is part of the seal of the United States, symbolizes a heterogenous na-
tion in the sense of race, ethnicity, and cultural background, and a homogenous nation in the 
sense of cultural and political values. As it states in the Ellis Island Immigration Museum, 
[o]ver the centuries, the make-up of the United States’ population has changed dramatically in terms of 
race, ethnicity, religion, and geographical distribution as people arrived here from every continent on 
Earth. This ever-evolving diversity challenges the idea of a single, dominant vision of the American 
identity, encouraging Americans to embrace inclusion and pluralism. 
From the outset, the nation has struggled with a tremendous need for labor and a simultaneous 
reluctance to include anyone different or “alien” into American society. Yet it took many hands to till 
the land and feed the populace. Many strong backs to build America’s cities, its infrastructure, and its 
industries. And many strands to weave what has become America’s culture. At every stage of American 
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history, diverse groups have been involved in the on-going process of redefining the country and who 
is and who can be an American.  1
3.2. National Identity in Germany 
Unlike the United States, which has a clearcut starting point as a sovereign nation, Ger-
many contains a much more complex history, and thus it is very difficult to define from 
which point the feeling of being German started to appear. There was the Holy Roman Em-
pire of the German Nation; there were the Greater Germany and the Lesser Germany derived 
from the German Question debate; there was the German Empire of the Bismarck era; there 
was the Greater German Reich of Naziism; there were the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the German Democratic Republic after the Second World War; and finally there is the unified 
Federal Republic of Germany (Weidenfeld 24). The German national identity in one era 
could be different from that in another, and there could also be common elements in this iden-
tity throughout all eras. 
Because of Germany’s complex history, German political identity is very confusing. In 
contrast to the United States, Germany did not only change geographically, but also political-
ly. Therefore, Rudolf von Thadden notes that German identity does not apply to a certain ter-
ritory, and it neither retrospectively reflects traditional values, nor does it project any future 
life forms (60). Consequently, there is a dilemma in the notion of German identity, for Ger-
man identity does not require fixed contents to stay stable, but it does need contents to exist 
(Thadden 60). 
Then what can be the contents of German identity? Peter Watson, a historian, sees that the 
essence of German identity lies in high culture, or Kultur, if using the German word. He 
quotes Wolf Lepenies to distinguish the German word Kultur from the English word culture, 
explaining that “the German concept of Kultur refers essentially to intellectual, artistic and 
religious facts, and has a tendency to draw a sharp dividing line between facts of this sort, on 
the one side, and political, economic and social facts, on the other” (qtd. in Watson 31). 
Therefore, German identity emerged from German literature, art, music, philosophy, and reli-
gion, rather than from the political idea of Germany as a nation state. 
 Quoted from the exhibition board “Who Is an American” in the Ellis Island Immigration Museum. Date of 1
visit: September 22, 2014.
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There are two main reasons for Watson to make that claim. The first one is vernacular 
language. Watson argues that Germanness started with Pietism, which later led to the recogni-
tion of the German language. Pietism, “deeply influenced by English Puritanism,” “first ap-
peared around 1670” (Watson 46). August Hermann Francke made a daring change in biblical 
thinking, believing that “Creation ‘could be improved upon’” “through practical acts of chari-
ty” (Watson 47). This new thinking added power to human beings, and therefore, resulted in 
the popularity of education in the hope that activism could be better conducted. “[I]n 1729 
Friedrich Wilhelm decreed that all Lutheran pastors in his realm must have studied at the 
University of Halle for at least two years” (Watson 48), reinforcing the importance of intel-
lectual development. Also as a result of the emphasis on education, there were many more 
universities in Germany than that in England in the eighteenth century, and with time and due 
to the efforts of Adolf von Münchhausen of the University of Göttingen, universities changed 
their focus from theology to “the ‘philosophical’ subjects — such as history, languages, and 
mathematics” (Watson 51), resulting in the liberation from the theological faculty’s censor-
ship. 
The use of the German language could be one of the most significant signs of the estab-
lishment of German awareness. By the late eighteenth century, pietism and the development 
of universities had changed the fact that “most educated Germans regarded French literary 
and artistic culture as superior to their own, and that British political freedoms and parliamen-
tary practices were likewise to be envied” (Watson 55). The reading revolution, as part of the 
result of the removal of censorship (Watson 55), increased the proportion of German publica-
tions, while the number of Latin publications rapidly decreased. In the mid-eighteenth centu-
ry, Christoph Gottsched “formed a German society devoted to linguistic integrity” and pro-
moted the use of High German as well as the development of German novels and drama 
(Watson 57). Benedict Anderson notes that Latin publications unified people of different spo-
ken languages, for they “became capable of comprehending one another via print and 
paper” (44). If so, the decline in Latin publications divided this unification into communities 
based on people’s vernacular languages. In this way, the widespread use of the German lan-
guage in publications accelerated people’s realization of a common consciousness, namely, 
Germanness. Furthermore, Johann Gottfried Herder connected language with nation. Watson 
summarizes this idea, stating 
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for Herder, language reflects the history and psychology of a distinctive social heritage, and this was by 
far his most influential argument — language identifies a Volk or nationality, and this, the historico-
psychological entity of the common language, is for him “the most natural and organic basis for politi-
cal organisation . . . . Without its own language a Volk is an absurdity (Unding). For neither blood and 
soil, nor conquest and political fiat can engender that unique consciousness which alone sustains the 
existence and continuity of a social entity.” Language, as well as unifying a community, also identifies 
that community’s consciousness of difference from those speaking other tongues. (124–25; emphasis in 
original) 
In this sense, the establishment of a nation is more than just political. The thinking that a 
common language is a primary factor to identify a nation directs German identity to a cultural 
level. 
Turkish-German author Zafer Şenocak, unrelated to Watson’s work, speaks from experi-
ence that the feeling for the German language is the key to Germanness. He notes that it is 
more than enough for educators if immigrants speak accent-free and correct German, but it is 
not enough for those who want to feel at home in Germany, because only when they feel the 
language can they be at home (Deutschsein 18). Therefore, language is an essential part of 
one’s identity. 
The second reason is the understanding of knowledge in life. Although Natural Law was 
widely accepted during the Aufklärung (the German Enlightenment, but different from the 
French, English, and Scottish Enlightenments in time) as a reason for the development and 
perfection of societies, Aufklärer still deemed “the forces of the spirit” to be another impor-
tant factor (Watson 73), and all creation, either artistic or scientific, was a representation of 
perfection. Therefore, knowledge was put on a very high level, and since “spiritual change” 
was random and has no realm, Aufklärer believed that “[a]rt as well as history had an infinite 
realm of future possibility” (qtd. in Watson 76). In other words, knowledge, largely repre-
sented in art, music, literature, etc., steadily drives societal development and perfection with-
out limitations. Isaak Iselin even associated knowledge with freedom, a term that usually ap-
pears in politics in America. He “contributed to the German (as opposed, say, to the British or 
American) idea of freedom. For him, freedom was to be acquired through knowledge; it was 
an internal freedom that concerned him, in contrast to an outward — political — 
freedom” (Watson 76; emphasis in original). In this way, even a seemingly political idea is 
understood from a philosophical perspective. 
Knowledge continued to be valued even after the Aufklärung ended. After Prussia was 
defeated in the Battle of Jena in 1806, the German philhellenism was changed extensively — 
“its anti-aristocratic aspects were transformed into probational sentiments, and a new form of 
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pedagogy, built on the notion of Bildung, made its peace with the state and the status 
quo” (qtd. in Watson 108). Wilhelm von Humboldt made some formality changes to the edu-
cational system and added more disciplines to it. For example, “[h]e introduced a requirement 
that all prospective university students pass a new examination, the Abitur, . . . [and] made 
the Abitur the sole prerogative of a particular type of classical school — known as the Gym-
nasium. Only these could prepare pupils for university” (Watson 109). Humboldt also de-
signed the University of Berlin, where the “philosophical faculty (containing philology, phi-
losophy proper, and the natural sciences)” was given more value than “the more ‘practical’ 
faculties of medicine, law, and theology” (Watson 109). The reason for this type of educa-
tional system lies in Humboldt’s understanding of Bildung. Similar to Iselin, Humboldt con-
nected Bildung with a term that usually has a political sense in America, namely, citizenship. 
For him, Bildung is a process that transforms individuals “from a natural state of ignorance 
and immaturity to ‘self-willed citizenship’: a shared understanding of civic harmony and loy-
alty to the state, a belief that spiritual emancipation through education in the humanities was 
the true path to (inner) freedom and ‘willing citizenship’” (Watson 109). Again, Humboldt 
offered a philosophical explanation of the seemingly political term, which reinforced the cul-
tural conception of German identity. 
Like Watson, Rogers Brubaker also sees the importance of the concept of the German 
Volk (people) or culture and the weak political sense in the German national identity. He ar-
gues that 
the German understanding [of nationhood] has been Volk-centered and differentialist. Since national 
feeling developed before the nation-state, the German idea of the nation was not originally political, 
nor was it linked to the abstract idea of citizenship. This prepolitical German nation, this nation in 
search of a state, was conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic cultur-
al, linguistic, or racial community — as an irreducibly particular Volksgemeinschaft. On this under-
standing, nationhood is an ethnocultural, not a political fact. (Citizenship 1) 
Consequently, although the term “national identity” contains the connotation of nationality or 
citizenship, the concept of German national identity might have lost these connotations and 
become associated with ethnoculturalism. 
Germanness would better be understood as the German Volk, not as the political sense of 
nation, also because the political identity of the German people has changed frequently 
throughout history. However, it is necessary to add a political frame before I compare immi-
gration policies between the United States and Germany, because policies depend strongly on 
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a nation’s political culture, and the study would only be valid if the changes in immigration 
policies are made under the same regime, for these changes reflect the changes in the nation 
state’s attitude toward immigration and immigrants. Therefore, to compare the U.S. and Ger-
man immigration policies, I will only consider Germany after the German reunification on 
October 3, 1990, since this date sets Germany in a frame of a valid and single nation state. 
The contents of German identity after the reunification not only include the German Kul-
tur, but also a more recent history, namely, the Nazi past. There had been a German victim-
hood ideology derived from “the legend of the ‘clean Wehrmacht’” in post-war German poli-
tics (Weber), but this opinion was strongly challenged in the 1990s. In 1995, the Hamburg 
Institute for Social Research organized an exhibition named “War of Annihilation — Crimes 
of the Wehrmacht between 1941 and 1944” (Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 
1941–1944), which not only raised the German public’s attention to their Nazi past, but also 
resulted in a heated discussion about the Wehrmacht. Accompanied by the book under the 
same name edited by Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann, the exhibition sent a message that 
“the activities of the German Wehrmacht in the east were not as ‘clean’ as widely perceived 
in post-war Germany,” and it questioned “the culpability of ordinary German soldiers” (Witt- 
linger 27). Similarly, Daniel Goldhagen published his book Hitler’s Willing Executioners: 
Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust in 1996, challenging “the still very deep-seated and 
dearly held belief in Germany that Germans were the first victims of Hitler and that the 
crimes were not committed by the German people themselves but ‘in their name’” (Wittlinger 
27), and the book, again, led to a discussion about the Wehrmacht. These two events and the 
following discourses brought “more widespread awareness of the involvement and responsi-
bility of ordinary Germans between 1933 and 1945” (Wittlinger 27), and thus reinforced the 
responsibility of ordinary Germans for the cruelty of the war. 
Holocaust memory also strengthens the recognition of the Nazi past. According to Ruth 
Wittlinger, “[t]he 1990s also saw an increasing institutionalisation of Holocaust memory part-
ly caused by the gradual disappearance of the eyewitnesses or what has been described as the 
transition from ‘communicative memory’ to ‘cultural memory’” (30). Furthermore, Holocaust 
memory had been globalized in the 1990s. National Holocaust Memorial Day was introduced 
in Germany in 1996 (Wittlinger 30), and Holocaust education was promoted by Sweden, 
Great Britain, and the United States in 1998 (Wittlinger 31). Although the globalization of 
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Holocaust memory more or less demonstrates that the Nazi past is a lesson “not just for Ger-
many but for the world” (Wittlinger 140), Germany is still responsible for this history. To 
some degrees, Holocaust memory has become an ideology rather than just a memory, and 
promoting this memory symbolizes Germans’ acceptance of the Nazi past. Angela Merkel 
sees Germany’s Nazi past as an irrevocable “part of German memory and identity and . . . it 
is only through a full acceptance of this past that the future can be shaped” (Wittlinger 40). 
Therefore, Germans have come out of the shadows of the Nazi past and the Holocaust memo-
ry without eliminating them from their national identity. 
If a shared Kultur and past can be seen as a bond of German identity, then the German 
division posed a challenge to it. “[D]uring the 1950s and 1960s [,] West German public de-
bate was preoccupied with the Alleinvertretungsanspruch — with the question of which (if 
either) of the two separate states could legitimately claim to be the German nation 
state” (Halfmann 260; emphasis in original). Also, the identities of “Auslandsdeutsche (Ger-
mans abroad),” “Vertriebene (the expellees from the former German territories),” “Aussiedler 
(the settlers of German origin in the former Soviet Union),” and “Übersiedler (those Ger-
mans who crossed the border between the two German states)” became blurred and compli-
cated (Halfmann 260). In the 1970s, the words “German” and “Germany” almost disappeared 
“from official terminology” (Wittlinger 49). Instead, abbreviations for West Germany and 
East Germany, FRG and GDR, were frequently used. The de-Germanization was especially 
obvious in the GDR, for the description of the GDR in the constitution was changed from “a 
socialist state of the German nation” in 1968 to “a socialist state of workers and peasants” in 
1974 (Wittlinger 49). In this way, German identity was blurred after the division. 
The revival of the German national identity emerged after the Wall fell. Helmut Kohl be-
lieved that the German nation was still united despite the division, saying “[t]here is no capi-
talist nation, there is no socialist nation, there is only one German nation, committed to peace 
and freedom” (qtd. in Wittlinger 59). Furthermore, protesters chanted “we are ONE people” 
and “Germany — united Fatherland” during the demonstrations in Leipzig on November 27, 
1989 (Wittlinger 59). Although voices of unification reached their climax after the Wall fell, 
the fall of the Wall was not the cause for the climax but a result. The willingness to unify and 
the hope for democracy were the main reasons for the unification, as Kohl saw the mass es-
cape and emigration from the GDR as people’s choice for freedom, a “vote with their 
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feet” (Wittlinger 58). Also, Germans had long suffered from the Nazi dictatorship, and thus 
the choice for democracy seems to be a natural progress. The reunification again eliminated 
the complexity of German identity, as the two German states became one again, and 
Aussiedler gradually migrated back to Germany. 
To conclude, German national identity is more culture-bound than politically concerned, 
because Germany as a nation-state did not only change geographically throughout history, but 
also politically. The German Kultur is the primary cause of the formation of Germanness, and 
all components of the Kultur — e.g., religion, music, and literature — reinforce the public’s 
awareness of German identity. German identity, when considered under a single sovereignty, 
becomes German national identity. However, since German sovereignty frequently altered in 
history, the feeling of “national” has never been stable. Therefore, German identity is based 
on Kultur, and since Kultur is connected to the foundation of German awareness, one could 
say that Kultur also results in the notion of German blood. 
To overcome the unstable national awareness in German national identity and make my 
comparison of immigration policies possible, I will focus on German immigration policies 
after the German unification to strengthen the political sense of German national identity. Af-
ter the German unification, there are at least two factors to influence German identity besides 
Kultur, namely, the Nazi past and the German division. The Nazi past becomes a content of 
German identity, and it also leads to Germans’ sensitivity to the word “race.” Therefore, 
while “race” is a neutral word in English, “Rasse” (the German word for race) often has a 
negative connotation in German. This negative connotation is likely to have strongly affected 
the formulation of immigration policy, avoiding “race,” which is in stark contrast to the U.S. 
immigration policy. The German division has weakened German national identity, as the 
word “German” gradually disappeared from official terminology, but the longing for democ-
racy again strengthens national identity. 
3.3. Comparison and Reflection 
The main difference between the U.S. and German national identities is that the U.S. na-
tional identity is more political than cultural, while the German national identity is the other 
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way around. This notion of national identity influences immigration policies, especially citi-
zenship and naturalization laws, resulting in two different models of policy. Although the 
United States is not a heterogenous country from the beginning, and Anglo-American culture 
is still predominant in the country, the strong political sense of national identity allows people 
to feel American when they accept American values. The United States citizenship law fol-
lows the jus soli principle, probably because it is confident that people born in the United 
States will accept American values through education and thus possess American national 
identity. As a result, the United States has become a heterogenous country in race and ethnici-
ty. In contrast, the strong sense of German culture in the German national identity largely 
hinders immigrants from feeling German. The concept of Volk behind the cultural sense of 
German national identity strengthens the blood-based Germanness, for “[t]he Volk [is] con-
sidered as a genetic, biological entity, so it was only logical that membership of it could only 
be transferred via the blood, and not simply via birth in the country” (Green, “Beyond” 108). 
The jus sanguinis principle of the German citizenship law might reflect the concern that only 
people who share the same culture, or in this context German blood, can possess German na-
tional identity. Consequently, Germany is a rather homogenous country in culture, race, and 
ethnicity. Although Germany’s jus sanguinis principle is gradually changing, its model of 
immigration policy is based on this principle. 
More specifically, language requirements play a large role in both countries’ national 
identities. In the United States, the ability to speak English is a symbol for a person’s integra-
tion. However, English as the de facto official language in the United States is only a result of 
the predominance of Anglo-American culture, for many people have their own original lan-
guages. To some extent, English is forced on every American as an attachment of the Ameri-
can identity, not a substance. On the contrary, German national identity is partly derived from 
the German language. Therefore, language is a more basic factor in national identity in Ger-
many than in the United States. 
The differences in the nature of national identities (political or cultural) in the two nation 
states are very likely to be an important cause for their differences in immigration policies. 
The political nature of national identity makes it easier for the United States to accept immi-
grants and become a nation of immigrants as well as a country of immigration, while the cul-
tural nature of national identity keeps Germany homogeneous, which is by no means a nation 
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of immigrants and refused to be a country of immigration until at least the twenty-first centu-
ry after a series of changes in the German naturalization law. Şenocak notes that after thirty 
years of the Turkish Gastarbeiterprogramm (guestworker program) Germany is still not tired 
of emphasizing that Germany is not a country of immigration (Atlas 65). Moreover, despite 
the acknowledgement of the importance of multiculturalism in Germany, chief thinker of for-
eign policies at the time Eckart Schiffer wrote in 1991 that other lifestyles can be freely prac-
ticed in an individual manner, but this does not mean that they can be taken as equals to the 
collective culture of the Volk. 
Furthermore, the different natures of national identities also may result in the differences 
in assimilation degrees in the two countries and immigrants’ feeling of belonging, because it 
is easier to integrate into or be accepted to a society politically than culturally. Basically, the 
assimilation degrees of the first-generation immigrants in the two countries are similar. How-
ever, second-generation immigrants in the United States show a higher degree of assimilation 
and tend to identify themselves as Americans rather than descendants of their land of origin, 
while second- or even third-generation immigrants in Germany tend to embrace their double 
identity of being German and descendants of their land of origin. I will explain and compare 
the differences in detail in chapter 4.3. 
The importance of the national identity approach is that it emphasizes the cultural and 
social perspective of immigration policies, for the understanding of national identity, which 
shapes the policymaking process, is beyond the legal and political perspectives. Although the 
U.S. national identity is more political than cultural, the understanding of national identity 
and the impact of such identity on policymaking are not political. Therefore, the comparison 
of immigration policies is beyond the comparison of legal provisions and political actions, 
but it also includes cultural response to the immigration situation such as literary works on 
immigration and immigrants. This type of literature aims to “illustrate various narratives of 
the social, cultural, economic and political aspects of the migrant’s lives in their alien condi-
tions of the host societies” (Fatemeh and Abdolali 681), and “[t]he protagonist of the migrant 
work endlessly recreates itself through its encounters with cultural complexities and discrim-
inating experience of being a minority” (Fatemeh and Abdolali 686). Therefore, literature on 
immigration mirrors how immigration and immigrants are perceived, which is the reason why 
I use some novels in the following chapters to support my arguments on the consequences of 
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certain immigration policies. Although in some cases difficulties and discrimination immi-
grants encounter may be criticized to be clichés and stereotypes, the reason for them to be-
come clichés is that they occur very often in reality.  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4. “I’m a Legal Alien”: Legal Immigration 
“I don’t drink coffee I take tea my dear / I like my toast done on one side / And you can 
hear it in my accent when I talk / I’m an Englishman in New York. / See me walking down 
Fifth Avenue / A walking cane here at my side / I take it everywhere I walk / I’m an English-
man in New York. / I’m an alien I’m a legal alien / I’m an Englishman in New York / I’m an 
alien I’m a legal alien / I’m an Englishman in New York.” These are the first three verses in 
Sting’s song “Englishman in New York,” and they illustrate the cultural differences a foreign-
er experiences. The term “alien” in the song has no negative connotations, and it is a common 
legal term, for it is used in laws such as the Immigration and Nationality Act. Also, the Unit-
ed States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) uses the term “permanent resident 
alien” to refer to “a lawful permanent resident” (“Permanent Resident,” my italics). However, 
the term “alien,” together with “illegal” as a noun and “illegal immigrant,” became offensive 
in the past few years,  and the Supreme Court started to omit these terms “except when quot2 -
ing other sources,” which is considered “groundbreaking” (Garcia). Instead, the terms “for-
eign resident,” “foreigner,” and “undocumented immigrant” are used to describe such popula-
tions, because they are thought to be more politically correct. Therefore, I will not use the 
terms “alien” or “illegal immigrants” unless in quotes to avoid unintended discrimination. 
People emigrate from their home country to live in a new one for different reasons. Some 
only intend to stay in the new country temporarily, but may decide to live there permanently 
later; some, on the other hand, settle down in the new country and will live there permanent-
ly. I will focus on three types of immigration. The first one is temporary immigration. In this 
part, I will only elaborate on guestworker and guestworker programs, although there are other 
means of temporary immigration such as education, because guestworker programs result in 
immigrant flows, and many of these guestworkers end up living in the receiving country 
permanently. Foreign students fully become part of the immigrant society when they start 
looking for jobs in the receiving country after graduation, because, as students, their partici-
pation in work-related fields is very limited, so natives do not often see them as competitors 
on the job market. Therefore, I will discuss immigration through education in the second part 
— which is about the second type of immigration, permanent residency — as one of the 
 I will elaborate on these terms more in chapter five.2
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pathways to permanent residency. I will also examine immigration policies through history in 
this part. The third type of immigration is naturalization, which in some way symbolizes the 
end of immigration, because immigrants change their status to citizens. 
4.1. Guestworkers and Guestworker Programs 
“Because of you –” 
“Because of all of you –” 
“ – you dirty foreigners. . . .” 
“You do overtime, overtime, there you have it. 
And we celebrate Christmas this time without cash, 
next week the short-term work will be over.” 
— Aras Ören (qtd. in Chin 72) 
Guestworker programs are usually created for low-skilled workers to fill in the country’s 
workforce shortage in agriculture, construction, and industry. According to Marxist theory 
(see chapter two), guestworker programs are based on the win-win deal between capitalists 
(in this case, employers) and laborers (guestworkers), which can lead to a win-win-win situa-
tion — “migrant workers win by earning higher wages abroad, migrant-receiving countries 
win with additional workers who expand employment and economic output, and migrant-
sending countries win via greater remittances and the return of workers who gained skills 
abroad” (Ruhs and Martin 249). However, apart from the advantages guestworker programs 
can provide, they may also have unexpected side effects. As Vernon M. Briggs points out, 
[t]he heart of the problem is that guest worker programs seek to reconcile two sharply conflicting 
goals: the need to protect citizen workers from the competition of foreign workers who are willing to 
work for wages and in conditions that few citizens would tolerate versus the wishes of some employers 
who rely on labor intensive production and service techniques to secure a plentiful supply of low cost 
workers. (qtd. in Smith 70) 
The quote at the beginning of this chapter is taken from Aras Ören’s poem “Was will Niyazi 
auf der Naunynstraße” (“What Is Niyazi Doing on Naunyn Street”), and it depicts the conflict 
between native and foreign workers or temporary guestworkers,  and perfectly mirrors what 3
Briggs means by “the heart of the problem.” Therefore, guestworker programs are also likely 
to be one of the main causes of immigrant-native conflict. 
 I will analyze this poem later in this chapter.3
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4.1.1. Guestworkers and Guestworker Programs in the United States 
Guestworkers have contributed to the development of the U.S. economy throughout histo-
ry, although these guestworker activities were either defined as immigration or not federally 
organized enough to be called guestworker programs. For example, legislations throughout 
the nineteenth century were designed to encourage immigration from Europe in order to “in-
crease the size of the work force” (Calavita 4). Although the employment of European labor-
ers was similar to today’s guestworker programs, legislature did not emphasize these work-
ers’ return. Also, employers hired a large amount of Chinese laborers in the nineteenth centu-
ry for their cheap labor on the transcontinental railroad or in the mining industry. Although 
Chinese laborers were doing the most dangerous jobs, they were discriminated by the white 
public. In 1882, Congress finally passed the Chinese Exclusion Act which prohibited immi-
gration from China. The Immigration Act of 1917 further banned workers from Asian coun-
tries, and at the same time, Mexican guestworkers started to replace Asian workers, for “the 
1917 guest worker program carefully classified Mexican nationals as ‘white’ and paved the 
way for an average of 162,000 workers from Mexico to enter annually” (Chien 18). 
A main guestworker program in U.S. history is the Bracero Program. The Bracero Pro-
gram was introduced during the Second World War (in 1942) in the United States as “a 
wartime emergency program” to import Mexican workers “to fill the declared labor shortage 
in agriculture” (Calavita 1). The term “bracero” is derived from the Spanish word 
“brazo” (arm) and is “translated loosely in this context as ‘farmhand’” (Calavita 1), which 
suggests that these Mexican workers were a great help to the U.S. agricultural economy. “The 
bracero work force was concentrated in cotton, sugar beets, fruits, and vegetables, and in 
some areas comprised the bulk of the unskilled labor for these crops” (Calavita 22). However, 
the term also implies a negative connotation, for, as Kitty Calavita points out, Mexican work-
ers were referred to as helping arms rather than human beings (1). 
The implementation of the Bracero Program avoided “congressional legislation or public 
debate” (Calavita 2), and it was a product of the Immigration Service, Departments of State, 
Labor, and Agriculture, the War Manpower Commission, together with Mexico’s agreement 
(Calavita 2). Congress did not oppose the idea, and the public was unaware of the launch of 
the program. In 1947, Congress saw no necessity to continue the Bracero Program as the war 
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was long gone (Calavita 2), and Public Law 40 stated that the Bracero Program “may be con-
tinued up to and including December 31, 1947, and thereafter shall be liquidated within thirty 
days” (qtd. in Calavita 26; emphasis in original). However, employers benefited from bracero 
workers’ cheap labor and their flexibility — “[t]o be ready to go to work when needed; to be 
gone when not needed” (Calavita 22). Many agricultural employers petitioned “to extend the 
stay of their braceros and to allow for additional admissions” (Calavita 26). At the same time, 
employers complained that it was “expensive and time-consuming” to recruit workers from 
Mexico. As a solution, the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) devised an 
arrangement to legalize undocumented Mexican farm workers found in the United States 
(Calavita 2), and the Bracero Program remained despite of PL 40. Because of this, “the gov-
ernment-to-government contracts . . . were replaced by direct grower-bracero work agree-
ments” (Calavita 29) against the will of the Mexican government. “By 1950, the number of 
Mexicans ‘legalized’ and ‘paroled’ to growers as braceros was five times higher than the 
number actually recruited from Mexico” (Calavita 2). In 1951, the Truman administration 
pointed out some brutal facts about the Bracero Program such as abuses by employers and 
exploitation (Calavita 2). Yet, “the Korean War escalated and growers’ allies in Congress 
warned of new labor shortages” (Calavita 3). PL 78 was passed in 1951, and it secured the 
Bracero Program, “[authorizing] the importation of contract labor for agriculture, officially 
voiding the prohibition against foreign contract labor that had been on the books since 
1885” (Calavita 46). However, probably as a solution to the problems caused by the direct 
grower-bracero work agreements and also “in response to Mexican pressures” (Calavita 46), 
PL 78 “reestablished the role of the state as farm labor contractor par excellence” (Calavita 
49), making “the U.S. government itself . . . the official contractor of Mexican labor, and 
hence technically the guarantor of the terms of the contracts” (Calavita 46). The Bracero Pro-
gram continued until 1964. 
Although the bracero contract contained the terms and conditions of the bracero work and 
guaranteed bracero workers their rights, many bracero workers did not understand the con-
tract, since the “vast majority of braceros . . . came from the least developed, poorest, and 
most remote areas of Mexico” (Calavita 21) and were poorly educated. All they could under-
stand was that “they were going to work in the United States” (Calavita 21). After the gov-
ernment-to-government bracero contracts were replaced by direct grower-bracero work 
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agreements, “the already lax enforcement of contract provisions” became even looser, be-
cause “the U.S. government was not held directly accountable” (Calavita 30). Many bracero 
workers were mistreated with “insufficient and substandard food and housing, inadequate 
wages, deplorable working conditions, and insufficient work during the contract period. 
Growers sometimes kept braceros unemployed for several hours a day or for weeks at a time 
due to weather conditions, a late harvest, or over-contracting” (Calavita 45). Moreover, 
bracero workers were not free agents in the labor market but contract workers. Therefore, 
they were bound to their employers and had no rights to “leave whenever [they desire] and 
seek more lucrative employment elsewhere” (Calavita 60). This means that bracero workers 
could face exploitation and terrible working or living conditions without being able to fight 
against them if they wanted to keep working in the United States. The situation became even 
more severe during the Cold War, because McCarthyist paranoia linked representatives who 
brought bracero workers’ complaints to employers to communist sympathizers (Calavita 86), 
and it happened that spokesmen selected by bracero workers were deported as “‘troublemak-
ers,’ ‘Reds,’ and ‘agitators’” (qtd. in Calavita 86). The fear of deportation kept the majority of 
bracero workers from fighting for their rights and forced them to accept any situation they 
were in. Therefore, the Bracero Program can be seen as a system of legalized slavery (Bauer 
and Stewart). 
Besides the mistreatment of bracero workers, another problem caused by the Bracero 
Program was the rise of illegal immigration, especially from Mexico. One reason is that Mex-
ican workers in Mexico were informed by returning bracero workers of “employment oppor-
tunities in the United States” (Calavita 34). However, due to limited numbers of “official 
slots” for bracero workers, many Mexican workers “bypass[ed] the contract system . . . [and] 
took matters into their own hands, crossing the border illegally” (Calavita 34). A more impor-
tant reason for the connection between the Bracero Program and illegal immigration is the 
encouragement of undocumented work by “INS enforcement policies” (Calavita 34). “The 
Border Patrol was notoriously reluctant to apprehend and deport illegal farm workers during 
the harvest season or at other times of peak labor demand” (Calavita 34), and the INS halted 
the search for undocumented workers “while harvest work was being done” and “until such 
times as there [was] not a shortage of farm workers” (Calavita 34). In this way, “undocu-
mented workers provided growers with an inviting alternative to the Bracero 
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Program” (Calavita 40), and these workers’ illegal status further enhanced the power of em-
ployers and minimized the rights or workers. The INS’s decision to ignore illegal immigra-
tion shows an economic-bound immigration policy, for the growers’ profit would lead to eco-
nomic growth of the country. Furthermore, even if the INS wanted to deport undocumented 
workers, deportation was hindered by growers as they protested against the INS action. Their 
main argument was that “the saving of food crops” was “more important” than “punctilious 
execution of immigration regulations” (Calavita 36). When “the Border Patrol increased their 
monthly apprehensions [of undocumented workers] by 30%” in 1950, growers compared the 
Border Patrol to Gestapos (Calavita 37). However, this outrage of growers was caused by the 
concern for their own profit, not by the concern for their employees’ rights. The reluctance to 
apprehend undocumented workers and the pressure on the INS whenever the INS became 
harsh on undocumented workers during peak seasons further encouraged more workers to 
cross the border illegally. 
After PL 78 was passed, the United States started to see illegal immigration caused by the 
Bracero Program as a problem. In 1954, Commissioner Joseph Swing initiated Operation 
Wetback to eliminate undocumented workers. The term “wetback” was invented to refer to 
Mexican undocumented workers who swam across the Rio Grande River to enter the United 
States illegally, but today it could be considered an ethnic slur (“Dwight”). Swing “conducted 
a massive roundup in California and Arizona agricultural areas,” and then “[t]he drive . . . 
spread to Northern California, and then the rest of the Southwest” (Calavita 58). Moreover, 
the Border Patrol also conducted “‘mop-up operations’ of illegal workers in industrial jobs in 
the interior of the United States” (Calavita 58). The removal of undocumented workers was 
supported by many employers, because Swing promised that he would replace undocumented 
workers with braceros (Calavita 59). As a result, Operation Wetback reinforced the Bracero 
Program. The elimination of undocumented workers, at the same time, eliminated the advan-
tage of employers who used illegal labor supply instead of bracero supply (Calavita 64), and 
thus Operation Wetback was welcomed by “[e]mployers using legally contracted 
Mexicans” (Calavita 64). A grower even claimed that “bracero labor was cheaper than illegal 
labor because the contract worker was confined to one employer. ‘The biggest trouble with 
the wetbacks . . . was that [employers] could not demand a day’s work for a day’s pay be-
cause if [they] did, the wetback would leave and go to work for someone else’” (Calavita 64–
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65). Ironically, this grower stated the fact that sometimes bracero workers were treated even 
worse than undocumented workers. Swing declared that Operation Wetback was a success, 
but “[t]here were widespread reports of abuses by the Border Patrol and charges that legal 
residents and in some cases American citizens had been deported, harassed and/or 
beaten” (Calavita 58). In this sense, anyone who looked Mexican might become a victim of 
Operation Wetback. Therefore, this operation carried the infamy of being abusive, discrimi-
native, and racist. 
Abuses did not only happen to bracero workers in the United States, but also often in 
Mexico during the bracero selection process. Eugene Nelson’s novel Bracero shows the 
hopelessness of bracero workers when they try to come to work in the United States. Nelson 
was the son of an orange and grape grower. Although he was not a bracero himself, he had 
worked alongside bracero workers and “wetbacks.” Therefore, he had many inside stories of 
braceros and thus his novel about bracero workers can be regarded as being authentic. 
The protagonist, Nacho, lives in a town called Esperanza (meaning hope) in Mexico. He 
works in a cane field for only forty-eight cents a day (Nelson 17), and half of his wages goes 
to pay back the money he borrows in the winter when there is no work. As a result, he and his 
family have to suffer from hunger every day. When he finally has the courage to ask the pa-
trón to pay him more, he gets fired. When Nacho feels desperate, he meets Paco, who just 
returns to Mexico from the United States, and Paco gives him new hope: 
“Go to the United States as a bracero like I did. Why rot here when you can make good money up 
north? Look at me:” — he made an elaborate downward gesture indicating his expensive clothes — 
“three years ago I went to the United States in rags, now I’m sitting pretty. With what I saved I can buy 
fifty or sixty hectares of land, build me a little house, and watch the money roll in. Don’t be a fool — 
get your papers fixed and go as a bracero!” (Nelson 33) 
Paco also tells Nacho that it costs nothing to go as a bracero. What Paco describes is the ideal 
situation that every bracero hopes for. In the whole novel, this ideal bracero work can only be 
heard in Esperanza, a town named hope, and with this hope, Nacho begins to picture his 
dreams — “good food, clothes, a sewing machine for China [Nacho’s wife], toys for Josefina 
[Nacho’s daughter], perhaps even a little land” (Nelson 40). When Nacho signs for bracero at 
the presidente’s office, he puts a dollar sign “$” on the paper as his mark, for he does not 
know how to write, and the dollar sign is what he often sees “on the papers [his family light] 
the fire with” (Nelson 79). The dollar sign represents on the one hand his illiteracy, which 
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foreshadows his unfortunate experience later on, because he does not know his legal rights as 
a bracero, and on the other hand his hope to get rich, which is ironically the opposite of reali-
ty. 
However, when Nacho is finally on his way to the bracero installation station in Em-
palme, he begins to come across different stories of bracero experiences. He hears someone 
singing “I went to the United States in huaraches . . . And I came back barefoot” (Nelson 
101), and he is told by a trucker that some contracts are bad, because the work is rough and 
the people (Americans, Mexicans, and “Negroes”) hate each other, but if braceros are lucky, 
they can get good contracts and save a lot of money. Nacho realizes that whether a man can 
get rich through bracero contracts is “purely a matter of luck,” and the work sounds “promis-
ing” and at the same time “risky” (Nelson 113). 
In Empalme (meaning crossroads), Nacho meets a man who claims that he can get Nacho 
out to the United States as a bracero the next day for two hundred pesos. When Nacho tells 
him that he already has the right papers, the man explains: 
“You don’t think that because it says the ninth of June on there that is really the day you’re getting out 
of here, do you? Why, sometimes they keep you waiting two months here if those are the only papers 
you have. You have to pay a little . . . sweetener, if you want to get out right away.” (Nelson 133) 
Although the man might be a fraud, what he says about the situation is true. Bracero appli-
cants who do not pay extra money have to wait for several weeks before they can actually go 
to the United States. In a conversation among bracero applicants, one says that he had to 
“borrow twelve hundred pesos at home to go up to the States six months ago. In six months 
[he had] only been able to save fifty dollars” (Nelson 144). Another says that “[t]he first time 
he came through [Empalme he] had to pay a hundred and fifty pesos. Next time it was two 
hundred and fifty” (Nelson 147). Nacho experiences this situation on the ninth of June, the 
date he thinks he is supposed to go to the United States, but it turns out that he is not on the 
list to go up north. After days of waiting, the official who is in charge of the workers from 
Esperanza tells them: 
“. . . the patrón said the quota for today was not large enough to include us,” . . . . “However,” he 
went on unsteadily, his gruff voice sinking even lower as if in ill-disguised shame, “the patrón said that 
a few more men are needed on a special list of men to go out today if some of you want to volunteer 
for that. The patrón said there would be a charge of three hundred pesos per man for special processing 
fees. . . .” 
. . . 
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“The patrón  said that those who did not go on the special list might have to wait three, four, five 
days, maybe a week, maybe longer — it all depends on the number of men needed in the fields of the 
north,” the old man said unconvincingly, folding up the battered lista and shoving it in his shirt pocket 
with a look of sadness tinged with disgust on his weathered face. (Nelson 199) 
The “special list” is a tool for the authorities to profit from bracero applicants, and for the 
majority of bracero workers who cannot pay the fee, the waiting time is very long, and they 
do not earn any money during this time. 
Since many bracero applicants are very poor, the waiting time is difficult to survive. 
Many of them have to compete for thrown-away lunch bags, and those who fail to get 
thrown-away food are left starving. Because of this, some bracero applicants even die from 
hunger. Once, a dead man is found under a tree, and autopsy shows that there is “nothing but 
paper in his stomach,” because he “had been eating paper to try to stay alive” (Nelson 218–
19). Another time, some soldiers on patrol find a dead man, and autopsy shows that there is 
“nothing but two banana skins in [his] stomach” (Nelson 243). Therefore, Empalme, as its 
name suggests, is really a crossroad, because some may become rich by getting a good con-
tract, and some have to suffer from hunger and even die while waiting, and when they finally 
get a contract, it may be a bad contract which will never pay off, and they suffer more. For 
the poor bracero applicants, the process of going to the United States to work is “the Way of 
the Cross,” as a bracero applicant explains: 
“You know, like in the Bible — the Way of the Cross was the journey of Christ from the place he was 
sentenced to the hill of Calvary where they nailed the poor misled bastard up on the cross. And we’re 
being nailed up just like Him — by the lousy enganchadores and the farmer bastards in the United 
States.” (Nelson 155) 
The suffering makes bracero applicants gradually lose hope, and some of them start to 
recall bad experiences as a bracero in the United States such as exploitation: 
“And do you know why they will not let you cook your own food? Because the labor contractor 
cabrones who run the camps make a fat profit off the food, that is why. They are supposed to charge us 
just what it costs for the food, and it is not supposed to be over $1.75 a day, but I have yet to be in a 
camp where they did not charge the full $1.75, no matter what kind of crap they serve you.” 
. . . 
“When I was up in Arizona last winter the cotton was so bad you were lucky to clear a dollar a day 
after they took out for your board. I had planned to return to my family in Nayarit for the spring plant- 
ing, but I did not even come out with enough money for the trip home.” (Nelson 187–88) 
From the conversation, it is clear that every authority tries to profit from bracero workers, and 
bracero workers are exploited, because they do not have guarantee of work or wages. Another 
man tells about the poor housing condition: 
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“What I did not like the damned country was the filthy pigsties we had to live in,” . . . . “When it rained 
more water would come inside than it was raining outside. And there was not even any drinking water. 
All there was was this coke machine so that you had to pay a dime every time you wanted a 
drink. . . .” (Nelson 188) 
However, although many are complaining, they are still eager to be on the list to go north, 
and despite that their hope disappears gradually, even the slightest work possibility would 
bring their hope back. Nacho, now informed with the downside of being a bracero, has a 
mixed feeling of becoming one, because the fortune of a bracero is still a mystery to him, and 
he “[wonders] with a disturbed perplexed feeling why they [are] returning to the north then, if 
they [complain] so much about the conditions there. He [guesses] that it must be because, be-
ing this far away from their homes, it [is] easier than returning home” (Nelson 189). 
Nacho has waited for twenty-seven days in Empalme before he is finally on the list to go 
to the United States. However, this only means that he is allowed to proceed to thorough con-
trols and examinations of whether he is qualified for becoming a bracero. Nacho overhears 
that a man who has lost his military permit gets rejected in the examination process in spite of 
his weeks of waiting, and a man who has participated in a strike for a decent wage is also re-
jected and taken away as a Communist. Apart from the possibility that bracero applicants 
might be stripped off their chances of going to the United States any time, they have to face 
humiliation. They are required to take off all their clothes and stand in line for health inspec-
tion, and the doctors treat them rudely. Bracero applicants are afraid to act against the humili-
ation, and they feel relieved when the inspection is over: 
“Chihuahua,” groaned the man next to Nacho, dressing himself with fantastic speed. “If I had 
known you had to go through this I never would have come here. It takes away your amor propio.” 
“Sí, they rob you of your self-respect,” complained another, dressing himself with equal haste, a 
look of pained outrage on his face. “They seem to get pleasure out of humiliating you.” (Nelson 253) 
When Nacho is finally through, he gets on a bus to Benjamín Hill, and from there all quali-
fied bracero applicants take a train to Mexicali, the border, and then another bus takes them 
onto the American soil. The train ride is also a suffering, for they are riding in freight cars, 
and the officials put 118 people in Nacho’s car. Someone complains: “The government of the 
Estados Unidos pays for first class transportation — and this is what we get! Somebody’s 
making money!” (Nelson 263) During the ride, bracero applicants can hardly move, and the 
urine makes the car smell badly. Nacho feels like he is “being packed into a furnace-like cof-
fin without air or movement,” and this feeling is even worse than hunger (Nelson 267). Be-
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cause the car is too crowded, someone even falls out. Although many people shout helplessly 
with the hope that the driver might stop the train, the train “rumble[s] on” (Nelson 269), and 
they are told by a very peaceful voice that accidents like this one are very normal — “[w]e 
lose a man or two this way almost every trip” (Nelson 270), and the man himself should take 
the blame, because it will happen “if a man is fool enough to hang out the door” (Nelson 
270). The train ride demonstrates that bracero workers are not treated as human beings, and 
authorities do not want to take responsibility for their lives. 
In the United States, bracero applicants have to go through another thorough health in-
spection before they can get their contracts. Like the officials in Mexico, Americans are also 
rude to them. The photographer who takes pictures of bracero workers “[grabs] Nacho’s hair 
with both hands and [bangs] his head furiously against the wall” (Nelson 291), because Na-
cho does not understand how to hold his head. This is the first time Nacho is treated badly by 
an American, and he is suddenly “possessed by simultaneous sensations of shock, violent out-
rage and terror” (Nelson 291) and starts to believe what everyone in his town has been telling 
him — that Americans are bad people — but he does not have the courage to express his 
anger out of the concern that he may lose the opportunity to earn money for his family. Just 
as Nacho thinks he is finally through and will get a contract, he is called back by the doctors, 
because they have diagnosed him with tuberculosis, and Nacho is asked to “rest for a few 
months and eat well [, and] [t]hen come back” (Nelson 293). Before Nacho could say any-
thing, he is taken out of the inspection building. Since Nacho does not have any money, it is 
impossible for him to rest and eat well, and it is almost certain that without rest, food, or 
medicine, his tuberculosis will not be cured. Therefore, despite all the suffering, Nacho can-
not and will never become a bracero, and readers cannot be sure if Nacho and his family will 
survive in the end. Without any delay or trouble, which is the opposite of the way Nacho en-
ters the United States, Nacho is sent back to Empalme. Seeing the town which “he [has] so 
recently left,” Nacho feels like he is “seeing some horrible movie in reverse” (Nelson 299). 
On the way back to Esperanza, “one of his huaraches to his foot [is] broken, and the crude 
sandal [will] no longer stay on his foot,” and the scene suddenly reminds him of the lyrics he 
heard on his way to Empalme — “I went to the United States in huaraches — I came back 
barefoot” (Nelson 306). For Nacho, Empalme, the crossroad, does not take him to fortune but 
to misery. 
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The misery that bracero applicants have to experience is too unbearable so that many de-
cide to go to the United States as wetbacks. For these people, going as a wetback is a way of 
survival, and probably going as a wetback is less risky than waiting, because there are people 
who die from hunger while waiting. Nacho constantly (over)hears people talking about going 
to the United States as a wetback, because they cannot wait any longer. When Nacho is wait-
ing in Empalme, a bracero applicant says: “The first time I came up here two years ago I paid 
a hundred pesos to some cabrón who said he was going to get me on the list the next day and 
I didn’t get on any list and I never saw the bastard again. I nearly starved for two months try-
ing to get on a list and then finally I went as a wetback” (Nelson 146–47). Two bracero appli-
cants in Nacho’s group have also made “the desperate decision to go north as 
wetbacks” (Nelson 213) because waiting means starving. When Nacho is rejected in the 
United States and is sent to take the train back to Benjamín Hill, he overhears a conversation 
in the bush that two men decide to cross the border illegally that night. In order not to get 
caught, they decide to walk ninety miles in the desert to avoid patrol, with no food or water. 
These decisions of Mexican workers suggest that although these workers do not mean to 
break the law and become undocumented immigrants, the miserable bracero selection process 
forces them to follow their instinct of survival and go as wetbacks. In addition, when the 
United States tried to end the Bracero Program in 1947, the U.S. government was not eager to 
deport undocumented laborers, because growers complained about labor shortage and extra 
expenses, which further reduced the risk of wetbacks. As a bracero says in the novel: 
“I came in first in 1943. I stayed four years that time. Then the Mexican government objected to the 
bad treatment up there and wouldn’t send any more workers for a while, so I went in as a wetback. 
Pues, remember, pues? The United States government legalized the wetbacks during that time in spite 
of the objections of our own government. I went as a wetback seven times between ’47 and ’50. Then 
in ’50 when the ban was lifted I started going as a bracero again.” (Nelson 144–45) 
Therefore, the Bracero System was responsible for the wetback situation in the United States, 
and to a great extent, both the U.S. and Mexican governments were to blame for the influx of 
undocumented immigrants to the United States. Undocumented workers themselves were 
usually the victims of such system, because the waiting period was too long and miserable, 
sometimes they were rejected for some diseases caused by their poverty, and being an undoc-
umented worker might be the only way to survive. 
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Besides the Bracero Program, the United States launched another guestworker program in 
the 1950s. The INA of 1952 “enumerates categories of aliens, known as nonimmigrants, who 
are admitted to the United States for a temporary period of time and a specific 
purpose” (Bruno 2). According to this law, low-skilled foreign workers are allowed to work 
in the United States temporarily under two temporary worker visas: the H-2A visa for agri-
cultural workers and the H-2B visa for nonagricultural workers (Bruno 2). Therefore, this 
guestworker program can be referred as the H-2 program. The H-2 program started in the 
1950s and lasts until today. 
According to the USCIS, in order to hire guestworkers under the H-2A visa, employers 
must “[o]ffer a job that is of a temporary or seasonal nature,” “[d]emonstrate that there are 
not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available to do the temporary 
work,” and “[s]how that the employment of H-2A workers will not adversely affect the wages 
and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers” (“H-2A”). Instead of demon-
strating the job is of a temporary or seasonal nature, employers who intend to hire guest-
workers under the H-2B visa must clarify which of the four types of job the employment is in 
nature — “one-time occurrence,” “seasonal need,” “peakload need,” or “intermittent 
need” (“H-2B”). There is also a limitation of guestworkers’ nationality — only nationals of 
68 countries (January 18, 2015)  are eligible to participate in the H-2 program (“H-2A” and 4
“H-2B”), possibly because the United States intends to control immigrant ratios among dif-
ferent nationalities. These requirements demonstrate that the United States tries to ensure that 
temporary workers do not take away jobs from citizens and do not drag wages down. Fur-
thermore, it indicates that guestworkers usually work in fields where citizen workers are not 
willing to work. 
An H-2A worker can enjoy the following rights: 
• Receive at least three-fourths of the total hours promised in the contract, which states the period of 
employment promised (the “three-quarters guarantee”); 
• Receive free housing in good condition and meals or access to a cooking facility for the period of the 
contract; 
 These countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa 4
Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Nauru, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, New 
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, Ser-
bia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Tonga, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Vanuatu.
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• Receive workers’ compensation benefits for medical costs and payment for lost time from work and 
for any permanent injury; 
• Be reimbursed for the cost of travel from the worker’s home to the job as soon as the worker finishes 
50% of the contract period. The expenses include the cost of an airline or bus ticket and food during 
the trip. If the guestworker stays on the job until the end of the contract or is terminated without 
cause, the employer must pay transportation and subsistence costs for returning home; 
• Be protected by the same health and safety regulations as other workers; and 
• Be eligible for federally funded legal services for matters related to their employment as H-2A work-
ers. (Bauer and Stewart) 
However, sometimes these rights exist only on paper, because guestworkers are highly de-
pendent on their employers. The H-2 program “permit[s] the guestworker to work only for 
the employer who petitioned the Department of Labor (DOL) for his or her services. If the 
work situation is abusive or not what was promised, the worker has little or no recourse other 
than to go home” (Bauer and Stewart). Therefore, “guestworkers do not enjoy the most fun-
damental protection of a competitive labor market — the ability to change jobs if they are 
mistreated. Instead, they are bound to the employers who ‘import’ them. If guestworkers 
complain about abuses, they face deportation, blacklisting or other retaliation” (Bauer and 
Stewart). Moreover, the opportunity for guestworkers to return for subsequent temporary 
work “depends entirely on an employer’s willingness to submit a request to the U.S. govern-
ment” (Bauer and Stewart). As a result, if guestworkers complain about their employers, their 
chance to return in the following season is very slim. Besides, “[g]overnment enforcement of 
guestworker rights is historically very weak. Private attorneys typically won’t take up their 
cause” (Bauer and Stewart). The situation for H-2B workers is even worse, for “non-agricul-
tural workers in the program are not eligible for federally funded legal services” (Bauer and 
Stewart). There were even “incidents where employers destroyed passports or visas in order 
to take away [guest]workers’ proof of legal status,” so that the police are “more likely to take 
action against complaining workers than against the employer” (Bauer and Stewart). 
Because of this dependence on employers, Bauer and Stewart criticize that guestworkers 
are often mistreated — they are “[c]heated out of wages,” “[f]orced to mortgage their futures 
to obtain low-wage, temporary jobs,” “[h]eld virtually captive by employers or labor brokers 
who seize their documents,” “[s]ubjected to human trafficking and debt servitude,” “[f]orced 
to live in squalid conditions,” and “[d]enied medical benefits for on-the-job injuries.” This 
mistreatment of guestworkers gives employers economic benefits, and thus employers prefer 
guestworkers to citizen workers, even though they need to demonstrate that there are not 
enough citizen workers available in their H-2 petition (Bauer and Stewart). Employers some-
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times discourage citizen workers by “requiring them to demonstrate their ability to run 
around carrying a 50-pound bag, scheduling interviews before 7 a.m., and requiring drug test-
ing prior to interviews” (Bauer and Stewart). In this way, the win-win attempt becomes a 
lose-lose situation for both guest and citizen workers. 
Guestworkers are not only mistreated by employers, but also exploited by recruiters, for 
“U.S. employers almost universally rely on private individuals or agencies to find and recruit 
guestworkers in their home countries” (Bauer and Stewart). Guestworkers have to pay their 
recruiters a large amount of money, “including [travel and visa costs and] profit for the re-
cruiters” (Bauer and Stewart), before coming to the United States. Since guestworkers are 
usually not in a prosperous condition, they sometimes have to “obtain high-interest loans” or 
“leave collateral” (Bauer and Stewart). In the case of David, et al. v. Signal International, 
LLC, et al., about 500 Indian guestworkers were trafficked to the United States by Signal in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to work as pipe fitters and welders with dishonest assur-
ances of “good jobs” and “permanent U.S. residency” (Bryant). However, these guestworkers 
were forced “to live in ‘man camps’ on ‘the reservation,’ with up to two dozen workers in a 
trailer with one bathroom; and deducted $1,050 monthly from their pay to do so” (Bryant). 
Signal even locked the workers who wanted to take action in a trailer and terminated the con-
tract of the leaders who organized the movement, so that they can get deported (Bryant). Fi-
nally, “[t]he jury found Signal had engaged in labor trafficking, fraud, racketeering and dis-
crimination” (Bryant), and Signal was ordered to pay $14 million to the trial plaintiffs, which 
was “the largest amount ever awarded by a jury in a labor trafficking case” (“David”). 
Although guestworkers should only stay in the United States temporarily, many of them 
have no intention to leave, and “[p]ast experience has shown . . . that these guest workers of-
ten manage to escape the program’s constraints and find ways to settle down” (Martin and 
Teitelbaum). Therefore, there is a tight relation between guestworker programs and illegal 
immigration. Philip L. Martin and Michael S. Teitelbaum point out that “virtually no low-
wage ‘temporary worker’ program in a high-wage liberal democracy has ever turned out to be 
genuinely temporary,” because employer and guestworkers have become codependent — 
“[e]mployers naturally grow to depend on the supply of low-wage and compliant labor, relax-
ing their domestic recruitment efforts and adjusting their production methods to take advan-
tage of the cheap labor,” and guestworkers can “earn much more than they could at home. 
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For instance, laborers in U.S. fruit and vegetable agriculture make between $5 and $7 an 
hour, as opposed to 50 cents an hour in Mexico” (Martin and Teitelbaum). 
In 2004, President George W. Bush proposed a guestworker program reform. In this pro-
posal, undocumented immigrants were allowed to apply for a temporary working visa if they 
could prove they were employed, and their temporary working visa should be renewable 
(“President Bush”). However, gaining a temporary legal status does not equal amnesty, be-
cause the legal status granted “will have an end” (“President Bush”). This reform indicates 
the United States’ attempt to control illegal immigration and its concern about the country’s 
economy without the contribution of undocumented immigrants. The attempt to reform the 
guestworker program failed in the end, because the Senate and the House had a grave differ-
ence in the bills they passed — the Senate bill included provisions to “allow 200,000 people 
to fill empty non-agricultural jobs with visas that could be renewed for three years before 
they would become eligible to apply for permanent residence,” to “allow 1.5 million agricul-
tural workers to be eligible for permanent legal residence in the U.S. if they could prove that 
they worked in agriculture in the U.S. before the bill was enacted and continued to work in 
agriculture for another three to five years,” and to give “illegal immigrants who had been in 
the U.S. since 2001 and had worked for three years the chance to apply to a path to legal sta-
tus,” while the House bill contained none of these provisions (Harper 9–10). 
The difference also mirrors the general debate about whether guestworker programs 
should be continued. Proponents of the program argue that apart from the financial and eco-
nomic win-win situation between employers and guestworkers, it is also a good way to re-
duce irregular entry to the United States, because many immigrants enter the country illegally 
with the hope of finding a job. Therefore, if the United States offers them an opportunity to 
work there legally, many would choose to enter the United States in a legal way, and they 
would be under U.S. government’s control (Martin and Teitelbaum). Opponents of the pro-
gram worry about the slavery-like life of guestworkers and employers’ discrimination against 
citizen workers (Bauer and Stewart). 
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4.1.2. Guestworkers and Guestworker Programs in Germany 
Starting in the 1950s, Germany “signed a series of bilateral recruitment agreements” with 
Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Yugoslavia to solve the labor shortage problem 
emerged with economic recovery (Oezcan). The recruitment agreements were made based on 
a mutual benefit that Germany would have cheap laborers to fill its labor shortage, and the 
sending countries would have trained and experienced workers when those guestworkers re-
turned home. These recruitments resulted in the influx of immigration of non-ethnic Ger-
mans. Most of these guestworkers (Gastarbeiter) were low-skilled workers who were al-
lowed to work in Germany for one to two years; then they were required to return home and 
were replaced by other guestworkers (Oezcan). This “rotation principle” was made to prevent 
guestworkers from settling down in Germany (Oezcan). By 1973 when the guestworker pro-
gram was halted due to the oil crisis,  foreigners’ “share of the population [had] reached 6.7 5
percent of Germany’s total population,” with Turkey being the primary sending country, fol-
lowed by Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, and Spain. 
Similar to the case in the United States, guestworkers were not treated like guests. Since 
guestworkers planned to earn as much as possible during their temporary stay in Germany, 
they prepared themselves for over-time work, and employers took advantage of it. With an 
agreed monthly working hour of 184 hours, thirty-six percent of the guestworkers worked 
more than 200 hours, and twenty percent of them worked more than 220 hours (Höhne et al. 
9). Moreover, guestworkers lived in very crowded dormitories. Although there were rules 
regulating the minimum living area per person in a dormitory and the maximum number of 
persons in a dormitory, many employers did not follow these rules (Höhne et al. 11). For ex-
ample, in 1971, forty-six percent of the inspected dormitories in North Rhine-Westphalia did 
not reach the regulated standard (Höhne et al. 11). Besides living in dormitories, some guest-
workers rented accommodations from the housing market. Some of these accommodations 
were attics or basements, and even though they had poor qualities, guestworkers had to pay a 
rent above the average rental price (Höhne et al. 11–12). 
 The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) proclaimed an oil embargo in 1973 as a 5
response to American involvement in the Yom Kippur War, and the price of oil rose rapidly. This oil crisis shook 
the world’s economy.
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During the guestworker program (Gastarbeiterprogramm), many guestworkers “acquired 
residence permits of a longer or permanent duration,” as opposed to the rotation principle 
(Oezcan). The “rotation principle” was scratched out from the German-Turkish agreement in 
1964, because it “was too expensive and time consuming to constantly hire and train re-
placements” (Prevezanos), and “the Turkish immigrants had proven to be reliable workers 
who made fewer demands than their German counterparts but were no less 
productive” (Bartsch, Brandt, and Steinvorth). This motive of eliminating the “rotation prin-
ciple” was also a cause for the immigrant-native conflict, as employers preferred guestwork-
ers to low-skilled German workers. Family members of these remaining “long-term” guest-
workers immigrated to Germany due to family reunification (Oezcan). Children born to these 
immigrants are considered to be second-generation immigrants, and they further increased 
the population of people without German blood, which in a way changed Germany’s ethnic 
demography and challenged its racial and ethnic homogeneousness. The elimination of the 
“rotation principle” transforms guestworkers into immigrants (Bartsch, Brandt, and Stein-
vorth), and although it was still unlikely for these immigrants (including second-generation 
immigrants) to naturalize to become citizens, their existence makes Germany a country of 
immigration. 
As the number of guestworkers grew, many of them moved out of factory dormitories and 
into cheap apartments near their factories (Bartsch, Brandt, and Steinvorth). Eventually, these 
nearby neighborhoods became immigrant neighborhoods as Germans “gradually 
vacated” (Bartsch, Brandt, and Steinvorth). Turkish guestworkers dominated the number of 
inhabitants in these neighborhoods, and a former Turkish guestworker recalls that he “mixed 
with people from other cultures, but none of them could speak German and that was a prob-
lem” (Mekhennet). This shows that Germany “did little to integrate the workers,” because 
“the guest workers had been expected to leave Germany eventually” (Mekhennet). This ex-
pectation isolated immigrants from citizens for a long time, which resulted in a barrier be-
tween immigrants and citizens for several generations. This barrier, together with the growth 
of the number of non-German residents, led Germany to reevaluate the importance of integra-
tion of foreigners in the country and reconsider its citizenship laws. In other words, the 
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guestworker program in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in the change in Ger-
many’s citizenship laws  to a great extent. 6
The flow of guestworkers resulted in the emergence of the so-called Gastarbeiterdeutsch 
(guestworker German), a product which more or less shakes German culture, for the German 
language is a substance of German national identity. A study by Volker Hinnenkamp in 1984 
shows that German interlocutors tend to speak German with a reduced structure and reduced 
vocabulary with guestworkers to make the language easier to understand. For example, they 
say “Türkisch Mann, Du?” (“Turkish man, you?” with the informal form of “you”) instead of 
“Sind Sie ein türkischer Mann?” (“Are you a Turkish man?” with the formal form of “you”) 
(Holm 619). This type of German is not only sometimes grammatically wrong, but it is also 
in a wrong form, because the informal “you” “is never used with strangers unless they are 
children” (Holm 619). Although this reduced structure makes German easier for guestwork-
ers to understand, it “clearly increases social distance and in the long run it may have helped 
to make Gastarbeiterdeutsch a socially constrained phenomenon rather than simply individu-
als’ various stages in the acquisition of a second language” (Holm 619). As a result, guest-
workers were alienated by language, and at the same time, as the immigrant population con-
tinued to grow, Gastarbeiterdeutsch might have an impact on spoken German. 
Besides Gastarbeiterdeutsch, another form of cultural product emerged due to the growth 
of the immigrant population, namely, guestworker literature (Gastarbeiterliteratur). In the 
1950s, there were already random poems, letters, novels, and stories written by immigrants, 
but it was not until the 1970s that literature written by immigrants was recognized as a cul-
tural phenomenon and series of anthologies about immigrant life and guestworkers were pub-
lished (Photong-Wollmann 26). This delay of recognition can be understood as a slow 
process of German citizens’ acceptance of immigration. Guestworker literature is usually 
written in German by immigrant authors, which opens guestworkers’ life to the German audi-
ence. It is a representation of the life of guestworkers in Germany, and it also mirrors the rela-
tions between citizen workers and guestworkers and their mental activity. Guestworker litera-
ture can appear in different forms (e.g., poems, plays, novels), and with different themes or 
issues. Usually the themes aim at four different integration problems, which are identity prob-
lems, conflicts in interpersonal relations, especially within a family, re-integration problems 
 I will discuss this change in chapter 4.3.2.6
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when returning home, and conflict with German citizens’ idea of integration (Ackermann 24). 
Very often, guestworker literature raises public discussions about immigration and the immi-
grant situation. Therefore, it usually has a political function. 
Although guestworker literature can be seen as part of German literature, it is different 
from the traditional German literature. Narratives in guestworker literature tend to be simpler 
and more practical; therefore, this kind of literature does not “[attack] the bastions of affluent 
German society [much] with the literary means of critical realism, but instead naively or cun-
ningly smuggles itself in” (qtd. in Teraoka 98; emphasis in original). The usage of the word 
“smuggle” also implies, as Arlene Akiko Teraoka argues, that “non-Germans in a German 
society, and non-German authors of German literature, are illegal aliens who have been 
smuggled in” (98), which not only alienates guestworker literature from German literature, 
but also questions the quality of guestworker literature or at least the quality of language in 
guestworker literature. 
The label “guestworker literature” can also be problematic, because these literary works 
were not written by guestworkers themselves (Tantow), but by immigrant authors who are 
better educated and in a higher position than guestworkers. For example, although Franco 
Biondi, the German-language author from Italy, worked at a factory for some time, he pur-
sued a degree in psychology later and became a psychiatrist. Rafik Schami, the Syrian-born 
author, studied chemistry, mathematics, and physics, and obtained a doctorate before he be-
came a full-time author. Yüksel Pazarkaya, the Turkish-German author, has a diploma in 
chemistry and a doctorate in literature, and he has worked as author, translator, and broad-
casting editor. 
One of the first literary works which can be categorized as guestworker literature is “Was 
will Niyazi in der Naunynstraße” (1973, “What Is Niyazi Doing on Naunyn Street”), which I 
quoted at the beginning of chapter 4.1. “Was will Niyazi” is written by the Turkish author 
Aras Ören in Turkish, and thus it has to rely on the German translation to raise public atten-
tion. “Was will Niyazi” is the first poem in his Berlin-trilogy, the other two being “Der kurze 
Traum aus Kagithane” (1974, “The Short Dream from Kagithane”) and “Die Fremde ist auch 
ein Haus” (1980, “Abroad Is Also a House”). Ören is an author, journalist, and actor. Howev-
er, “Was will Niyazi” is written in an aesthetically plain language, as if the poem was a work 
of a real guestworker. The German translation of this poem even contains sentences that are 
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grammatically wrong (as in footnote 12), which indicates that guestworkers are usually poor-
ly educated and do not speak German well. The poem depicts the life of guestworkers in 
Germany, the motives for their migration, and immigrant-native conflict, all of which are 
quite typical in guestworker literature. Therefore, I choose it as an example for guestworker 
literature. 
One primary driven motive for guestworkers to come to Germany is their hope to become 
wealthy. As the poem shows, 
When it came to Germany, 
I said to myself, 
was like everyone else, me too: 
Germany is a little America. 
If you go over there, Niyazi, 
you live there like a rich man from Bebek. 
Because the poor 
could only live like an American in America – or in Germany 
or in another Western country. While 
that is only a thing of the wealthy in our countries. 
And only when a person lives like an American 
can the person say, I have lived.  (Ören 25, my translation) 7
Germany, like the United States, is a symbol of opportunity and good life for the poorer peo-
ple in the guestworker-sending countries. These people imagine a dream life — for instance, 
everyone has a car, there are modern apartments with a bath, and people wear suits and nylon 
shirts (Ören 25). However, not all guestworkers plan to stay in Germany permanently. Most 
of them (e.g., Halime and Ali) only want to change their living condition, earn as much mon-
ey as they can to support their family (Chin 65), and return home to live a richer life. Some 
(e.g., Sabri San) want to open their own business with the money they have saved when 
working in Germany (Chin 65), so that they can be their own boss and have a shift in class 
position. 
 The German version of this verse is: 7
Als das mit Deutschland aufkam 
sagte ich mir, 
so wie jedermann, ich auch: 
Deutschland ist ein kleines Amerika. 
Gehst du dorthin, Niyazi, 
lebst du dort wie die Reichen von Bebek. 
Denn die Armen 
können nur in Amerika – oder in Deutschland 
oder in einem anderen westlichen Land – 
leben wie ein Amerikaner. Während 
das in unseren Ländern 
nur eine Sache der Reichen ist. 
Und nur wenn man wie ein Amerikaner lebt 
kann der Mensch sagen, ich habe gelebt.
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Because guestworkers usually have a clear mind about what they need to achieve, they 
work very hard, very often harder than native workers, as the case of Kazim shows: 
All people work for nine hours. 
I do not speak of it, when I work for eleven hours. 
I am only interested in what I have in my pocket. 
No one pays attention to other people’s pockets here. 
When you work, you get your money. 
Do not care about the Germans who 
are used to comfort, 
this abundance messes with their heads. 
Many consider themselves powerful. 
They stick their nose in the air, 
but they do not see what they step into.  (Ören 32–33, my translation) 8
This shows guestworkers’ willingness to work overtime, and thus they become a threat to 
“spoiled” native workers — employers prefer guestworkers who can bring more profit than 
native workers. Also, guestworkers take hard work for granted, and they do not seem to un-
derstand native workers’ behavior. In a way, they may feel it being unfair that native workers, 
who are not as diligent as they are, are in a better position just because they are German citi-
zens, and if native workers ever encounter trouble with their employment, it should be their 
own fault. 
Native workers, on the other hand, usually think that guestworkers take away their jobs. 
Therefore, native workers sometimes are hostile to guestworkers. The case of Ali, as de-
scribed in the quote at the beginning of chapter 4.1, shows this conflict: 
“Because of you – ” 
“Because of all of you – ” 
“– you dirty foreigners. . . . 
You do overtime, overtime, there you have it. 
And we celebrate Christmas this time without cash, 
 The German version of this verse is: 8
Alle arbeiten neun Stunden. 
Ich rede nicht mal davon, wenn ich elf Stunden arbeite. 
Mich interessiert nur, was ich in der Tasche habe. 
Hier hat keiner die Augen auf anderer Leute Taschen. 
Wenn du arbeitest, kriegst du dein Geld. 
Scher dich nicht um diese Deutschen, die 
sind an Bequemlichkeit gewöhnt, 
dieser Überfluß verschmiert ihnen die Köpfe. 
Halten mächtig viel von sich selbst. 
Die Nasen tragen sie ganz hoch, 
aber sie sehen nicht, wo sie hintreten.
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next week the short-term work will be over [sic].”  (qtd. in Chin 72) 9
Native workers blame guestworkers for the lack of opportunities for employment or their low 
income. This hostility is personal at first, as Ali’s German co-workers use the “singular form 
of ‘you’ (deinetwegen)” (Chin 72), but they quickly change the form to plural (euretwegen), 
“treating Ali as an ethnic representative” (Chin 72), and the personal resentment turns into 
collective xenophobia. “You dirty foreigners” explicitly demonstrates that immigrant-native 
conflict occurs because native workers lose jobs to guestworkers and are short of “cash.” This 
hostility is also to be found in another scene when a native worker beats a guestworker after 
some beer. He shouts: 
“What are you doing standing around stupidly? 
You can’t even speak correctly, 
dirty foreigner, what do you want here?”  (Ören 48, my translation) 10
Here, the conflict is not personal, because the guestworker who is beaten is random, and thus 
he is also a representative of all guestworkers or even all foreigners. Guestworkers’ incompe-
tence to speak German becomes a marker of foreignness, and it can also be native workers’ 
argument that guestworkers should not be hired, although language incompetence does not 
necessarily affect low-skilled labor. “[W]hat do you want here” indicates that native workers 
blame guestworkers for taking their jobs. 
However, it is not guestworkers’ fault that native workers lose jobs. One reason is that 
native workers are not as diligent as guestworkers, as it is shown above in Kazim’s case. An-
other reason is that employers prefer guestworkers because they are easy to exploit, because 
guestworkers want to earn as much money as possible, and they are afraid of deportation, so 
they would not act against their employers’ will. The poem explains: 
 The German version of this verse is: 9
“Deinetwegen – ” 
“Euretwegen – ” 
“– ihr dreckigen Ausländer … 
Überstunden macht ihr, Überstunden, da hast dus. 
Und wir feiern Weihnachten diesmal ohne Pinke, 
nächste Woche geht die Kurzarbeit los.” 
The last line in this verse should be translated as “next week the short-term work will begin,” meaning that they 
will have reduced hours of work.
 The German version of this verse is: 10
“Was stehste hier so dämlich rum? 
Kannst ja noch nicht mal richtig quatschen, 
dreckiger Ausländer, was willst’n hier überhaupt?”
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Ali often worked overtime, 
because the master wanted him to. 
And the others, instead of telling him 
about short-term work and other harassment, 
stand up against him instead of 
against the bosses, 
who take advantage of the situation.  (Ören 51–52, my translation) 11
Employers are responsible for hiring guestworkers instead of native workers, because they 
can gain more profits by exploiting guestworkers. Guestworkers are victims of this labor sys-
tem, but they are usually treated as the cause of employment problems in the eyes of native 
workers. 
Discrimination against guestworkers is not only expressed among native workers. Naun-
yn Street in the title of the poem “is located in the heart of Berlin’s Kreuzberg district, a 
neighborhood historically inhabited by the working class. During the postwar labor recruit-
ment, this district became a prime settlement area for Turks, one of the few places where 
guest workers found landlords willing to rent to them” (Chin 66). Therefore, guestworkers 
are separated from citizens not only because of their cultural difference and their incompe-
tence to speak German properly, but also because they are discriminated against by landlords, 
so it is very difficult for them to find accommodation in areas where Germans live. 
Moreover, guestworkers are discriminated against at job centers. At the end of the poem 
there are three letters written by guestworkers to try to regain their rights. The first letter mir-
rors their trouble finding an apartment as described above; the third one is a complaint about 
the hostile attitudes from their German co-workers, which I also discussed above. The second 
letter is written to the job center, and it reads: 
“Dear 
Mr. 
Hofmann. 
Job Center II. 
Don’t always shout! 
Don’t always say no! 
I am not your servant. 
I am not a criminal. 
I am a worker. 
 The German version of this verse is: 11
Ali hat oft Überstunden gemacht, 
weil der Meister das so wollte. 
Und die anderen, statt ihm was zu sagen 
von Kurzarbeit und anderen Schikanen, 
stellten sich gegen ihn statt 
gegen die Chefs, 
die das ausnützen.
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Workers always work. 
Workers pay taxes. 
You please make 
My papers alright 
again.”  (Ören 68, my translation) 12
This letter indicates that guestworkers are not treated as equal citizen workers. The job center 
is unfriendly to guestworkers, and guestworkers are treated as servants or even criminals 
even though they contribute to the country’s economy. 
“Was will Niyazi” reflects the hardship and unfair situation guestworkers face, and it crit-
icizes the profit-oriented capitalism in the Bonn republic,  for “the realization of economic 13
inequity and exploitation leads to violence against foreigners” (Chin 76). Also, Germans’ 
hostility toward guestworkers and even all foreigners mirrors the existence of racism. There-
fore, “Was will Niyazi,” as Rita Chin points out, links capitalism in the Bonn republic to fas-
cism, suggesting that “the complacency and accommodation of the Bonn republic’s institu-
tions and political culture” are related to “the Nazi regime” (76). However, “postwar society’s 
obsession with economic prosperity obscured a failure to deal with its fascist past” (Chin 76). 
Another theme and issue addressed in guestworker literature is foreign workers’ feeling of 
alienation both in Germany and in their native country (Teraoka 81–82), which results in their 
loss of identity. Yüksel Pazarkaya is a representative of authors of guestworker literature who 
emphasize the “mutual understanding” or “recognition” of different cultures and “the desir-
ability of integration ‘with mutual respect and the preservation of cultural identity and inde-
pendence’” (Teraoka 86). Pazarkaya’s novel Ich und die Rose (2002, Me and the Rose) is a 
good example of this theme. This novel is originally written in German, and thus Pazarkaya 
 The German version of this verse is: 12
“Sehr Geherter 
Herr 
Hofmann. 
Arbeitsamt II. 
Nicht immer schrein! 
Nicht immer nein sagen! 
Ich bin nicht dein Dienner. 
Ich bin nicht verbrecher. 
Ich bin arbeiter. 
Arbeiter arbeiten immer. 
Arbeiter zahlen steuer. 
Du machen bitte 
Meine papier ordnung 
wieder.” 
This letter contains many typing errors and grammar mistakes, which indicate guestworkers’ incompetence to 
speak and write correct German and possibly also their poor education.
 Rita Chin uses the term “Bonn republic” instead of “Germany” probably to identify that the setting of “Was 13
will Niyazi” is West Germany.
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intends to present his novel to the German audience. The novel focuses on the protagonist’s 
loss of identity and his alienation in his native country (Turkey). 
The protagonist Orhan Barut is an electronic engineer in Germany, and he is married to a 
German woman Maria and has settled down in Germany. After a ten-year residence in Ger-
many, he finally has time to visit his hometown in Turkey with the hope of finding himself 
and understanding who he is. At first, he feels excited like a fish back in the ocean (Pazarkaya 
16), but then he experiences some difficulty with his native language. When Orhan bumps 
into a stranger on the street, the stranger swears and keeps going, but Orhan cannot find the 
word to respond: 
I wanted to apologize. Yet I could not find the word for it. He spoke his words with the highest 
confidence, without even pausing for a minute. I could only stare after him. Only long after I had lost 
him in the crowd did my tongue lisp: 
“I’m sorry.”  (Pazarkaya 17, my translation) 14
Right after this incident, a similar one happens again. When a stranger mistakes Orhan for 
someone else, he swears out of disappointment and goes away, but Orhan cannot respond 
right away: 
I stood there stiffly. I wanted to apologize right away when he was disappointed because I was not 
Turan, but the word for it would not occur to me. My tongue was numb. Only after he disappeared into 
the crowd did the word run out of my mouth: 
“I’m sorry.”  (Pazarkaya 18, my translation) 15
Although Orhan regards himself as Turkish, for he compares his return to Turkey with a 
fish’s return to the ocean, his problem with his mother tongue suggests that he is not as Turk-
ish as he thinks he is, because language is a symbol of national identity. In a way, Orhan has 
lost some of his Turkish identity unconsciously. 
 The original text is as follows: 14
Ich wollte mich entschuldigen. Doch ich fand das Wort dafür nicht. Er sprach seine Worte mit größter 
Selbstverständlichkeit, ohne einen Augenblick zu verweilen. Ich konnte ihm nur noch nachstieren. Erst lange 
nachdem ich ihn in der Menge verloren hatte, lispelte meine Zunge: 
“Entschuldigung.”
 The original text is as follows: 15
Ich stand stocksteif da. Ich wollte mich gleich, als er enttäuscht war, weil ich nicht Turan war, 
entschuldigen, doch das Wort dafür fiel mir nicht ein. Meine Zunge war wie betäubt. Erst nachdem er in der 
Menge verschwunden war, gerann mir im Mund: 
“Es tut mir Leid.”
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Moreover, family friends in Turkey treat Orhan as a German. In a conversation, Turkish 
friends ask Orhan questions about Germany and discuss Orhan’s accent when he speaks 
Turkish: 
“Ee, what do you have in your countries?” 
“Is it true that people there don’t like our people?” 
“They are supposed to despise our people and think low of us.” 
“Is it true what the newspapers write?” 
“Do you feel their contempt?” 
“Nonsense, who would despise Orhan?” 
“Of course he speaks their language very well.” 
“God, you see, he even speaks our language well.” 
“People can notice a foreign accent.” 
“Have you forgotten Turkish?” 
. . . 
“From his words I can hear the accent of a European who learns Turkish.”  (Pazarkaya 143–44, 16
my translation) 
“Your countries” and “our people” indicate that Orhan’s Turkish family friends do not treat 
Orhan as one of their own, but as one of “them,” the “Other,” and the plural form of the word 
“country” suggests that they probably see all Western countries as a whole and do not distin-
guish Germany from any other Western countries. Moreover, although Orhan was born and 
raised in Turkey, one of his family friends is surprised that he can speak Turkish, his mother 
tongue, very well. Therefore, Turkish people do not consider him to be Turkish anymore, but 
rather, to be a European who knows Turkey very well. The claim that Germans despise Turks 
shows that Germans do not quite accept Turkish culture if the claim is true, and that there is a 
prejudice against Germans if it is not true. Either way, the conversation represents a lack of 
mutual understanding of different cultures. 
The lack of cultural understanding is also shown when Turkish people act cautiously 
around Orhan, because he might be corrupted by European countries. A distant relative of 
Orhan’s family warns Orhan’s mother: 
 The original text is as follows: 16
“Ee, was gibt es denn dort in euren Ländern?” 
“Stimmt es, dass man dort unsere Menschen nicht mag?” 
“Sie sollen angeblich unsere Menschen verachten und gering schätzen.” 
“Stimmt es, was die Zeitungen schreiben?” 
“Spürst du auch ihre Verachtung?” 
“Nicht doch, wer wird denn Orhan verachten?” 
“Natürlich spricht er ihre Sprache sehr gut.” 
“Gott, sieh doch, selbst unsere Sprache spricht er gut.” 
“Man hört einen fremden Akzent.” 
“Hast du Türkisch verlernt?” 
. . . 
“Aus seinen Worten höre ich den Akzent eines Europäers heraus, der Türkisch lernt.”
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You don’t know these European countries. People can become scholars there, but also criminals. These 
Christians have many ways. Some fly to the moon, some even defeat cancer; some can do all the work 
in the world on a computer; others dye their hair green and pink. Men wear women’s clothes, women 
wear men’s pants, young people inject heroin in the arm; little boys and girls become prostitutes …  17
(Pazarkaya 133, my translation) 
The concern that Orhan might be influenced by all the negative elements in Europe demon-
strates Turkish people’s bias against Western culture. Also, things such as dyeing one’s hair 
green and pink are not necessarily negative, they are only different from what people tend to 
accept in a more conservative culture, which indicates a lack of understanding or recognition 
of a different culture. Furthermore, Orhan encounters some trouble with authority in Turkey, 
and he is suspected of being an anarchist, because he has lived in Germany for ten years, and 
the Turkish authority assumes that he has potential to act against the government. 
Orhan’s friends’ discussion about Western countries and Orhan’s accent, his relative’s 
concern, and the authority’s suspicion all isolate Orhan from being one of their own, which 
makes Orhan’s journey to find his identity even more difficult. Throughout the novel, Orhan 
is confused about who he is, thinking that he does not know himself. In a scene, a fortune 
teller tries to read Orhan’s past, but she cannot: 
“I have never seen anything like this,” said she. “For the first time in my life I see something like this. I 
have even told fortune for babies and little children, but I have never seen anything like this. Should I 
say you haven’t been born at all? I don’t know. In forty years of fortune telling, I have never had such a 
dark background. I have never stood there powerless, not being able to read a person’s past. But you 
just don’t have a past. Where your past should be, there is a dark curtain, besides that nothing at all.”  18
(Pazarkaya 181–82, my translation) 
Orhan’s past should be an important element to define Orhan’s identity, but the non-existence 
of his past, as the fortune teller shows, symbolizes that Orhan’s Turkish past is concealed by 
his German life. This past is not lost, however, because it is only hidden behind the curtain. 
At one time, Orhan hears more than a thousand students singing the national anthem, and he 
cannot help singing along. Although Orhan does not know the lyrics, he has soundless sylla-
 The original text is: 17
Du kennst aber diese europäischen Länder nicht. Man kann dort zum Gelehrten werden, aber auch zum Ver-
brecher. Diese Christen haben viele Wege. Manche fliegen zum Mond, manche besiegen selbst den Krebs, 
manche können die ganze Arbeit der Welt am Computer ausführen, andere färben ihre Haare grün und rosa, 
Männer ziehen sich Frauenkleider an, Frauen Männerhosen, Jugendliche spritzen sich Heroin in den Arm, 
kleine Jungen und Mädchen gehen auf den Strich …
 The original text is: 18
“So was hab ich noch nie gesehen”, sprach sie. “Zum ersten Mal in meinem Leben seh ich so was. Auch für 
Babys und kleine Kinder hab ich wahrgesagt, aber so etwas noch nie gesehen. Soll ich sagen, du bist noch gar 
nicht geboren? Ich weiß nicht. Vierzig Jahre bin ich Wahrsagerin, so ’nen dunklen Hintergrund hab ich noch nie 
gehabt. Noch nie stand ich machtlos da, ohne die Vergangenheit des Menschen lesen zu können. Aber du hast 
einfach keine Vergangenheit. Wo deine Vergangenheit sein soll, dort ist ein dunkler Vorhang, sonst gar nichts.”
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bles in his head which match the rhythm, as if the rhythm was embedded in his subconscious 
before he was born (Pazarkaya 341). This demonstrates that Orhan’s past is not lost but only 
concealed. 
However, Orhan is not fully embracing his newly gained German identity. While in Tur-
key, Orhan meets a Turkish woman Gül (meaning rose) and falls in love with her. Gül is not a 
typical Turkish woman, because Gül has also lived in Germany and is influenced by German 
culture. Orhan’s divorce from Maria, a German woman, symbolizes his farewell to a pure 
German life. He decides to be with Gül and live in Germany, which indicates that Orhan ac-
cepts a mixture of German and Turkish cultures. In a way, Orhan manages to find a compro-
mise between two different cultures, and for him, the best way to live is to preserve two cul-
tural identities. 
Another theme of guestworker literature has little to do with politics or identity problems, 
but it emphasizes cultural diversity. For example, Rafik Schami’s literary works barely con-
tain any political issues such as the hardship immigrants face in Germany or xenophobia. 
Rather, the stories of his works usually take place in Damascus, Syria, and his works present 
people’s lives in Syria to the German audience. Schami’s novel Erzähler der Nacht (1989, 
translated into English with the title Damascus Nights) contains stories from seven different 
characters, some of which are not even realistic. This type of theme of guestworker literature 
does not have much political impact, but it shows some immigrant authors’ intention to 
spread their own culture to a different audience without criticizing anything. 
The guestworker program from the 1950s to 1973 changed German society demographi-
cally and resulted in two cultural products — guestworker German and literature. Germany 
started another guestworker program in the late 1980s as a result of the weakening and finally 
the fall of the Iron Curtain,  and Germany focused on Central and Eastern European coun19 -
tries to be the sending countries (Oezcan). Similar to the earlier program, the new one was 
also based on the mutual benefits for both Germany and the sending countries. Guestworkers 
admitted to Germany included trainees, contract workers, and seasonal workers, many of 
whom came from Poland (Oezcan). Their work permits ranged from three months to two 
years (Oezcan). 
 The Iron Curtain was an ideological barrier between the west and the Soviet-controlled regions in Europe.19
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In 1986, Jörg Gfrörer and Günter Wallraff made a documentary film Ganz Unten (trans-
lated into English as Lowest of the Low) based on Wallraff’s book with the same title. To 
make the documentary, Wallraff disguised himself as a Turkish worker, Ali Levent Sinirli-
oglu, and got a job at Thyssen Steel Mills in Duisburg. Gfrörer used a hidden camera and fol-
lowed Wallraff to film how foreign workers were treated. The documentary shows that these 
workers are discriminated against and have to do the most dangerous and the dirtiest jobs. 
Once, Ali was required to give his protection shirt to a German colleague even though he 
owned the shirt. When he wanted to reject the order, his boss told him that he could either 
give his shirt to his German colleague or come to get his papers and leave. Similarly, when 
Ali was taken to clean metal dust, he asked if he could have a protection mask. His boss told 
him that there was no mask available and claimed that the dust was harmless to his health. 
However, German workers wore masks when doing similar jobs, because metal dust could 
stay in lungs forever and cause serious diseases. Another time, Ali and two other foreign 
workers were told to continue working when the warning signals in the mill were sent. 
Ali’s fellow foreign colleagues usually worked twelve to sixteen hours a day. However, 
their employer often registered shorter working hours on paper or even forgot to register or 
confirm several working days, so that they often received fewer wages than they were enti-
tled to. One of the foreign workers found out that there were thirty hours missing in his regis-
tered working hours, so he went to the job agency to talk to the employer, Mr. Vogel, but Vo-
gel denied that he knew about the missing thirty hours and said that the worker was lying. 
Vogel also became very impolite and impatient, and he shouted at the man as if it was his 
fault that thirty hours were not registered. Another foreign colleague told Ali that Vogel 
claimed that he had transferred his wages to his bank account, but he did not receive the 
money. Moreover, the employment of foreign workers was not completely legal. Vogel made 
an agreement with several of his foreign employees that he would only report half of their 
wages, so that they could evade some taxes. For example, Ali’s income was ten marks an 
hour, but officially he only earned five marks an hour, and the other five marks were given to 
him unreported. Although this agreement might seem beneficial to foreign workers, because 
they could earn more money, it made it easier for the employer to refuse to pay them enough 
wages, and workers could not fight against it without exposing their illegal work. 
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The hidden camera makes it possible that Ganz Unten shows foreign workers’ real life to 
the maximum extent. It demonstrates that they were treated much worse than their German 
peers, and the hostility makes it impossible for them to create a feeling of belonging in Ger-
many. As a Turkish worker said in the documentary, he used to think Germany was his 
dream, but then he realized that Germany did not need them and that he was on the wrong 
road. 
In 2004, some of the sending countries (e.g., Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) 
joined the EU. However, although “citizens of European member states have the right to 
work in any other member state” (Oezcan), old member states of the EU (including Ger-
many) postponed “freedom of movement for the workers of the [new member states] by sev-
en years” (Palmer, “Guest”) due to the fear of massive immigrant influx from these countries 
and their impact on the receiving countries’ social welfare (Oezcan). Therefore, citizens of 
those European sending countries (Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic) have only been 
allowed to work in Germany without a work permit since 2011 (Palmer, “Guest”). Similarly, 
Bulgaria and Romania, which are also guestworker-sending countries, joined the EU in 2007, 
and the free movement clause applied to citizens of these two new EU states in 2012 (Palmer, 
“Guest”). The admittance of these guestworker-sending countries to the EU altered Ger-
many’s guestworker program, because workers from these new EU member states do not 
count as guestworkers anymore. 
4.1.3. Comparison and Reflection 
In both countries, guestworker programs are designed to solve the country’s labor short-
age. The intention to have such programs is to achieve a win-win-win situation, where the 
receiving country gains working force, the sending country gains experienced workers when 
they return home, and guestworkers have better wages abroad. In other words, the same eco-
nomic needs result in the same immigration policy in the two countries. However, guest-
worker programs do not usually go as they are planned, and the win-win-win situation may 
easily turn out to be a lose-lose-lose situation, where employers in the receiving country hire 
guestworkers instead of native workers, resulting in immigrant-native conflict, employers 
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hire guestworkers for a longer term, so that the sending country does not gain experienced 
workers as planned, and guestworkers are often abused or exploited. In this case, the same 
immigration policy has the same consequences in the two countries. 
Guestworkers in both countries face hardships, because their residence permit is bound to 
employers, which puts the employer in a very powerful position. To be able to continue 
working abroad, guestworkers usually do not fight for their rights and tend to silently endure 
exploitation. Besides, they are usually poorly educated and do not quite understand their 
rights stated in the contract. Because guestworkers are easily exploited, employers prefer 
guestworkers to native workers in order to gain more profits, which makes guestworkers the 
cause of immigrant-native conflict, even though they are merely the victims in this equation. 
In the United States, illegal immigration is often linked with guestworker programs, be-
cause many workers, especially from Mexico, cross the border illegally to seek job opportu-
nities (or in many cases they are forced to cross the border illegally, because the procedure to 
become a guestworker is too long and they might die from hunger while waiting), and the 
U.S. government tends to loosen immigration regulations and ignore illegal immigration at 
times of labor shortage. Recent studies of U.S. public opinions toward guestworker policies 
are also related to opinions toward undocumented workers due to Bush’s attempt of a guest-
worker program reform in 2004. In Shayerah Ilias et al.’s study “American Attitudes toward 
Guest Worker Policies,” they also elaborate on American attitudes toward the current illegal 
immigration situation: 
In the days and months following President Bush’s call for a guest worker policy in January 2004, 
Americans were split in their attitudes toward temporary worker initiatives. Close to half supported the 
creation of a guest worker program for current illegal immigrants in 2004 surveys sponsored by the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (52%) and by NPR/Kaiser/Harvard (44%). Since 2004, public 
opinion polls have reflected similar divisions in attitudes toward unauthorized immigrants and public 
support for temporary worker initiatives. For example, an AP/Ipsos Public Affairs poll from March 
2006 found that 56% of Americans favor allowing currently unauthorized individuals working in the 
United States to apply for legal, temporary worker status. A Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg poll from 
June 2007 found that 49% of adults supported a guest worker program for “non-citizens” working in 
the US, while an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll conducted around the same time (June 2007) indicated 
slightly less support for a more specific proposal, with 31% endorsing “automatic work visas” for cur-
rent illegal immigrants who pay a $5,000 fine. 
. . . 
Although many Americans have somewhat favorable attitudes toward temporary worker programs, 
there is greater disagreement over how to address the unauthorized immigration problem. In the Pew 
Research Center/Pew Hispanic Center survey (2006), respondents were almost evenly divided in their 
support for three different policy options when given an explicitly comparative choice between them: 
to allow current unauthorized immigrants to remain in the US permanently (32%); to allow them to 
stay in this country under a guest worker program (32%); or to send them back to their home countries 
(27%). However, in another survey, regardless of party affiliation, a majority of Americans (61%) fa-
vored temporary worker and legalization policies over deportation as a means of reducing unauthorized 
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immigration (Washington Post/ABC News, 2005). A more recent USA Today/Gallup poll (July 2007) 
revealed a similar preference for temporary worker and legalization policies in a comparative question. 
(744–45) 
Therefore, guestworker programs and illegal immigration are intertwined with each other, 
and the American public does not have a strong preference if guestworker programs are a so-
lution to illegal immigration. Individuals who are highly educated are more likely to support 
the idea of a guestworker program, because they feel less threatened by guestworkers on the 
job market since they work in different fields (Ilias et al. 748). 
 Compared to the United States, Germany’s guestworker programs do not have a strong 
connection with illegal immigration, although in some cases, the employment is only partial-
ly legal. This difference may suggest that the immigration policy in the United States is more 
flexible and profit-oriented and regulations can be bent in accordance with the economic situ-
ation, while Germany has been quite strict on immigration regardless of the economic situa-
tion, and although guestworker programs in Germany were also created to help the country’s 
economy, illegal immigration was not tolerated for possible economic benefits. In this sense, 
the consequences of guestworker programs in the two countries are different due to different 
principles of immigration policy. However, although the connection between guestworker 
programs and illegal immigration in Germany is very weak, literature shows the hostility of 
native workers toward guestworkers, and thus it is also very possible that low-skilled workers 
will oppose such programs, regardless of its relation to illegal immigration, because for them, 
the risk of unemployment is the cause of this conflict. 
Although guestworker programs in both countries are similar in terms of motivation, and 
guestworkers face similar problems, such programs are of different significance in regard to 
immigration policy in general in the two countries. To some extent, guestworker programs in 
Germany are of greater significance than in the United States, because the one from the 
1950s to 1973 can be deemed as the beginning of the country’s acceptance of immigration 
systematically, even though guestworkers were only designed to be in the country tem-
porarily, whereas in the United States they are only one of the many means to help the coun-
try’s economy. Germany’s guestworker programs changed the ethnic demography in Ger-
many, as many guestworkers stayed in the country and brought their families along. There-
fore, Germany was obliged to adjust its immigration policy to this change. In a way, Ger-
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many started to change its immigration policy gradually to strengthen its economy, and the 
consequences of these changes can result in more changes. 
The development of guestworker literature in Germany further highlights the significance 
of such programs in Germany. Similarly to the definition of migrant literature I stated in 
chapter two, I categorize literature about guestworkers into guestworker literature, regardless 
of the author’s national origin. Like their significance in German immigration policy, these 
programs also have a cultural significance, as guestworker literature in Germany can be 
deemed as the beginning of German migrant literature. The United States, on the other hand, 
does not have a category specifically for guestworker literature. Migrant literature in the 
United States is more of a product of mass immigration, and literature with guestworker ele-
ments is only a fraction of the whole. 
4.2. Permanent Residency 
“Current immigration trends are an outgrowth of world-
wide population movements — rising and falling, shifting 
and changing over several centuries — that have been 
generated by the actions of states and economies and by 
demographic forces.” 
— Reed Ueda 
There are different motivations for people to emigrate to another country. Roughly, they 
can be divided into economic and non-economic motivations. Economic motivation includes 
seeking a better life or more job opportunities, and non-economic motivation includes, for 
example, seeking political protection. Better education is also a reason for people’s residency 
abroad, but if the person will return home after education, then the person will not be consid-
ered to be an immigrant; if he or she, however, stays in the country after the completion of an 
educational process, usually having found a job, the person becomes an immigrant. 
To some extent, permanent residency is a stage between foreigner and citizen, because 
one of the prerequisites of naturalization in both the United States and Germany is being a 
permanent resident. Excluding immigration by marriage or family reunion, foreigners must 
have had certain achievements or contributions (sometimes measured by salary or income 
tax) to gain the right of permanent residency, which means that they have proven themselves 
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worthy in the receiving country. In a way, permanent residency is a step in the selection 
process for naturalization. 
Assimilation might occur alongside the immigration process, as the assimilation model I 
briefly mentioned in chapter two indicates. An early definition of this terminology is by 
Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess. They point out that it “is a process of interpenetration 
and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of 
other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with 
them in a common cultural life” (360). Milton M. Gordon collects several other definitions of 
assimilation in his book Assimilation in American Life. One definition by Brewton Berry 
states that 
[b]y assimilation we mean the process whereby groups with different cultures come to have a common 
culture. This means, of course, not merely such items of the culture as dress, knives and forks, lan-
guage, food, sports, and automobiles, which are relatively easy to appreciate and acquire, but also those 
less tangible items such as values, memories, sentiments, ideas, and attitudes. Assimilation refers thus 
to the fusion of cultural heritages, and must be distinguished from amalgamation, which denotes the 
biological mixture of originally distinct racial strains. (qtd. in M. Gordon 65; emphasis in original) 
In another definition by Joseph Fichter, assimilation is understood as 
a social process through which two or more persons or groups accept and perform one another’s pat-
terns of behavior. We commonly talk about a person, or a minority category, being assimilated into a 
group or a society, but here again this must not be interpreted as a “one-sided” process. It is a relation 
of interaction in which both parties behave reciprocally even though one may be much more affected 
than the other. (qtd. in M. Gordon 65) 
Arnold Rose defines it as 
the adoption by a person or group of the culture of another social group to such a complete extent that 
the person or group no longer has any characteristics identifying him with his former culture and no 
longer has any particular loyalties to his former culture. Or, the process leading to this adoption. (qtd. 
in M. Gordon 66; emphasis in original) 
From these definitions, people note that this term can have different implications for different 
scholars or in different situations. Although all scholars admit the process of adopting a dif-
ferent culture, Fichter’s theory emphasizes a two-way process, whereas Rose’s definition 
highlights the loss of former culture, or in other words, a one-sided process. In a way, Rose’s 
theory is what makes assimilation gain a rather negative connotation or even become “intel-
lectual sins” (Alba and Nee 827), because full abandonment of one’s culture is the only out-
come. Yet, theories by Park, Burgess, and Berry do not contain the idea of full erasure of mi-
nority culture. 
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Gordon divides assimilation into different types or stages, as shown in table 4.1. Cultural 
or behavioral assimilation is the adoption of the culture of the host society, which may also be 
“the first of types of assimilation to occur when a minority group arrives on the scene” (M. 
Gordon 77). This type/stage is also known as acculturation. According to Robert Redfield, 
Ralph Linton, and Melville J. Herskovits, acculturation “comprehends those phenomena 
which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-
hand contact, which subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both 
groups” (qtd. in M. Gordon 61). Similarly, Richard Alba and Victor Nee note, in the context 
of American society, that  
[t]he influence of minority ethnic cultures can occur also by an expansion of the range of what is con-
sidered normative behavior within the mainstream; thus elements of minority cultures are absorbed 
alongside their Anglo-American equivalents or are fused with mainstream elements to create a hybrid 
cultural mix. (834) 
 
Therefore, acculturation can be a two-way process. Furthermore, Raymond H. C. Teske and 
Bardin H. Nelson define acculturation to be an “individual or group process” (351), where 
“the ability to function in another culture is added to [the immigrant’s] repertoire of skills 
without displacing [his or her] prior cultural identity” (Callan 471, my italics). In this sense, 
Table 4.1 
The Assimilation Variables
Source: Milton M. Gordon; Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins; 
New York: Oxford UP, 1964; print; 71; table 5.
Subprocess or Condition Type or Stage of Assimilation Special Term
Change of cultural patterns to those of 
host society Cultural or behavioral assimilation Acculturation
Large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs, 
and institutions of host society, on 
primary group level
Structural assimilation None
Large-scale intermarriage Marital assimilation Amalgamation
Development of sense of peoplehood 
based exclusively on host society Identificational assimilation None
Absence of prejudice Attitude receptional assimilation None
Absence of discrimination Behavior receptional assimilation None
Absence of value and power conflict Civic assimilation None
 90
acculturation does not erase cultural identity of minority groups. Although the definitions of 
acculturation above are not necessarily related to Gordon’s theory of cultural or behavioral 
assimilation (they may also be introduced to replace the term “assimilation”), I still see this 
type of assimilation, like acculturation, as a two-way process, and it does not necessarily re-
quire the erasure of the original culture. 
Structural assimilation includes, for example, people of different ethnicities or cultures 
joining the same college fraternity or sorority (M. Gordon 80), or they are representatives of 
the same political party. Marital assimilation means intermarriage between couples of differ-
ent races or ethnicities. Identificational assimilation may take place together with marital as-
similation, but it can also occur when children of a minority group are raised in a host society. 
Attitude and behavior receptional assimilation requires host society’s acceptance of minority 
groups, which in a sense suggests a two-way process. Civic assimilation can be the result of 
all above listed types and stages of assimilation. 
Alba and Nee add another type of assimilation besides Gordon’s assimilation variables, 
namely, occupational mobility and economic assimilation (835). They point out that this type 
of assimilation is likely to happen when a person of minority culture seeks equal economic 
status in the host society (835), because in order to be economically equal, he or she needs to 
achieve what Gordon calls structural assimilation, and possibly, cultural or behavioral assimi-
lation. Moreover, this person has to be accepted by the host society. 
Because of the criticism of assimilation based on the notion that it requires full erasure of 
a minority culture, and because the abandonment of the term “assimilation” may result in a 
change in language, Alba and Nee redefine assimilation to be “the decline, and as its endpoint 
the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that 
express it” (863). They go on to explain why this new definition is better as follows: 
This definition does not assume that one of these groups must be the ethnic majority; assimilation can 
involve minority groups only, in which case the ethnic boundary between the majority and the merged 
minority groups presumably remains intact. . . . The definition stated above avoids a pitfall frequently 
stumbled upon by conventional definitions, which focus exclusively on the minority ethnic group, as-
suming implicitly that only it changes. By intent, our definition is agnostic about whether the changes 
wrought by assimilation are one-sided or more mutual. Indeed, there should be no definitional prescrip-
tion on this point, for it is likely that the unilaterality of the changes depends upon the minority group, 
the era, and the aspect of group difference under consideration. (863–64) 
To eliminate the negative connotation of assimilation (the erasure of a minority culture), 
the term “integration” is introduced. Integration “predominantly carries the implicit ideal of 
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(a minimum degree of) cultural homogeneity — especially referring to a language —as a pre-
requisite for social cohesion” (Schneider and Crul 1144). Very often, “successful integration” 
means a harmoniously interacting “parallel societies” or cultures (Schneider and Crul 1144). 
Therefore, if an immigrant accepts, understands, and feels comfortable with the culture of the 
host society and vice versa, and if he/she is able to interact with natives without cultural bar-
riers when still holding on to his/her own culture, then this immigrant is successfully inte-
grated into the host society. I will use the term “integration” instead of “assimilation” only 
when the minority culture or an immigrant’s characteristics identifying this culture is not or 
only slightly altered. 
Also because of the criticism of assimilation, scholars such as Fernando Ortiz mean to 
replace the terms acculturation and assimilation with transculturation (Birkle 5). Nancy 
Morejón defines transculturation to be 
the constant interaction, the transmutation between two or more cultural components with the uncon-
scious goal of creating a third cultural entity — in other words, a culture — that is new and indepen-
dent even though rooted in the preceding elements. Reciprocal influence is the determining factor here, 
for no single element superimposes itself on another; on the contrary, each one changes into the other 
so that both can be transformed into a third. (qtd. in Birkle 5) 
If the definition of assimilation allows a two-way process, then assimilation and transcultura-
tion are very similar. The only difference of the two terms can be that in the sense of transcul-
turation, a minority culture influences the mainstream culture to the same extent as the other 
way around, while in the sense of assimilation, the minority culture only slightly changes the 
mainstream. However, it is not explicitly defined in “assimilation” in how far a minority 
group will affect the host society. Therefore, assimilation and transculturation can still mean 
the same theoretically. If the two terms are this similar, then I prefer to use “assimilation,” 
because it can be used on the individual level to describe an individual’s change in social be-
havior. For example, I can say “a person is assimilated,” but not “he/she is transculturated.” 
With that said, I still want to use the term “assimilation” in the sense that cultural transforma-
tion happens to both minority and mainstream cultures; however, the impact of minority cul-
ture on the mainstream is much weaker than vice versa. Another reason why I insist on using 
the term “assimilation” although it may contain a negative connotation is that assimilation 
still exists in immigrant-receiving countries, especially among second-generation immigrants. 
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I do not encourage assimilation, but I think by eliminating the term, people will also overlook 
this existing phenomenon. 
4.2.1. Permanent Residency in the United States 
As chapter 3.1 explains, the United States can be seen as a nation of immigrants. There 
had been immigration flows from different parts of the world due to different reasons such as 
religious persecution, poverty and death in the home country, or war. Also, “the abolition of 
slavery in European empires reconfigured the international demand for settlers and laborers 
in New World societies” (Ueda 15) and “resulted in India and China becoming international 
suppliers of indentured labor to peripheral zones of economic development” (Ueda 15). For 
some of these immigrants, settling down in the United States was their goal, and for others, 
settling down abroad was unexpected, because they failed to return home. 
At least until the mid-nineteenth century, the United States accepted most of the immi-
grants, but it does not mean discrimination did not exist. For example, the discrimination 
against the Irish was already formed in Great Britain before the mass Irish immigration, start-
ing in the 1820s, and the discrimination against Irish Americans “was done publicly in highly 
humiliating fashion through signs that announced ‘Help Wanted: No Irish Need 
Apply’” (Jensen 405), although Richard Jensen argues that this sign is rather metaphoric than 
realistic, since historians have not located any photographs or drawings of the sign hung in 
the United States, and no ethnic group except Irish Catholics has reported seeing one (405). 
Real or not, Irish Americans were seen as the “Other” throughout the nineteenth century with 
a peak of anti-Irish sentiments in the mid-1850s, because they were blamed for being “re-
sponsible for public disorder and poverty,” were considered to be “premodern,” and were 
thought to embody “undermining republicanism” (Jensen 406). The Irish were compared to 
blacks: 
During the mid-nineteenth century, anti-Irish stereotypes emphasized nature over nurture and descent 
over consent. The Irish were imaged as apelike and “a race of savages,” at the same level of intelli-
gence as blacks. Pursuing the “lower” rather than the “higher” pleasures, seeking “vicious excitement” 
and “gratification merely animal,” the Irish were said to be “slaves” or “passions.” . . . 
Like blacks, Irish workers were condemned for lacking the habits of punctuality and industry. 
They were dismissed from their jobs for laziness, gambling, drinking, and “other debaucheries,” as 
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well as for “levity” and “impudence.” . . . Irish children, moreover, were seen as “undisciplined” and 
“uninstructed,” “inheriting” the “stupidity of centuries of ignorant ancestors.” (Takaki 149–50) 
The discrimination against Irish Americans was more practical than legal, because there was 
still no act which specifically discriminated against people of Irish descent. 
As the number of immigrants grew in the course of the nineteenth century, the United 
States started to set barriers to immigration through policies. There are several acts in the 
U.S. immigration history that mirrors the selection process of the United States. The first sig-
nificant law restricting immigration was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (“Chinese”). This 
law prohibited the immigration of Chinese workers out of the fear that Chinese workers 
would take away jobs from native-born Americans (“Chinese”). Although the Naturalization 
Act of 1790 limited naturalization to white people only, immigration of colored people was 
not restricted. In fact, the Chinaman was welcomed in the first few years of mass Chinese 
immigration to the United States (started roughly around 1850 as a result of the Gold Rush, 
and also a consequence of the Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion in China which devas-
tated all industry and trade), because “in those days race antipathy was subordinated to indus-
trial necessity, and in a heterogeneous community where every Caucasian expected to be a 
miner or a speculator, the reticent, industrious, adaptable Chinese could find room and some-
thing more than toleration,” and “[t]hey were highly valued as general laborers, carpenters 
and cooks” (Coolidge 21). However, as the Chinese population in the United States grew, 
Chinese workers became a threat to the white population for their cheap labor, and anti-Chi-
nese sentiments began to grow. “White workers referred to the Chinese as ‘nagurs,’ and a 
magazine cartoon in California depicted the Chinese as a bloodsucking vampire with slanted 
eyes, a pigtail, dark skin, and thick lips. Like blacks, the Chinese were described as heathen, 
morally inferior, savage, childlike, and lustful” (Takaki 205). There had been failed attempts 
to restrict immigration of Chinese workers to the United States before 1882, but in 1882 the 
act was finally passed. The Chinese Exclusion Act suspended “the coming of Chinese labor-
ers to the United States,” and the term “Chinese laborers” applied to “both skilled and un-
skilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining” (“Archives”). This act also banned natural-
ization for Chinese immigrants, stating that “no State court or court of the United States shall 
admit Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in conflict with this act are hereby 
repealed” (“Archives”). Therefore, the Chinese Exclusion Act was the first federal act that 
restricted immigration from a specific country. This act was first signed to be in effect for ten 
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years, and it was extended for another ten years through the Geary Act of 1892, and finally it 
became permanent in 1902 (“Chinese”). The Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed in 1943 by 
the Magnuson Act, because China became America’s war ally. However, this act still “al-
lowed only 105 Chinese immigrants per year, reflecting persisting prejudice against the Chi-
nese in American immigration policy” (“Chinese”). 
The discrimination against Chinese immigrants is well depicted in Chinese American lit-
erature. The collection of Sui Sin Far’s short stories, Mrs. Spring Fragrance, was published 
in 1912, a time when the Chinese Exclusion Act was in effect. Therefore, these short stories 
mirror the life of Chinese immigrants in the United States during a time of discrimination and 
exclusion. In one of the short stories, ironically titled “In the Land of the Free,” the infant of a 
Chinese couple is detained by U.S. immigration, because there is no proof that the child is 
theirs. U.S. immigration officials promise that as soon as they hear from Washington, the 
child will be returned to the couple. However, months have passed, but there is still no word 
from Washington. The Chinese couple hires an American lawyer with the hope that he can 
get their son back, but the lawyer only asks for more and more money in return without ac-
complishing anything. After ten months, the Chinese couple can finally have their son back, 
but the child does not know his mother anymore and bids his mother go away. Here, “a Chi-
nese child is stripped of his ethnic identity [by ‘the land of the free’] and a Chinese mother 
loses the freedom to keep her son” (qtd. in Birkle 137). The tragedy of the Chinese couple is 
the result of discrimination against Chinese immigrants, and although they are in the “land of 
the free,” Chinese immigrants are not free at all. “The particular irony,” as Carmen Birkle 
states, 
lies in the fact that the Exclusion Act allowed merchants and their wives as well as their children entry 
into the United States as long as they had proper documents, but many court cases from the turn of the 
century showed that despite this right, many Chinese had to fight for it. Here, “the law of the land” 
which has to be complied with is contrasted with common sense, namely that “‘[t]here cannot be any 
law that would keep a child from its mother!’” (136–37) 
Besides the threat Americans felt toward Chinese laborers, another reason for this restric-
tion is that Chinese were thought to be too different and unassimilable. Chinese American 
literature indeed shows the grave difference between Chinese and American customs, but it 
also shows that assimilation is not impossible for Chinese immigrants. For example, in Sui 
Sin Far’s short stories, both aspects are represented. In a story in this collection, “The Ameri-
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canizing of Pau Tsu,” the young wife of a Chinese immigrant, Pau Tsu, came to the United 
States without the slightest knowledge of the English language, and she has brought her Chi-
nese customs along. She decorates her American apartment with things she has brought from 
China and turns it into “an Oriental bower” (Far 83). Also, Pau Tsu is not eager to learn Eng-
lish, because both her husband and her maid speak Chinese; she does not want to wear Amer-
ican dresses, because it makes her look like her husband’s American friend, Miss Adah, from 
whose presence she suffers, for she does not seem to understand that a man and a woman can 
just be friends in the United States; and she feels ashamed to be examined by a male doctor. 
All her behavior and thinking demonstrate a grave difference between Chinese and American 
customs and thinking, and they suggest the difficulty for a Chinese immigrant to assimilate as 
the U.S. government expects. However, June Howard states that “Pau Tsu does ‘Americanize’ 
[in the end], as the title indicates — enough to step substantially out of bounds and ask her 
husband to divorce her, ‘as is the custom in America’” (152). In this sense, however difficult 
it is, Chinese immigrants can adjust to the American way of thinking. 
In another short story, “Mrs. Spring Fragrance,” Far depicts a Chinese woman who has 
been Americanized fully. The eponymous heroine Mrs. Spring Fragrance came to the United 
States without knowing a single word of “the American language,” but in five years, “[t]here 
are no more American words for her learning” (Far 1). She reads American poetry and quotes 
American poems from time to time, and she understands the American way of love and mar-
riage. As June Howard notes, the word “American” is frequently used in the story, as “Mrs. 
Spring Fragrance is not learning English but ‘the American language,’ understood in the next 
sentence by ‘American words’” (146). Moreover, Mrs. Spring Fragrance believes that mar-
riage should be based on love as opposed to the Chinese traditional arranged marriage. There-
fore, her Americanization is “not only a matter of learning how to talk, but also learning how 
to feel” (June Howard 148). Mrs. Spring Fragrance represents those Chinese immigrants who 
are Americanized and have integrated into American society. Americanization is a type of 
assimilation, because it requires a change in behavior, values, and attitudes. In this case, Mrs. 
Spring Fragrance has adopted the American language and values, which demonstrates Chi-
nese immigrants’ ability to adjust, contrary to the claim that they are “unassimilable.” 
The Chinese Exclusion Act foreshadowed more immigration-restriction acts. The 1917 
Immigration Act, also known as the Asiatic Barred Zone Act,  
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restricted the immigration of “undesirables” from other countries, including “idiots, imbeciles, epilep-
tics, alcoholics, poor, criminals, beggars, any person suffering attacks of insanity, those with tuberculo-
sis, and those who have any form of dangerous contagious disease, aliens who have a physical disabili-
ty that will restrict them from earning a living in the United States . . . , polygamists and anarchists, 
those who were against the organized government or those who advocated the unlawful destruction of 
property and those who advocated the unlawful assault of killing of any officer.” (Tucker and Creller) 
The act also created a zone called the Asiatic Barred Zone, and “‘[a]ny country not owned by 
the U.S. adjacent to the continent of Asia’ along specified longitudes and latitudes were re-
stricted from immigrating” (Tucker and Creller). With this act, not only the Chinese, but also 
most Asians were restricted from immigration. The Asiatic Barred Zone was abolished by the 
1952 Walter-McCarran Act, which makes the official discrimination against Asians last for 35 
years. Furthermore, the 1917 Immigration Act “implemented a literacy test that required im-
migrants over 16 years old to demonstrate basic reading comprehension” (“Milestones”), 
probably as a means to eliminate “idiots,” as the act formulated. Those undesirable criteria 
also made it easier and subjective to refuse any immigrant’s entrance. The 1917 Immigration 
Act was carried out at inspection stations. For example, Ellis Island served as one of Ameri-
ca’s busiest inspection stations. Immigrants’ physical and mental health was checked there, 
and only those who were thought to be both physically and mentally healthy were allowed to 
enter the United States. On an exhibition board in the Ellis Island Immigration Museum, it 
states that 
[f]or the vast majority of immigrants, Ellis Island meant three to five hours of waiting for a brief med-
ical and legal examination prior to admittance. For others, it meant a longer stay with additional testing 
or a legal hearing. For an unfortunate 2%, it meant exclusion and a return trip to the homeland.  20
Immigrants who were thought to be unhealthy were marked with symbols,  and this could 21
look humiliating, because being chalk-marked made immigrants look like animals. 
The Emergency Quota Act of 1921 expanded restriction worldwide. This act states that 
“the number of aliens of any nationality who may be admitted under the immigration laws to 
the United States in any fiscal year shall be limited to 3 per centum of the number of foreign- 
born persons of such nationality resident in the United States as determined by the United 
States census of 1910” (5). This limitation did not apply to government officials, temporary 
visitors for pleasure or business, citizens of those countries which had bilateral agreements 
 Quoted from the exhibition board “Through America’s Gate.” Date of visit: September 22, 2014.20
 These symbols are: X: suspected mental defect; X with a circle around it: definite signs of mental disease ob21 -
served; B: back; C: conjunctivitis; CT: trachoma; E: eyes; F: face; Ft: feet; G: goiter; H: heart; K: hernia; L: 
lameness; N: neck; P: physical and lungs; Pg: pregnancy; Sc: scalp (favus); and S: senility.
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with the United States, citizens of the Asiatic Barred Zone, and citizens of adjacent countries 
and islands. The 1921 Quota Act was followed by the 1924 Quota Act, or officially the Im-
migration Act of 1924, which reduced the quota percentage, stating that “[t]he annual quota 
of any nationality shall be 2 per centum of the number of foreign-born individuals of such 
nationality resident in continental United States as determined by the United States census of 
1890, but the minimum quota of any nationality shall be 100” (159). The two quota acts 
demonstrate the United States’ attempt to reduce immigration, especially from Southern and 
Eastern Europe, because the change of denominator (from the 1910 census to the 1890 cen-
sus) offered a much smaller quota to Eastern and Southern Europe (see tables 4.2 and 4.3). If 
we calculate the quotas based on the two quota acts, we see a great difference between the 
quotas given to Eastern (for Germany belongs to Central Europe, and its immigrant propor-
tion was much larger in 1890 than in 1910) and Southern Europe (see table 4.3). In other 
words, the United States intended to maximize the dominance of immigrants from North-
western Europe. The 1924 Quota Act also separated non-quota immigrants from quota immi-
grants — basically, residents of the Western Hemisphere and immigrants “who had spouses 
Country of Birth
Number
1890 1910
Total Foreign-Born 9,249,560 13,515,886
Europe 8,020,608 11,791,841
Northwestern Europe 4,380,752 4,239,067
Central and Eastern Europe* 3,420,629 6,024,041
Southern Europe 206,648 1,525,875
Other Europe 12,579 2,858
Table 4.2 
Foreign-Born Population, by Country of Birth
* Germany belongs to this category, and the numbers for the German-born population were 2,784,894 in 1890 
(81.4% of all foreign-born immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe) and 2,311,237 in 1910 (38.4%). 
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1929; census.gov; United States Census Bureau, 27 Jul. 
2015; Web; 33; PDF file; table 30.
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or parents already in the United States” (Lee 14) belonged to non-quota immigrants, and 
therefore the 1924 Quota Act did not apply to them. 
The period between 1920 and 1965 is sometimes known as “immigration pause” (as 
shown in figure 3.1 in chapter three). The two Quota Acts successfully reduced the immigrant 
population, especially in the second half of the 1920s, and throughout the 1930s when the 
Great Depression hit the United States, immigrants were not eager to come — “in some years 
more people left . . . than arrived” (Martin). The Great Depression also fueled anti-Semitism 
(Mintz), which probably affected the admission of Jewish refugees later. During the Second 
World War, the United States “did not pursue an organized and specific rescue policy for 
Jewish victims of Nazi Germany until early 1944” (“United”). In 1944, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt finally established the War Refugee Board which “helped to rescue many thou-
sands of Jews in Hungary, Romania, and elsewhere in Europe” (“United”). He “also directed 
that Fort Ontario, New York, become a free port for refugees. However, only a few thousand 
refugees were allowed there and they were from liberated areas, not from Nazi-occupied ar-
eas” (United”). “Between 1933 and 1945 the United States took in only 132,000 Jewish 
refugees, only ten percent of the quota allowed by law” (Mintz). After the war, “veterans re-
turned with European spouses and Europeans migrated,” and hence immigration started to 
rise again (Martin). 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 erased restrictions based on race, gender, 
and national origin, and it replaced the quota system of the 1920s with “a preference system 
Country of Birth
Quota Based on The Quota Act of …
1921 1924
Northwestern Europe 127,172 87,615
Central and Eastern Europe* 180,721 68,413
*Germany 69,337 (38.4% of the quota for Central and Eastern Europe)
55,698 (81.4% of the quota for 
Central and Eastern Europe)
*Other 111,384 12,715
Southern Europe 45,776 4,133
Table 4.3 
Quotas Based on Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924, by Country of Birth
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that focused on immigrants’ skills and family relationships with citizens or residents of the 
U.S.” (“1965”). It also set numerical restrictions on visas to 170,000 per year, “not including 
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, nor ‘special immigrants’ (including those born in ‘inde-
pendent’ nations in the Western hemisphere; former citizens; ministers; employees of the U.S. 
government abroad)” (“1965”). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 is considered to 
be a milestone in American history, because it officially eliminated racial and ethnic discrim-
ination. Instead of formulating who cannot enter the United States (like the “undesirables” 
stated in the Immigration Act of 1917), this Immigration and Nationality Act formulated a 
preferred immigrant group (skilled immigrants), which not only functioned as a filter for the 
immigrant selection process, but also made the act sound more politically correct. 
The immigration history of the United States creates what people call a “nation of immi-
grants.” Hollifield notes that “immigration has long been a national political issue” in nations 
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Fig. 4.1. Foreign-Born Population by Region of Birth, 1850–2000
Fig. 4.1. Dianne Schmidley, Profile of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2000 (files.eric.ed.-
gov; U.S. Census Bureau, Dec. 2001; Web; 11; 1 Feb. 2016; PDF file).
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of immigrants (“The Politics” 134). Figure 4.1 shows foreign-born population percentages by 
region of birth from 1850 to 2000. The dominant number of immigrants from Europe before 
1970 indicates a strong preference for European immigrants instructed by the U.S. immigra-
tion policies at that time, and the rapid growth of the foreign-born population from Latin 
America and Asia after 1970 demonstrates that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 
had a strong effect on immigration, and this growth, together with the decrease in the foreign-
born population from Europe and North America, continued to change U.S. demography. In 
addition, in a nation of immigrants, immigration is not only a political issue in the country, 
but also a part of the country’s national identity. The fact that the United States has statistics, 
polls, and analyses categorized by race, ethnicity, or country of birth demonstrates that the 
immigrant background is embedded in the national characteristics of the United States. It 
suggests that the United States is a nation of different ethnicities and races and sees cultural 
background as an influential factor in people’s behavior and thinking. Furthermore, the map 
in figure 3.3 in chapter three indicates that most Americans are aware of their immigrant 
backgrounds, which means that immigration is part of American national identity. 
There are several ways to become a permanent resident, or a Green Card holder, in the 
United States. The first way is to obtain permanent residency through family. If a person is an 
immediate relative (parent, spouse, child, or sibling) of an American citizen or a family 
member (spouse or unmarried child) of a Green Card holder, the person can petition for per-
manent residency (“Green Card through Family”). 
The second way is through a job. When an employer offers an immigrant permanent em-
ployment, the immigrant is eligible to become a permanent resident based on this offer 
(“Green Card through a Job”). In this case, the employer needs to “get a labor 
certification” (“Green Card through a Job”) from the Department of Labor (DOL), where the 
DOL “[certifies] to the USCIS that there are not sufficient U.S. workers able, willing, quali-
fied and available to accept the job opportunity in the area of intended employment and that 
employment of the foreign worker will not adversely affect the wages and working condi-
tions of similarly employed U.S. workers” (“Permanent Labor”). This process is similar to 
the United States guestworker programs. However, the difference is that in most cases of em-
ployment-based permanent residence, employers hire foreign workers not for possible cheap 
labor, but for their skills, and thus the employers benefit from their productivity rather than 
 101
low wages. Therefore, the Marxist approach which I discussed in chapter two does not ex-
plain this type of immigration. After employers have obtained a labor certification, they can 
“file a Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker” (“Green Card through a Job”). Im-
migrant workers can also file a petition for themselves if they are of “extraordinary ability in 
the sciences, arts, education, business or athletics” (“Green Card through Self Petition”). This 
means to obtain permanent residency further demonstrates the United States’ attempt to keep 
immigrants with extraordinary abilities and skills. 
There are several job categories that are seen as “special,” and foreign workers whose 
past or current job belongs to these categories can apply for permanent residency. Some of 
the categories are Afghan/Iraqi translator, Afghan/Iraqi who assisted the U.S. government, 
armed forces member, broadcaster, and international organization employee (“Green Card 
through Special”). Many of these categories of jobs relate to political issues and help main-
tain and reinforce the United States’ political power in the world. 
Immigrants who invest in “a commercial enterprise in the United States” and create full-
time jobs may also be eligible for permanent residency. In order to gain permanent residency 
through investment, an immigrant needs to “invest $1,000,000, or at least $500,000 in a tar-
geted employment area (high unemployment or rural area)” (“Green Card through Invest-
ment”). The United States offers foreigners this means to gain permanent residency, because 
these immigrants contribute to the U.S. economy and help the United States solve the prob-
lem of unemployment. 
The third way to obtain permanent residency is through refugee or asylee status. This 
means of getting the desired status is based on humanitarian reasons. A refugee is “required 
by law to apply for permanent resident status 1 year after being admitted to the United 
States,” but an asylee is not required to do so,  yet it might be beneficial to asylees them22 -
selves if they are Green Card holders (“Green Card through Refugee”). The United States has 
been very cautious in the current crisis of Syrian refugees caused by the Islamic State due to 
national security concerns, especially after the Islamic State terrorists attacked Paris on No-
vember 13, 2015, San Bernardino, CA on December 2, 2015, and Brussels on March 22, 
2016. Although President Obama announced in September 2015 that the United States would 
 The difference between a refugee and an asylee is the location of the applicant. If an applicant is outside the 22
United States, he/she may apply for refugee status, whereas an applicant who is already in the United States may 
apply for asylee status.
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admit 10,000 Syrian refugees in the next year, the number is much lower than “the numbers 
being taken in by Canada, Germany and other close U.S. allies” (Zengerle). All refugees to 
the United States have to go through a background check by the Department of Homeland 
Security when they apply for refugee status, and this procedure usually takes eighteen months 
or more (Welsh). The current refugee program demonstrates that the United States is obliged 
to admit refugees for humanitarian reasons, but it is still reluctant to do so due to national se-
curity and economic (how much money refugees will cost the United States) concerns. 
A rather unique way to gain permanent residency is through Green Card lottery, also 
known as the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program (DV Program). This program “makes up to 
50,000 immigrant visas available annually, drawn from random selection among all entries to 
individuals who are from countries with low rates of immigration to the United States”  23
(“Green Card through the Diversity”). Applicants for the DV Program must have “at least a 
high school education or its equivalent,” or have, “within 5 years of the date of application 
for a [diversity immigrant visa], at least 2 years of work experience in an occupation which 
requires at least 2 years of training or experience” (INA of 1990, 4999). The DV Program is 
very likely to be a unique product of nations of immigrants, for it is designed to maintain di-
versity in the country. The requirements to have a certain level of education and work experi-
ence are to ensure that these immigrants will have the ability to work, and thus they will not 
be a burden to the United States. 
Although there are many means to gain permanent residency, the most common means is 
through family ties. David Seminara of the Center for Immigration Studies summarizes the 
percentages of every preference category of gaining permanent residency status (LPR for le-
gal permanent resident/residency) from 2006 to 2007 (fig. 4.2), and permanent residency 
through family ties (including spouses of American citizens, spouses and children of LPRs, 
children of American citizens, parents of American citizens, and brothers and sisters of Amer-
ican citizens) has an evident lead of 62% of the total number of permanent residents. This 
may suggest that permanent residency through family ties is the easiest way and has fewer 
requirements than any other means. This results in marriage fraud cases, as Seminara points 
out in his study. Some common types of marriage fraud include, for example, “[c]ash-for-
 For DV-2016, natives of the following countries are NOT eligible to apply: Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chi23 -
na (mainland-born), Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Nige-
ria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Korea, United Kingdom (except Northern Ireland) and its dependent terri-
tories, and Vietnam (Instructions).
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vows weddings, where Americans are paid to wed,” “[f]riends-and-family plans, where 
someone pitches in to help get someone else’s spouse to the United States,” and “‘I do, I 
don’t, I do’ marriages, where foreign nationals divorce their spouses in their home countries, 
marry Americans, and get green cards two years later; then divorce the Americans, remarry 
their original spouses, and petition to bring them to the United States” (Seminara). Although 
most marriages are legitimate, marriage fraud can have a negative impact on the general 
process of gaining permanent resident status through marriage, because “bogus marriage peti-
tions . . . bog down an already slow and cumbersome visa bureaucracy,” and “[s]cam mar-
riages . . . can cast a shadow of illegitimacy over real marriages,” so “many legitimate cou-
ples may be forced to endure invasive and sometimes harsh interviews with United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) and State Department personnel who are try-
ing in good faith to screen out fake couples” (Seminara). 
Diversity Lottery Winners 
4%
Brothers and Sisters of American Citizens 
6%
Refugees 
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Fig. 4.2. Foreign Citizens Gaining LPR Status by Preference Category, 2006–2007
Fig. 4.2. David Seminara, “Hello, I Love You, Won’t You Tell Me Your Name: Inside the Green Card Mar-
riage Phenomenon” (cis.org; Center for Immigration Studies, Nov. 2008; Web; 9 Jan. 2016).
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Second in line of the preference category in gaining LPR status is employment-based 
preferences, and the incomes of natives and foreign-born residents in general seem equal. 
Figure 4.3 shows the median household income by household type and region of birth. In the 
category of “all households,” there is no clear income disparity between natives and foreign-
born residents; those born in Asia, Europe, Northern America, and Oceania even have higher 
median household income than natives, and only residents born in Latin America show a 
great disadvantage in household income. A possible explanation would be that residents from 
Latin America take over more low-skilled jobs in the United States, and these countries are 
the main sending countries of the H-2 program. There are slight differences in household in-
come ranks by region of birth due to different household types, but household income of res-
idents born in Latin America is the lowest in every household type, and the median household 
income gap between residents born in Latin America and all foreign-born residents is large. 
Immigration reforms in the United States gradually eliminated discriminating policies 
against immigrants. However, nativism has always been a phenomenon in the country. In his-
tory, nativism developed in accordance with immigration flows and immigration policy. “Un-
Fig. 4.3. Median Household Income by Household Type and Region of Birth: 2010
Fig. 4.3. Elizabeth M. Grieco, Yesenia D. Acosta, G. Patricia de la Cruz, Christine Gambino, Thomas Gryn, 
Luke J. Larsen, Edward N. Trevelyan, and Nathan P. Walters, The Foreign-Born Population in the United 
States: 2010 (census.gov; United States Census Bureau, May 2012; Web; 19; 10 Feb. 2016; PDF file).
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til the mid-1880s,” when most immigrants came from Northern and Western Europe, “xeno-
phobia appears to have remained relatively low” (Fetzer 29–30). “Starting around 1885, 
however, nativism flared up and continued rising until around 1896” (Fetzer 30). There were 
riots against the Chinese and Mexicans, because Chinese and Mexican workers took away 
jobs from white Americans; and anti-Italian violence occurred (Fetzer 30). The First World 
War resulted in a strong anti-German sentiment, and even German Americans were thought to 
be enemies. In 1920, “membership in the antiforeigner Ku Klux Klan skyrocketed,” and these 
nativists aimed at eliminating colored people (Fetzer 33). Probably because the Quota Acts 
restricted immigration, nativism “declined from 1925 to 1928” (Fetzer 35). “Yet perhaps be-
cause the Quota Acts did not exclude [Mexico], Mexican immigrants and their U.S.-born 
children suffered public hostility, government raids, and mass deportation around 1931” (Fet-
zer 35–6). The Second World War brought many “Jews, intellectuals, and other refugees from 
Hitler’s persecutions” to the United States, and this led to anti-Semitic violence (Fetzer 37). 
Fig. 4.4. U.S. Views of Immigrants, by Party
Fig. 4.4. Jens Manuel Krogstad, “On Views of Immigrants, Americans Largely Split along Party 
Lines” (pewresearch.org; Pew Research Center, 30 Sep. 2015; Web; 4 Mar. 2016).
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Moreover, anti-Japanese sentiments began to grow. After 1946, “[m]ass nativism appears to 
have fallen steadily,” although anti-Mexican sentiment and discrimination against Jews and 
Asians still existed (Fetzer 39–40). Since Congress passed the 1965 Immigration and Nation-
ality Act, “[n]early 59 million immigrants have come to the U.S.” (Krogstad, “On Views”). 
However, anti-immigrant sentiment continued, though not as strong. Violent acts still hap-
pened, for example, “[x]enophobes beat Chinese-American Vincent Chin to death in Detroit 
in 1982, and blue-collar whites rioted against Latinos in Massachusetts in 1984” (Fetzer 42). 
Even nowadays, the U.S. public does not show a very positive attitude toward immigra-
tion. Figure 4.4 shows the U.S. views on immigrants in 2014. Generally, Democrats have a 
more positive view of immigrants than Republicans, but the percentage of Democrats who 
think immigrants make U.S. society better in the long run (55%) is still not very high. Al-
though slightly more than half the Democrats do not see a connection between immigrants 
and crimes, the number of respondents who believe that immigrants make crimes worse is 
larger than that of respondents who think they make the situation better, regardless of party. 
Also, while the majority of the Republicans believe that immigrants make the U.S. economy 
worse, only 34% of Democrats think the same. However, the number of Democrats who 
think that immigrants make the economy better is not much larger than those who think the 
opposite, with only 4% difference. Their attitudes toward different groups of immigrants also 
vary. The Pew Research Center finds out that 
Americans on both sides of the partisan line have mostly positive or neutral views of Asian and Eu-
ropean immigrants. But when it comes to those from Latin America, 58% of Republicans say these 
immigrants have had a mostly negative impact on society, compared with 23% of Democrats. There is 
a similar divide on views of Middle Eastern immigrants, with Republicans more than twice as likely as 
Democrats to view them negatively. (Krogstad, “On Views”) 
A more general survey shows that very few Americans support an increase in immigration, 
and nearly half Americans think immigration should be decreased (fig. 4.5). Democrats, who 
are likely to hold a more tolerant view on immigration, have the tendency to think the United 
States should keep immigration at its present level, but not increase it. 
In the 2016 presidential primaries, the GOP front-runner Donald Trump, later elected 
President, proposed to end birthright citizenship and advocated harsh immigration policies 
toward Mexicans and Muslims. He assured reporters that “he was not only serious about de-
porting every undocumented immigrant in the United States — at least 11 million people — 
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but sending their U.S.-born or U.S.-raised children or young adult progeny with them, 
too” (Ross). However, Trump considered his plan “humane,” as he explained, “[i]f they’ve 
done well, they’re going out and they’re coming back in legally” (qtd. in Ross). With regard 
to Mexican immigrants, Trump even used discriminating language to describe them, saying 
[w]hen Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending the best. . . . [T]hey’re sending people that have 
lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems. . . . They’re bringing drugs, they’re bringing 
crime. They’re rapists and some, I assume, are good people, but I speak to border guards and they’re 
telling us what we’re getting. (qtd. in Ross) 
To solve these “problems,” he claimed that he would build a great wall along the U.S.-Mexi-
co borderline and Mexico had to pay for it. As for Muslims, “Trump called for a ‘total and 
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives 
can figure out what is going on’” (Ross). The fact that Trump was elected President in No-
vember 2016 demonstrates that a considerable number of Americans agree with Trump’s 
claims, prejudice against Mexicans and Muslims, and support an (even far-right) restriction in 
immigration to hinder immigration of specific racial and ethnic groups. 
4.2.2. Permanent Residency in Germany 
The concept “third-country nationals” must be employed in the context of permanent res-
idency in Germany due to the free movement of EU nationals. According to the free move-
Fig. 4.5. U.S. Views on Immigration, by Party
Fig. 4.5. Jens Manuel Krogstad, “On Views of Immigrants, Americans Largely Split along Party 
Lines” (pewresearch.org; Pew Research Center, 30 Sep. 2015; Web; 4 Mar. 2016).
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ment agreement, EU nationals can work in another EU country without obtaining a work 
permit and reside in that country even after completion of employment (“Free Movement”). 
Therefore, EU nationals are treated differently from non-EU nationals in Germany, and regu-
lations and requirements to obtain permanent residency in Germany mostly apply to non-EU 
nationals, also known as third-country nationals. 
As chapter 2, part 1, section 9 of the current Residence Act (AufenthG) states, a foreigner 
can apply for permanent residency, or settlement permit (Niederlassungserlaubnis), if 
1. he or she has held a residence permit for five years, 
2. his or her subsistence is secure, 
3. he or she has paid compulsory or voluntary contributions into the statutory pension scheme for at 
least 60 months or furnishes evidence of an entitlement to comparable benefits from an insurance 
or pension scheme or from an insurance company; time off for the purposes of child care or nursing 
at home shall be duly taken into account, 
4. the granting of such a residence permit is not precluded by reasons of public safety or order, ac-
cording due consideration to the severity or the nature of the breach of public safety or order or the 
danger emanating from the foreigner, with due regard to the duration of the foreigner’s stay to date 
and the existence of ties in the federal territory, 
5. he or she is permitted to be in employment, if he or she is in employment, 
6. he or she is in possession of the other permits which are required for the purpose of the permanent 
pursuit of his or her economic activity, 
7. he or she has a sufficient command of the German language, 
8. he or she possesses a basic knowledge of the legal and social system and the way of life in the fed-
eral territory and 
9. he or she possesses sufficient living space for himself or herself and the members of his or her fam-
ily forming part of his or her household. (Act on the Residence) 
These requirements ensure that permanent residents will not be a burden on Germany’s econ-
omy, but on the contrary, permanent residents should be able to contribute to the country’s 
economy. In cases of highly educated or highly qualified foreigners, some requirements are 
modified to simplify their process to gain permanent residency. For example, for graduates 
from German universities, the time period in number 3 of section 9 is shortened to 24 months 
if they have “a job commensurate with [their] degree” (Act on the Residence). This demon-
strates the preference of workers with special skills and knowledge. 
Section 9 also describes an employment-based permanent residency, which is a very 
common method to gain permanent residence status. Similar to the Green Card through em-
ployment in the United States, where employers need to get a certification from the DOL to 
show that there are not sufficient U.S. workers available or qualified for the job, Germany 
also has a law to protect citizen workers. According to the AuftenthG, “[t]he admission of 
foreign employees shall be geared to the requirements of the German economy, according 
due consideration to the labour market situation and the need to combat unemployment effec-
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tively” (Act on the Residence). Therefore, employers need approval from “a statutory instru-
ment” before hiring a foreign employee (Act on the Residence). 
Apart from permanent residency through employment, there are only a few ways to gain 
this status, and one of which is residence for family reasons. A foreigner who is “spouse of a 
German,” “minor, unmarried child of a German,” or “parent of a minor, unmarried German 
for the purpose of care and custody” is eligible to gain residence permit, and this permit can 
become permanent after three years (Act of the Residence). The spouse of a permanent resi-
dent can only get a residence permit, but this kind of residency cannot become permanent 
unless the spouse fulfills the requirements in section 9. The same regulations also apply to 
other dependents of a permanent resident, with the exception of a child born in Germany to a 
permanent resident, who, in this case, is eligible for German citizenship. 
Through humanitarian and political assistance, a foreigner can gain a limited residence 
permit at first, and the duration of such residence permit should not exceed a period of three 
years, although it is possible to extend this permit (Act of the Residence). This kind of resi-
dence permit includes a work permit, as it entitles “the holder to pursue an economic activi-
ty” (Act of the Residence). However, after three years, a foreigner may become a permanent 
resident if he or she is entitled to asylum and if “the conditions for revocation or withdrawal 
do not apply” (Act of the Residence). Moreover, any holder of this type of residence permit 
(not only refugees, but also victims of criminal offense, for instance) is entitled to permanent 
residency after seven years if he or she can fulfill the requirements in section 9. In this case, 
humanitarian-based residency is turned into employment-based permanent residency. 
The possibility that these foreigners seeking for protection may become permanent resi-
dents and eventually citizens would put many citizens to unrest in any insecure situation. For 
example, Germany is facing a turn of public attitudes toward refugees in the temporary 
refugee crisis in Europe roughly starting in 2014. At first, Germans warmly welcomed 
refugees when Germany started admitting them to the country, “flocking to train stations with 
food and clothing” (Marcus), and the media reported in an entertaining manner that refugees 
were taking selfies with Chancellor Merkel to show their respect and gratitude. However, af-
ter some criminal offenses committed by refugees, the public began to doubt Chancellor 
Merkel’s decision to admit refugees in such a large number — the “positive stance [had] giv-
en way to increasing alarm and, occasionally, violence,” and Merkel’s job approval rating had 
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dropped (Marcus). This change demonstrates the vulnerability of German citizens’ attitudes 
toward immigration. Since refugees are coming to Germany in large numbers and with a high 
rate, it is very likely that sending them back will become a problem, and many of them will 
permanently stay in the country in the future. Therefore, similar to Germany’s guestworker 
programs, which resulted in unplanned or even unwanted permanent residency of foreigners, 
the flow of refugees may have the same result, and this challenges German culture. 
Similar to the Green Card through investment in the United States, Germany also issues 
residence permits to foreigners who are self-employed. However, this permit is only issued if 
“an economic interest or a regional need applies,” “the activity is expected to have positive 
effects on the economy,” “and personal capital on the part of the foreigner or a loan undertak-
ing is available to realise the business idea” (Act on the Residence). The residence permit is 
limited to three years, and if the activity is successful, as equivalent to what is described in 
section 9 (2), a settlement permit may be issued. 
Household with a 
Household Net Income 
from … to (Not Include) 
… Euros per Month
Number of Households*, by Immigration Background, in 1,000
Total Without Immigration Background
With Immigration 
Background
Total 40,223 33,799 6,424
Under 500 630 (1.57%) 495 (1.46%) 135 (2.10%)
500–900 3,669 (9.12%) 2,934 (8.68%) 735 (11.44%)
900–1,300 5,282 (13.13%) 4,326 (12.80%) 956 (14.88%)
1,300–1,500 2,865 (7.12%) 2,384 (7.05%) 482 (7.50%)
1,500–2,000 6,340 (15.76%) 5,340 (15.80%) 1,000 (15.57%)
2,000–2,600 5,988 (14.89%) 4,982 (14.74%) 1,006 (15.66%)
2,600–3,200 4,353 (10.82%) 3,633 (10.75%) 720 (11.21%)
3,200–4,500 5,629 (13.99%) 4,854 (14.36%) 776 (12.08%)
4,500 and More 4,305 (10.70%) 3,850 (11.39%) 456 (7.10%)
Table 4.4 
Number of Households in Germany, by Household Income and Immigration Background: 2014
* Numbers in each income category do not add up to the total number due to rounding. 
Source: Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit: Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund — Ergebnisse des 
Mikrozensus; destatis.de; statistisches Bundesamt, 2015; Web; 338–40; PDF file; table 11.
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To some degrees, immigrants’ social status can be shown through income. The Federal 
Statistical Office collected statistics of the number of households in Germany by household 
income and immigration background. Table 4.4 shows an overview of the number of house-
holds in 2014, categorized by income and immigration background. To better analyze these 
numbers, I calculated the percentages of households in each income group and added them 
after each number. This means, for example, that 1.57% of all households have a monthly net 
income under 500 euros. If grouped by immigration background, 1.46% of the households 
which have no immigration background receive a monthly net income under 500 euros, while 
2.10% of the households with immigration background are in this income group. Since the 
numbers of households in each category do not add up to the total number due to rounding, 
the percentages in each category also do not add up to 100%. From the percentages, we see 
that the percentage of households that have a low income (up to 1,300 euros per month) is 
evidently higher in households with immigration background than those without. On the con-
trary, the percentage of households that have a high income (3,200 euros per month and 
more) is much higher in household without immigration background. 
More closely, table 4.5 shows only the numbers of households with immigration back-
ground categorized by income and region of origin. Similar to table 4.4, I also calculated the 
percentages of households in each income group. This means, for example, 1.80% of all 
households whose country of origin belongs to the European Union have a monthly net in-
come under 500 euros, while 4.15% of all households whose origin is Africa are in this in-
come group. Different from table 4.4, where the total number of each category is known, the 
total number of each immigration group in table 4.5 is not available. In addition, some num-
bers of households are not applicable (for example, the number of households with North 
American origin whose monthly net income is under 500 euros). Therefore, I only used the 
available numbers in my calculation and let the inapplicable numbers be zero. In this way, the 
percentages in each column should add up to 100% theoretically, but the sums are not accu-
rate enough due to rounding. The percentages show that households originally from Africa, 
Asia, Australia, and Oceania have a lower monthly income, as a higher percentage of house-
holds are in the lower income categories (up to 1,300 euros per month), and a lower percent-
age in the higher income categories (3,200 euros per month and more). Households originally 
from America (including North, Central, and South America) show signs of both low income 
 112
and high income. However, since a very high percentage of households with the origin of 
North America are in the higher income category (3,200 euros per month and more), few 
households with the origin of Central and South America are in this category. In fact, if North 
America is excluded from the category “America,” only 9.59% of households originally from 
America are in the income category of 3,200–4,500 euros, and only 8.22% are in the income 
group of 4,500 euros and more. 
Comparing these two tables, we do not find a clear disparity in the income categories 
from 1,300 to 3,200 euros. However, immigrants from Africa, Central and South America, 
Asia, Australia, and Oceania show disadvantages in high-income industries compared to na-
tive-born citizens, and a considerable number of immigrants from these regions work for 
Household 
with a 
Household 
Net Income 
from … to 
(Not Include) 
… Euros per 
Month
Number of Households with Immigration Background, in 1,000
EU-28
Other 
European 
Countries
Africa
America 
(Including 
North, 
Central, and 
South 
America)
North 
America
Asia, 
Australia, 
and Oceania
Under 500 44 (1.80%) 38 (1.87%) 9 (4.15%) N/A N/A 33 (3.19%)
500–900 229 (9.35%) 237 (11.67%) 42 (19.35%) 20 (14.49%) 7 (10.77%) 163 (15.73%)
900–1,300 358 (14.62%) 304 (14.97%) 43 (19.82%) 22 (15.94%) 8 (12.31%) 168 (16.22%)
1,300–1,500 201 (8.21%) 146 (7.19%) 18 (8.29%) 10 (7.25%) N/A 75 (7.24%)
1,500–2,000 409 (16.71%) 319 (15.71%) 35 (16.13%) 18 (13.04%) 8 (12.31%) 157 (15.15%)
2,000–2,600 380 (15.52%) 358 (17.63%) 31 (14.29%) 17 (12.32%) 9 (13.85%) 161 (15.54%)
2,600–3,200 274 (11.19%) 257 (12.65%) 18 (8.29%) 13 (9.42%) 8 (12.31%) 114 (11.00%)
3,200–4,500 323 (13.19%) 259 (12.75%) 15 (6.91%) 18 (13.04%) 11 (16.92%) 112 (10.81%)
4,500 and 
More 230 (9.40%) 113 (5.56%) 6 (2.76%) 20 (14.49%) 14 (21.54%) 53 (5.11%)
Table 4.5 
Number of Households in Germany with Immigration Background, by Household Income and Region of Ori-
gin: 2014
Note: Percentages do not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
Source: Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit: Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund — Ergebnisse des 
Mikrozensus; destatis.de; statistisches Bundesamt, 2015; Web; 340; PDF file; table 11.
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lower wages. Only immigrants from other EU countries and North America show a compara-
ble income condition with native-born citizens in every income category. 
As stated in chapter 3.2, German national identity is strongly related to culture and eth-
nicity. However, ever since the guestworker programs, the population of foreign residents has 
increased rapidly, and Germany has gradually become a “country of immigration,” which 
means that immigration is a phenomenon in the country, but it does not belong to the coun-
try’s national identity. To a great extent, it is a compromise to economic needs and immi-
grant-state conflict that Germany has adopted (but not necessarily admits to have adopted) 
the concept of being a country of immigration. 
Before the 1990s, Germany denied to be a country of immigration. For decades, “gov-
ernments did not bother to put into place many of the formal policy structures which are 
common in other countries where immigration has been more readily acknowledged; on the 
contrary, . . . residence and citizenship policies were defined on an exclusionary basis, rather 
than on the inclusionary basis” (Green, The Politics 6). In addition, for many years, “depen-
dant migration (otherwise known as family reunification) and asylum seekers” were the main 
forms of “non-ethnic German immigration” (Green, The Politics 6). Together with the large 
amount of guestworkers who stayed in Germany permanently in contrast to Germany’s origi-
nal plan, the foreign population in Germany became quite large. As I pointed out in chapter 
two, immigrant-state conflict will occur if the political power of immigrants is low. “[A]t the 
end of 2002,” when Germany had already begun a series of changes in its immigration policy, 
“the average residence period of the 7.3 million foreigners in Germany was 15.3 years; two-
thirds had lived in Germany for eight or more years, and one-third for more than twenty 
years,” and these “figures do not reflect the fact that those foreign residents who were born in 
Germany (some 1.6 million persons or 21 per cent of the total in 2002) have lived in the 
country all their lives. Thus a four year-old non-national child born in Germany is statistically 
counted as having just four years’ residence” (Green, The Politics 6). Therefore, with such a 
large foreign population who seldom had any political power, it was inevitable that Germany 
had to deal with immigrant-state conflict. The requirements of obtaining permanent residence 
status in the current Residence Act and the prerequisites of gaining citizenship (on which I 
will elaborate in chapter 4.3.2) demonstrate that the German immigration policy has been 
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changed from the exclusionary to the inclusionary basis. Therefore, Germany has become a 
country of immigration. 
Similar to the United States, nativism also exists in Germany even after the Second World 
War. When Germany received a huge amount of guestworkers, most of whom came from 
Turkey, Germans committed “hundreds of anti-Turkish hate crimes” and made “vicious 
‘Turkish jokes’” (Fetzer 70). For example, a joke appears in Günter Wallraff’s book Ganz 
Unten (1985): 
Udo to me (Ali): How many Turks will fit in a VW? 
Me (Ali): Don’t know. 
Udo: Twenty thousand. Don’t believe it? 
Me (Ali): Whatever you say. 
Udo: You wanna know, anyhow? 
Me (Ali): I’d rather not. 
Udo: Very simple. Two in the front, two in the back, the others in the ashtray. (qtd. in Fetzer 1) 
This joke humiliates Turkish guestworkers, for they are considered to be trash in Germany. It 
also indicates that German citizens wanted the government to send back guestworkers. Be-
sides anti-Turk sentiments, there were also “anti-Semitism [,] . . . Neo-Nazi vandalism,” and 
“hate crimes” against refugees and asylum-seekers (Fetzer 72). 
Nativism is not as strong in Germany nowadays. The Pew Research Center conducted a 
survey on public views of immigrants in the United States and Europe in May 2015, and fig-
Germany
U.S.
41%
29%
51%
66%
Make our country stronger because of their work and talents
Are a burden on our country because they take our jobs and social benefits
Fig. 4.6. Views of immigrants in Germany and the U.S.: 2015 
% who say immigrants today …
Note: Don’t know/refused and both/neither responses not shown. 
Fig. 4.6. Jens Manuel Krogstad, “What Americans, Europeans Think of Immigrants” (pewresearch.org; Pew 
Research Center, 24 Sep. 2015; Web; 7 Mar. 2016).
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ure 4.6 shows the results of the United States and Germany. Quite surprisingly, as a nation of 
immigrants, the United States shows less enthusiasm for immigrants than Germany. The pub-
lic in Germany is quite optimistic about the economic influences that immigrants bring to the 
country. However, Germany’s optimistic view on their economic influences is not equal to an 
acceptance of an increase in immigration. Another survey by the Pew Research Center in 
2014 shows that 44% of Germans agree that their country should allow fewer immigrants, 
and 40% say that Germany should keep immigration at the same level (“A Fragile 
Rebound”). Moreover, more Germans (48%) think that immigrants are more to blame for 
crime compared to other groups than those who (45%) believe that immigrants are no more to 
blame for crime (“A Fragile Rebound”). 
4.2.3. Comparison and Reflection 
The United States and Germany provide similar methods for immigrants to gain perma-
nent residence status, for example, through family, through employment, through investment, 
and through refugee status, and permanent residency through family is the most common 
method in both countries. These methods are derived from similar economic, political, and 
humanitarian concerns of the two countries. Therefore, similar situations and concerns of the 
United States and Germany lead to similar immigration policies. 
One exception is permanent residency through lottery, which is a way to obtain perma-
nent residence status in the United States but not in Germany. This difference demonstrates 
two models of nation states in regard to immigration, and this difference can be explained 
with the understanding of national identity. As a nation of immigrants, where immigration is 
an element of people’s national identity, the United States uses permanent residency through 
lottery to achieve racial diversity and balance the number of residents by country of origin. 
As a country of immigration, where immigration is only a phenomenon in the country but not 
part of its national identity, Germany has no intention to achieve racial diversity. On the con-
trary, Germany had long avoided to deal with the rapidly rising number of immigrants due to 
its belief in ethnocultural identity. Eventually, its immigration reforms in the past twenty 
years were largely made to solve potential immigrant-state conflict, because if the political 
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power of immigrants is very low and the number of immigrants is large, immigrant-state con-
flict is likely to occur. 
Statistics of household income in the two countries do not show great income disparities 
between those who are native-born and immigrants in general, although employers need to 
explain the necessity to hire foreign workers instead of native workers.  This means that for24 -
eign workers may face more difficulties than native workers when seeking a job, but once 
they are employed, there is no obvious procedural discrimination against them. However, 
immigrants with different regions of origin show clear income disparities. The median 
household income of immigrants from Latin America and Africa is evidently lower than that 
of natives in both the United States and Germany, while the median household income of 
immigrants from North America and Europe is about the same with, if not higher than, that of 
natives. This difference among different immigrant groups can be related to immigrants’ level 
of education, and their level of integration, for low education and low level of integration can 
be the reasons that these immigrants can only be low-skilled workers and work for low 
wages. Immigrants from Asia, Australia, and Oceania show a great advantage in household 
income compared to natives in the United States. However, the same ethnic group shows dis-
advantages in Germany. One possible explanation can be that people with different skills 
from these regions have different preferences of where they emigrate to, and more high-
skilled workers emigrate to the United States. Yet, I still need more research and supporting 
statistics to find the actual and exact reasons for this income difference between the United 
States and Germany, which I am not able to do here. 
Generally, Germans have a more positive view of immigrants’ impact on economy than 
Americans, which is quite surprising, since the United States has the notion of being a nation 
of immigrants. Yet, the public in neither country is willing to accept an increase in immigra-
tion. Moreover, the public in both countries tends to agree that immigrants make crime 
worse, which indicates a prejudice against immigrants. Therefore, immigrants are still not 
treated as equal to natives, even though there is no discriminating policies against them. Sim-
ilar public attitudes toward immigration in the United States and Germany also suggest that 
these attitudes are independent of immigration policy models, but they are more likely to be 
 Here, by “immigrants” I also mean those who have been naturalized. Therefore, in the case of employment 24
naturalized citizens are not treated as foreign workers; however, they do count as residents with immigration 
background in the income statistics.
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related to the country’s economic situation and public security. In this sense, immigration pol-
icy alone is not adequate to solve immigrant-native conflicts. 
From the comparison, people can deduce that the situations in the United States and Ger-
many are very similar. Although the two countries have two completely different immigration 
models (nation of immigrants and country of immigration), their immigration policies have 
become very similar in recent years out of economic, political, and humanitarian interests. 
Therefore, similar situations in the two countries result in similar immigration policies. These 
policies do not imply any discrimination against immigrants, but the public still holds preju-
dice against them and does not have a very liberal opinion on immigration. Although the ma-
jority believe that immigrants make economy stronger, a considerable number of people think 
that immigrants are a burden on society and believe that immigration is strongly related to 
crime. In addition, natives tend to reject to accept more immigrants. 
4.3. Citizenship and Naturalization 
“Citizenship requires a direct sense of community mem-
bership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is a com-
mon possession. It is a loyalty of free men endowed with 
rights and protected by a common law. Its growth is stim-
ulated both by the struggle to win those rights and by their 
enjoyment when won.” 
— T. H. Marshall 
  
According to Ruth Lister, citizenship creates a tension between inclusion and exclusion 
(49), which means that citizenship draws a line between insiders (citizens) and outsiders (for-
eigners). This tension might not be apparent among native-born citizens, but it is evident in 
the context of naturalization. T. H. Marshall notes that 
[c]itiznship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the 
status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no uni-
versal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship 
is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be 
measured and towards which aspiration can be directed. (149–50) 
This “image of an ideal citizenship” could be the basis of an “inclusive citizenship” proce-
dure for immigrants, where qualified immigrants become insiders. In this sense, citizenship 
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and naturalization policies reflect a state’s concept of a fittest citizen, thus, studying citizen-
ship and naturalization policies can help understand the state’s ideology. 
4.3.1. Citizenship and Naturalization in the United States 
There are three ways to gain U.S. citizenship. The “most common way” is “citizenship by 
birth” within the United States jurisdictions, regardless of the nationality of the parents. This 
method “reflects the Anglo-American tradition of jus soli, a right protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s citizenship clause” (Schuck, “Citizenship” 44). During the 2016 presidential 
campaign, Donald Trump proposed to abolish birthright citizenship as a method to control 
illegal immigration, which in a way also means the repeal of part of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. If he succeeds, it would strongly shake the conception of American national identity. 
The second way is “through descent from one or more American parents” (Schuck, “Citizen-
ship” 45), a method also known as jus sanguinis. There are some eligibility requirements in 
citizenship through parentage if the child was born overseas. As the citizenship law states, a 
person with married parents by the time of birth is an American citizen if the person 
[is] born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents both of whom are citizens 
of the United States and one of whom has had a residence in the United States or one of its outlying 
possessions, prior to the birth of such person; [and if the person] . . . born outside the geographical lim-
its of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a 
citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United 
States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five years, at least two of 
which were after attaining the age of fourteen years. (8 USC. Sec. 1401) 
If a person was born out of wedlock and the mother is an American citizen, the person is a 
citizen “if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such person’s 
birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present in the United States or one of 
its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year” (8 USC. Sec. 1409). If the father 
is an American citizen, the person born out of wedlock is a citizen only if 
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear and convincing evi-
dence, 
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person’s birth, 
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the person until 
the person reaches the age of 18 years, and 
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years — 
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s residence or domicile, 
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(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or 
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent court. (8 USC. Sec. 
1409) 
The third way is through naturalization. The U.S. naturalization policy has gone through 
many reforms in the past centuries. 
Plural citizenships are allowed in the United States. Although immigrants have to take the 
oath of allegiance in their naturalization ceremony, and this oath requires them to “renounce 
their prior allegiance” (Schuck, “Citizenship” 45), this action does not “terminate [their] for-
eign citizenship under the foreign state’s law,” and the renunciation has no “legal 
effect” (Schuck, “Citizenship” 45). 
The Naturalization Act of 1790, passed by the First Congress, was the first act to regulate 
naturalization, and it states that only “a free white person, who shall have resided within the 
limits and under the jurisdictions of the United States for the term of two years, may be ad-
mitted to become a citizen” (“Acts of the First Congress” 103). Moreover, this person has to 
prove “satisfaction” to the court that “he is a person of good character,” and take “the oath or 
affirmation prescribed by law” (“Acts of the First Congress” 103). As I already introduced in 
chapter 4.2.1, two Quota Acts were enacted in 1921 and 1924, which limited annual admis-
sions of immigrants and even denied “admission to all aliens who were ‘ineligible for citizen-
ship’” (Lee 12). The current naturalization policy, which keeps the provisions in the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965, allows a person to be naturalized regardless of eth-
nicity, country of origin, and gender. Lyndon B. Johnson emphasized the need for this change 
already in 1964 in his annual message to Congress on the State of the Union, saying “a nation 
that was built by the immigrants of all lands can ask those who now seek admission: ‘What 
can you do for our country?’ But we should not be asking: ‘In what country were you born?’” 
(9) The INA of 1965 finally symbolizes America’s open gates to the world, stating that “[n]o 
person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of 
an immigrant visa because of his race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of 
residence” (911). If an immigrant wants to be naturalized to be an American citizen, he or she 
“must prove five years of residence as a legal immigrant, pay a fee of $320, prove basic oral 
and written ability in English, . . . demonstrate knowledge of US government and 
history” (Bloemraad and Ueda 42), and show “good moral character.” After the person’s nat-
uralization application is approved by the judge or the USCIS, the person is required “to take 
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the oath of allegiance in a ceremony to officially become an American. Comparing the situa-
tion of 1790 with now, it seems that the U.S. immigration policy has achieved a revolutionary 
reform” (Li 316). 
Many scholars argue that assimilation does not exist in the United States anymore be-
cause of this revolutionary immigration reform and the fact that the United States has 
achieved ethnic and cultural heterogeneity. For example, David Hollinger states in his book 
Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism that among “academic and popular political 
voices, . . . [t]he figure of the melting pot, encumbered with assimilationist connotations, lost 
favor to the salad bowl, the mosaic, and the garden of plants each with its own autochthonous 
roots” (64–65). He further notes that “[t]he United States came increasingly to be represented 
as a complex patchwork of distinctive communities” (65). “The melting pot” and “the salad 
bowl,” as Hollinger uses them, are two popular metaphors people encounter when studying 
multiculturalism in the United States. Milton Gordon defines “the melting pot” to be the idea 
that “envisaged a biological merger of the Anglo-Saxon peoples with other immigrant groups 
and a blending of their respective cultures into a new indigenous American type” (85). I want 
to extend this definition to a non-biological sense where cultural or behavioral assimilation is 
involved, but amalgamation is not a must. “The salad bowl,” on the other hand, does not con-
tain the notion of assimilation — that is, different cultures do not merge, but coexist in soci-
ety. Therefore, “the melting pot” contains the connotation of assimilation, whereas “the salad 
bowl” refers to integration (see definitions at the beginning of chapter 4.2). According to 
Michael Lind, multiculturalists believe that the United States “is a nation of nations, a federa-
tion of nationalities and cultures sharing little or nothing but a common government” (1). In 
this sense, assimilation gives way to multiculturalism, as he introduces the term “Multicultur-
al America” in his book The Next American Nation, where he states that “Multicultural Amer-
ica” is “the de facto orthodoxy of the present American regime” formed in the late 1960s and 
the early 1970s (97). 
Despite these opinions, John Higham does not think that the United States has reached the 
state multiculturalists suggest. He argues that 
[i]f America [is] in fact a patchwork of ethnic subcultures, which [are] somehow distinct, equal, and at 
least potentially harmonious, scholars should be able to describe them and to specify their relations to 
one another. For the most part, efforts to demonstrate the persistence of ethnic subcultures [have] pro-
duced either trivial or negative conclusions. It [is] of course not difficult to show that people recently 
transplanted to America, or segregated within in, maintain some peculiarities of their own. A longer-
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range approach, however, typically reveal[s] an erosion of distinctive customs and ways of life with 
each successive generation. (Send 225–26) 
Higham further points out that cultural pluralism “itself [is] one of the products of the Ameri-
can melting pot,” because 
[w]e may anticipate . . . that cultural pluralism would appeal to people who [are] already strongly 
enough positioned to imagine that permanent minority status might be advantageous. It [is] congenial 
to minority spokesmen confident enough to visualize themselves at the center rather than the periphery 
of American experience. Accordingly, cultural pluralism prove[s] most attractive to people who [are] 
already largely assimilated. (Send 213) 
I believe that the naturalization process in the United States still shows evident signs of the 
government’s attempt to assimilate immigrants, and thus people should not overlook the exis-
tence of assimilation and acculturation even though multiculturalism has become increasingly 
popular among scholars. There are several reasons. 
First, the naturalization oath of allegiance to the United States remains. “The naturaliza-
tion oath of allegiance has been an indispensable step for applicants for naturalization to gain 
citizenship. It requires applicants to renounce all allegiance to any foreign sovereignty and 
support the Constitution” (Li 317). The USCIS notes that before 1906, “there were as many 
as 5,000 courts with naturalization jurisdiction,” and “[e]ach court could develop its own pro-
cedures” how applicants take the oath (“Naturalization Oath”). The Basic Naturalization Act 
of 1906 standardized the procedures, adding the oath of allegiance to either the applicants’ 
Declaration of Intention  form or their Petition for Naturalization  form, and the oath of al25 26 -
legiance should be performed live again in a formal naturalization ceremony before the U.S. 
citizenship is officially granted. “Every word in the oath of allegiance is mandatory in the 
naturalization ceremony except the last formula ‘so help me God’” (Li 317). 
To better analyze the notion of assimilation in the naturalization process, I quote the cur-
rent version of the oath of allegiance: 
I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity 
to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a sub-
ject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America 
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I 
 Applicants for naturalization can file their Declaration of Intention after they meet the physical presence re25 -
quirement (usually thirty months or eighteen months if the applicant is married to a U.S. citizen). The Declara-
tion of Intention is also known as First Papers.
 After five years of permanent residency or three years if the applicant is married to a U.S. citizen, applicants 26
are allowed to submit their Petition for Naturalization, also known as Second Papers or Final Papers. It usually 
takes six months for a judge or the USCIS to approve naturalization.
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will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombat-
ant service in the armed forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform work 
of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation 
freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God. (“Naturalization Oath”) 
With the renunciation of allegiance to other countries, the United States requires applicants to 
“cut the bonds to their origins and fully integrate into the American nation” (Li 318). Al-
though it is very difficult for first-generation immigrants to fully integrate, this oath suggests 
that “applicants have to surrender at least part of their original identity in order to gain Amer-
ican citizenship. Therefore, the process of naturalization functions more like a melting pot, 
not the salad bowl multiculturalists suggest” (Li 318). 
Besides the aspect of renunciation of former allegiance, “modifications of the oath of al-
legiance only added mandates to the text” (Li 318). The earliest oath only requires applicants 
to “renounce allegiance to any foreign sovereignty and support the Constitution” (Li 318). 
The 1906 modification “implemented a text that requires applicants to defend the Constitu-
tion against all enemies,” and “[t]he Immigration Act of 1950 further introduced a require-
ment that ‘forced’ all applicants to serve in the military” (Li 318). Hence, the danger that im-
migrants may lose their original identity due to the renunciation of former allegiance remains 
unsolved. The change in the oath only means that applicants need to take more responsibili-
ties. Moreover, serving in the military shows loyalty of (naturalized) citizens to the United 
States. For example, after the Pearl Harbor attacks, anti-Japanese sentiments increased, and 
thus Japanese Americans had to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States. As a result, 
“[d]uring the [Second World War], 33,000 Japanese Americans were in uniform. Several 
thousand of them were members of the Military Intelligence Service, functioning as inter-
preters and translators on the Pacific front” (Takaki 383). Because the United States and 
Japan were enemies in the war, Japanese Americans tried to prove their loyalty to the United 
States and “fight racism at home” by choosing the American side and going to war (Takaki 
384), as a Japanese American soldier explained: 
My friends and my family — they mean everything to me. They are the most important reason why I 
am giving up my education and my happiness to go to fight a war that we never asked for. But our 
Country is involved in it. Not only that. By virtue of the Japanese attack on our nation, we as American 
citizens of Japanese ancestry have been mercilessly flogged with criticism and accusations. But I’m not 
going to take it sitting down! I may not be able to come back. But that matters little. My family and 
friends — they are the ones who will be able to back their arguments with facts. They are the ones who 
will be proud. In fact, it is better that we are sent to the front and that a few of us do not return, for the 
testimony will be stronger in favor of the folks back home. (qtd. in Takaki 384–85) 
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The balance between one’s original identity and the new citizenship can be seen as “rational-
choice models,” where the “decision [of applicants] to naturalize derives from weighing the 
benefits vs. the costs of becoming a citizen” (Van Hook et al. 646). 
Second, “the main changes in the naturalization laws are usually caused by the U.S. polit-
ical and economic necessities, not by the belief in multiculturalism” (Li 318). Since the Natu-
ralization Act of 1790 regulated that only “free white persons” were allowed to be natural-
ized, the definition of “white” became essential in court decisions. However, the definition 
was often subjective and problematic. For example, as Peter Schrag notes, 
[l]awsuits seeking to answer the racial question had begun in 1878, . . . — suits in which the courts 
ruled repeatedly that the Chinese weren’t white, that the Japanese weren’t white, that Hawaiians 
weren’t white, that Filipinos weren’t white, and that Burmese weren’t white. There were also decisions 
that Armenians were white. . . . In 1919 two courts ruled that Asian Indians were white (one other 
court, in 1919, ruled they probably weren’t). After 1923, the courts ruled that Asian Indians, sometimes 
“Hindoos,” weren’t white and (in 1925) that Punjabis weren’t white. Four pre-1917 decisions had ruled 
that Syrians were white, and three that they weren’t. Then came rulings that Koreans weren’t white; 
that Afghanis weren’t white, followed in 1945 by a decision that they were; and that “Arabians” 
weren’t white, again followed by a Board of Immigration Appeals ruling (in 1941) that, because Eu-
ropean civilization had originated in the Middle East, that they were white. 
By the late 1930s, Mexicans were considered white for most official purposes. Court decisions 
going back to the turn of the century also held that persons who were half white, one-fourth Chinese, 
and one-fourth Japanese weren’t white. Following what appeared the one-drop-of-blood standard, there 
were similar decisions for all mixed-race individuals, including one, as late as 1938, that ruled that a 
person who was three-fourths American Indian and one-fourth African was not African and thus not 
entitled to naturalization. (111) 
These lawsuits indicate that there is no clear-cut boundary between “white” and other races, 
because different rulings on the same ethnic group happened constantly. Also, “courts have 
the ability to deny naturalization whenever they consider the applicant not fit for assimila-
tion” (Li 319). Similar to the cases Schrag notes, there are two other cases which demonstrate 
the subjectivity of the definition of “white.” In 1922, Takao Ozawa was denied citizenship 
because he was Japanese, and therefore, he was not a “white person.” The Supreme Court’s 
ruling was based on the science of ethnology, which indicates that “white” means the Cau-
casian race. However, in the following year, Bhagat Singh Thind, a high caste Indian, was 
also denied citizenship. Although Thind argued that he was Aryan and thus belonged to the 
Caucasian race scientifically, the Supreme Court ruled that “the Aryan theory, as a racial ba-
sis, seems to be discredited by most, if not all, modern writers on the subject of 
ethnology” (Vile 149). Therefore, Thind was not a white person. The inconsistency of the de-
cisions demonstrates that the classification of whiteness is purely subjective, for persons who 
are supposed to be of the same race were categorized in different racial groups based on the 
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judges’ perception of race, and the supposedly scientific basis of race was debatable in differ-
ent situations. Therefore, the definition of “white” is constructed by the society’s political and 
cultural values. Erika Lee states that the prerequisite of being white mirrors “Congress’s con-
fidence in the ability of European immigrants to assimilate and become worthy American cit-
izens” (9). On the contrary, the concern about Asians’ ability to assimilate resulted in the 
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and the Immigration Act of 1917 which I already introduced in 
chapter 4.2.1. 
However, there were exceptions in times of war. Irene Bloemraad and Reed Ueda note 
that “[i]n 1935, President Roosevelt signed the Nye-Lea Act, providing for the naturalization 
of all Asian veterans by exempting them from the racial bar applied to foreign-born 
Asians” (41), because national security was jeopardized during such time. “Today’s oath of 
allegiance also shows America’s preparation for recruiting soldiers — a benefit the United 
States gains from naturalized citizens” (Li 320). In fact, the Second World War was what ac-
tually ended the exclusion of Chinese immigrants in 1943, “because the United States felt the 
urge to recruit China as a war ally” (Li 320). Similarly, as Lee notes, “Congress also . . . al-
lowed for the naturalization of immigrants” from India and the Philippines in 1946 “to shore 
up support from Asian allies” (16). The Japanese, on the other hand, were excluded from nat-
uralization because they were the enemy during the war, and even Japanese Americans “were 
summarily stripped of their rights, freedom, and property and shipped off to . . . ‘war reloca-
tion camps’” (Schrag 153). Despite the discrimination against the Japanese, the Second 
World War “helped glorify the idea of America as a nation of immigrants, turned Ellis Island 
into a symbol of historic triumph and belonging, and made the whole idea of immigration 
less toxic” (Schrag 154). 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which abolished “all racial, gender, and 
nationality barriers to citizenship” (Lee 17), symbolizes America’s open gates to the world. 
However, the preference stated in this act for immigrants with “exceptional ability in the sci-
ences or the arts” and for “skilled laborers” (913) demonstrates the economic needs of the 
United States, as the act frankly points out, such immigrants “will substantially benefit 
prospectively the national economy, cultural interests, or welfare of the United States” (913). 
President Obama’s immigration reform, which offers a pathway for the eleven million un-
documented immigrants in the country to earn citizenship, is also out of economic interest, 
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because this reform will “encourage them to come out of the shadows so they can pay their 
taxes and play by the same rules as everyone else” (“Earned”). In other words, if undocu-
mented immigrants “can play by the rules and earn their legal status, the United States will 
not only benefit from their contribution to the country such as in the fields of agriculture and 
construction, but it can also expect an increase in tax revenues” (Li 320–21). Through these 
examples, it is clear that the country’s economic and political needs play a large role in the 
change in the U.S. naturalization laws. 
Third, “[e]ducation in the United States functions as a tool of Americanization” (Li 321). 
The United States shows great interest in educating immigrants. In 1907, New Jersey passed 
the first state legislation to support evening classes in English and civics for the foreign-born 
(Atzmon 75). Later, the interest escalated to the national level, for “[f]rom 1914 to 1920 the 
Bureau of Naturalization of the Immigration and Naturalization Services waged an intensive 
nationwide campaign to interest the public schools in establishing classes for English and the 
essentials of good citizenship to the foreign-born” (Atzmon 75–76). In addition, the Bureau 
of Education was founded in 1916, which “publicized the approved methods of instructing 
foreigners, continuing its support of the Americanization movement” (Atzmon 77). Bloem-
raad and Ueda point out that “[e]ducators throughout the decades of the early twentieth cen-
tury sought to prepare immigrants for naturalization by imbuing their teaching of English, 
civics, and history with veneration for the nation-state and its historic traditions” (41). By do-
ing so, “an individual could incorporate him or herself democratically into American nation-
ality through the voluntary internalization of the civic code and patriotic actions, reinforcing 
the image of civic loyalty” (Bloemraad and Ueda 41). Applicants for naturalization also need 
this kind of education, because the Naturalization Act of 1906 “raised the qualifications for 
naturalization by demanding a rudimentary knowledge of American history and civics, a ba-
sic ability to speak and understand English, and proof of moral worth” (Bloemraad and Ueda 
40). 
Like assimilation, the process of Americanization is also debatable among scholars and 
thinkers, because many believe that “immigrants should maintain their cultural pluralism, and 
that the United States will benefit the most if it preserves ‘separate cultures side by side with-
in its boundaries’” (Li 321), English and American civics are still required by the USCIS, and 
applicants for naturalization tend to rely on citizenship education programs to help them pass 
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the naturalization test. Since language, myths, symbols and rituals, a common history, and 
shared vernacular culture are the most significant aspects of national identity (Olneck 202), 
“naturalization tests on English and American civics are an effective method to accelerate the 
speed of Americanization” (Li 322). 
To educate immigrants and help them prepare for the naturalization test, the USCIS offers 
study pamphlets which not only teach them American government, history, and integrated 
civics, but also tell them the reasons to be patriotic. These pamphlets contain words such as 
“strength,” “unity,” “determination,” “great ideals,” “equality,” and “fairness” (Learn 15), 
which embody the notion of American values. In this way, American values are added to the 
thinking of immigrants through education. 
As pointed out above, language is an essential element of national identity. “Therefore, 
understanding English is fundamental to obtaining American identity” (Li 323). The House of 
Representatives of the 59th Congress reported in 1905 that 
if [an immigrant] does not know our language he does in effect remain a foreigner, although he may be 
able to satisfy the naturalization laws sufficiently to secure our citizenship. . . . The Commission is 
aware that some aliens who can not learn our language make good citizens. They are, however, excep-
tions, and the proposition is incontrovertible that no man is a desirable citizen of the United States who 
does not know the English language. (11) 
Language assimilation — that is, immigrants’ preference for English instead of the language 
of their country of origin when speaking — is obvious among second-generation immigrants. 
According to Michael Olneck, surveys show that “[t]oday’s immigrant parents, like those of 
the past, are encountering the refusal of their children to use their native language, and many 
report that their children speak primarily English among their friends” (212). This can be the 
result of education, for second-generation immigrants have been educated in the United 
States since they were born or very young. 
Fourth, accepting American values is decisive in the naturalization process. For example, 
“[d]uring the naturalization process, applicants have to demonstrate to the USCIS that they 
have good moral character (GMC)” (Li 324). Volume 12, Part F of the USCIS Policy Manuel 
specifically defines what GMC is, and it contains permanent bars (table 4.6) and conditional 
bars (table 4.7) to GMC. From the tables we see that “[s]ome of the permanent and condi-
tional bars seem overlapping, and the overlap indicates the undesirableness of such immi-
grants to the United States” (Li 324). These bars represent American values, because, 
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Table 4.6 
Permanent Bars to GMC
Source: “Chapter 4: Permanent Bars to GMC”; USCIS Policy Manual; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Ser-
vices; n.d.; Web; 13 Dec. 2013.
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Table 4.7 
Conditional Bars to GMC
Note: CIMT stands for crimes involving moral turpitude. 
Source: “Chapter 5: Conditional Bars for Acts in Statutory Period”; USCIS Policy Manual; U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services; n.d.; Web; 13 Dec. 2013.
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“[a]lthough felonies such as murder and violence are globally unacceptable, some bars to 
GMC are legal in some countries” (Li 324). For example, prostitution offenses are mentioned 
in both permanent and conditional bars. However, in some countries such as Germany and 
the Netherlands, prostitution is not an offense. Therefore, immigrants from these countries 
“may have been involved in prostitution without breaking the law in his or her original coun-
try, but is thus eliminated from GMC in the United States” (Li 325). In this sense, “GMC is 
the American ideal, and demonstrating GMC symbolizes immigrants’ acceptance of the 
American ideal and their determination of becoming a good citizen” (Li 325). 
American civics, as stated above, is already important in the naturalization process, but 
morality and loyalty play even a larger role. Susan Gordon notes that 
[w]hen the US government first developed educational materials to help immigrants prepare for that 
exam in the early twentieth century, the bureaucrats at the Bureau of Naturalization chose . . . to privi-
lege morality and loyalty (attachment) over the requirement that immigrants demonstrate their knowl-
edge of US history and government. In doing so, they designed an educational program that focused 
more on inculcating standards of proper American behavior than on civics and history. (368) 
She further demonstrates the significance of morality and loyalty by giving an example of the 
court’s decision on the naturalization of Ricardo Rodriguez, a Mexican national. The court 
“dismissed [his] inability to explain the principles of the constitution,” but “[i]nstead, . . . re-
lied on testimony by a white acquaintance of Rodriguez, who explained that [he] was hard 
working, honest, law-abiding, [and] peaceable” (S. Gordon 372). The emphasis on morality 
and loyalty, together with the “citizenship education” (S. Gordon 372), as Gordon points out, 
“has contributed to the social practice of becoming a citizen and, as such, to the manufactur-
ing of ideas of ‘the good citizen’” (373). During national crisis, morality and loyalty tend to 
become more important. For example, “[i]n the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US gov-
ernment finds it more necessary than ever before to ‘encourage immigrant attachment to the 
United States and immigrant adoption of “American values”’ through citizenship 
education” (Li 325). In this sense, the U.S. naturalization process functions as a selection 
process for the fittest citizens, “who accept American values and morality, and who will inte-
grate fully into American society” (Li 325). 
As I explained in chapter 3.1, American values and the idea of the American Creed were 
introduced by White Anglo-Saxon Protestants, and the United States is a homogeneous coun-
try in terms of cultural and political values. Therefore, “accepting American values more or 
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less equals assimilating into white society” (Li 326). John Tehranian points out in his article 
that 
[s]uccessful litigants demonstrated evidence of whiteness in their character, religious practices and be-
liefs, class orientation, language, ability to intermarry, and a host of other traits that had nothing to do 
with intrinsic racial grouping. Thus, a dramaturgy of whiteness emerged, responsive to the interests of 
society as defined by the class in power — an “evolutionary functionalism” whereby courts played an 
instrumental role in limiting naturalization to those new immigrant groups whom judges saw as most 
fit to carry on the tradition of the “White Republic.” The courts thereby sent a clear message to immi-
grants: The rights enjoyed by white males could only be obtained through assimilatory behavior. (819) 
Therefore, in a broader sense, when Americans say “whiteness,” they can mean more than 
one race, and it is more related to Americanism. In other words, immigrants, regardless of 
ethnicity or race, can become “white” through “assimilatory behavior.” Schrag notes that 
“[t]o be that special creature, the American, there always had to be the Other” (26). “In cur-
rent American society, this ‘Other’ is most likely to be those who are un-American” (Li 326). 
In this sense, the U.S. government still tries to assimilate immigrants, because the naturaliza-
tion requirements make applicants learn American values, memories, sentiments, ideas, and 
attitudes, which are the exact items of a culture that would be essential in the process of as-
similation (see Berry’s theory at the beginning of chapter 4.2). Still in a broader sense, “even 
though today’s naturalization policy has no racial, gender, or nationality barriers, it still cre-
ates an ideal model of naturalized citizen which does not differ much from the model in 
1790” (Li 326). 
Because of these four reasons, one could say that “the main difference between the Natu-
ralization Act of 1790 and today’s naturalization policy is that the basic requirement was . . . 
altered from being physically white to being innerly white” (Li 329). Peter Schrag sees the 
Second World War as the “biggest whitener” (152) and labels the changes in naturalization 
policy as “the Great Awhitening” (139). Nowadays, although naturalized citizens may be of 
different ethnicities, their cultural behavior should highly adapt to the Anglo-Saxon American 
norm. In other words, assimilation or integration (depending on whether or to what extent an 
immigrant’s original culture is affected) can be nonwhite immigrants’ pathway to become 
“white.” 
Although assimilation is criticized by many scholars, it is still inevitable in American so-
ciety and should not be overlooked. Assimilation can be measured by four factors, namely, 
socioeconomic status, spatial concentration, language assimilation, and intermarriage (Waters 
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and Jiménez 107–08). The U.S. naturalization process can more or less raise the level of im-
migrant assimilation. For example, socioeconomic status is largely shaped by “educational 
attainment” (Waters and Jiménez 107), “which the USCIS tries to reinforce through citizen-
ship education” (Li 327). Studies show that many “1.5-generation (those who arrive before 
age 13) and second-generation children” even have better performance at school than their 
“native-born schoolmates” (Waters and Jiménez 108–09). In addition, socioeconomic assimi-
lation can be achieved by immigrant minority’s “participation in institutions such as the labor 
market . . . on the basis of parity with native groups of similar backgrounds” (Alba and Nee 
836), and immigrant minorities do not necessarily show disadvantages among such native 
groups. The English test in the naturalization process is also a method to encourage language 
assimilation. Studies suggest that there is “a strong association between a foreign-born per-
son’s time in the United States and his or her ability to speak English well” (Waters and 
Jiménez 110), and while second-generation immigrants are usually bilingual, “the third gen-
eration speaks English only” (Waters and Jiménez 110). 
Despite the efforts the U.S. government spends on immigrant integration or even assimi-
lation, it is very difficult for first-generation immigrants to fully adapt to American culture. 
For example, some still show signs of low education and poverty (Waters and Jiménez 108), 
and many, though having made some progress, continue to prefer their native language to 
English (Waters and Jiménez 110). Furthermore, “spatial concentration (e.g., China Town and 
Little Italy) remains essential in the settlement of the immigrant generation” (Li 327). There-
fore, there is a contradiction between the written policy where the U.S. government expects 
naturalized citizens to (fully) integrate and the reality that naturalized citizens, being the im-
migrant generation, cannot fully adopt American culture. Even those who score the highest in 
their naturalization tests preserve their original identity to some extent and may have difficul-
ty living in a new culture (in this case, Anglo-American culture), “because the cultural and 
social impacts of their home country are embedded in their thinking” (Li 327). 
Assimilation can be seen in many literary works, usually with the connotation that immi-
grants have (largely) adopted the culture in the host society, but at the same time are still 
holding on to some of their original culture. Jhumpa Lahiri’s novel The Namesake (2003) 
demonstrates the great contrast of assimilation levels between first-generation and second-
generation immigrants. In the novel, Ashoke and Ashima Ganguli are Indian immigrants, and 
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their son, Gogol, and their daughter, Sonia, were born in Boston. Lahiri uses food to represent 
Indian and American cultures, and the eating habit of the family symbolizes the difference 
between first- and second-generation immigrants. While Ashoke and Ashima eat rice and cur-
ry chicken, Gogol and Sonia eat frozen waffles and pizzas. Finally, their children are so used 
to American food that Ashoke and Ashima have to give in: 
[i]n the supermarket [Ashoke and Ashima] let Gogol fill the cart with items that he and Sonia, but not 
they, consume: individually wrapped slices of cheese, mayonnaise, tuna fish, hot dogs. For Gogol’s 
lunches they stand at the deli to buy cold cuts, and in the mornings Ashima makes sandwiches with 
bologna or roast beef. At his insistence, she concedes and makes him an American dinner once a week 
as a treat, Shake ’n Bake chicken or Hamburger Helper prepared with ground lamb. (Lahiri 65; my 
italics) 
The roast beef sandwich is a contradiction to Indian culture, which indicates that Gogol has 
already abandoned or has never had certain characteristics of Indian identity. His eager em-
brace of American dinners also shows signs of second-generation immigrants’ assimilation 
into the American way of life. 
Besides food, language is another symbol in the novel. While Ashoke and Ashima speak 
Bengali at home, Gogol’s mother tongue is English. When Gogol is in the third grade, 
Ashoke and Ashima send him to learn the Bengali language and culture, and they find that 
Gogol “sound[s] just like [an American], expertly conversing in a language that still at times 
confounds them, in accents they are accustomed not to trust” (Lahiri 65). Interestingly, while 
Gogol sounds “foreign” in Bengali class, Ashoke and Ashima sound foreign outside the class, 
for Gogol “is aware, in stores, of cashiers smirking at his parents’ accents, and of salesmen 
who prefer to direct their conversation to Gogol, as though his parents were either incompe-
tent or deaf” (Lahiri 67–68). The preference and usage of language illustrate a grave contrast 
of assimilation levels between first- and second-generation immigrants. 
The family’s social circle also shows the contrast. Ashoke and Ashima’s friends are pri-
marily Indians. They celebrate Indian festivals together, and all the Indian immigrants in the 
neighborhood get together once in a while like a big family. Ashima even makes Gogol go to 
a panel discussion about Indian novels written in English against Gogol’s will, because one of 
the presenters is Gogol’s distant cousin. Although Gogol has never met him before, Ashima 
feels obliged that someone in the family should go greet him. Gogol, on the other hand, does 
not have any Indian friends. On the contrary, he avoids them on purpose, for he intends to 
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escape the way of life his parents choose to live. In that panel discussion, Gogol learns a new 
term ABCD: 
Gogol has never heard the term ABCD. He eventually gathers that it stands for “American-born con-
fused deshi.” In other words, him. He learns that the C could also stand for “conflicted.” He knows that 
deshi, a generic word for “countryman,” means “Indian,” knows that his parents and all their friends 
always refer to India simply as desh. But Gogol never thinks of India as desh. He thinks of it as Ameri-
cans do, as India. (Lahiri 118) 
Gogol thinks as the Americans do, goes to typical American college parties with his Ameri-
can friends, dates American girls, and feels more comfortable with his American girlfriend’s 
parents than with his own. Their choice of social circle illustrates how well they integrate into 
American society. 
The family’s behavior in India reinforces the contrast. When Ashoke and Ashima decide 
to spend several months in India, Ashima becomes very excited, while Gogol and Sonia feel 
irritated and scared. Once they arrive in India, 
[w]ithin minutes, before [Gogol and Sonia’s] eyes Ashoke and Ashima slip into bolder, less complicat-
ed versions of themselves, their voices louder, their smiles wider, revealing a confidence Gogol and 
Sonia never see on Pemberton Road. “I’m scared, Goggles [Gogol’s nickname],” Sonia whispers to her 
brother in English, seeking his hand and refusing to let go. (Lahiri 81–82; my italics) 
It is indicated in the scene that to Ashoke and Ashima, India is home, but to Gogol and Sonia, 
India is only a strange land. Although living with relatives, Gogol feels lonely, because “[o]f 
all the people who surround [Gogol and Sonia] at practically all the times, Sonia is his only 
ally, the only person to speak and sit and see as he does” (Lahiri 84). They only feel comfort-
able with each other, and they cannot get used to anything in India — “the air, the rice, [and] 
the wind” (Lahiri 86). Contrary to the scene when the family arrives in India, the journey 
back to America creates a different atmosphere. Ashima “will sit silently, staring at the clouds 
. . . . But for Gogol, relief quickly replaces any lingering sadness” (Lahiri 86–87). The fami-
ly’s feelings and behavior in India demonstrate that first-generation immigrants may still 
deem their original country as home, no matter how long they have been away, while second-
generation immigrants do not feel attached to their original country at all. 
However, Ashoke and Ashima’s attachment to India does not necessarily mean that they 
refuse to integrate. On the contrary, they have adopted many American traditions: 
[T]he Gangulis, apart from the name on their mailbox, apart from the issues of India Abroad and Sang-
bad Bichitra that are delivered there, appear no different from their neighbors. Their garage, like every 
other, contains shovels and pruning shears and a sled. They purchase a barbecue for tandoori on the 
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porch in summer. . . . They learn to roast turkeys, albeit rubbed with garlic and cumin and cayenne, at 
Thanksgiving, to nail a wreath to their door in December, to wrap woolen scarves around snowmen, to 
color boiled eggs violet and pink at Easter and hide them around the house. . . . 
There are other ways in which Ashoke and Ashima give in. Though Ashima continues to wear 
nothing but saris and sandals from Bata, Ashoke, accustomed to wearing tailor-made pants and shirts 
all his life, learns to buy ready-made. He trades in fountain pens for ballpoints, Wilkinson blades and 
his boar-bristled shaving brush for Bic razors bought six to a pack. (Lahiri 64–65) 
Ashoke and Ashima’s adoption of American culture indicates first-generation immigrants’ 
willingness to integrate into the new culture, but their retention of original traditions only al-
lows them to integrate partly. 
Also, Gogol and Sonia’s Americanization and assimilation do not mean that they have 
fully forgotten their Indian origin. Gogol’s identification clash is shown in the two romantic 
relationships he had. His relationship with a true American did not work out in the end, and 
his marriage to an ABCD was disastrous. The two unsuccessful relationships symbolize 
Gogol’s failure to find his real identity, and this failure results in his attempt to discover his 
traits, embodied in the book his father gave him a long time ago. In this sense, second-gener-
ation immigrants could also experience the confusion over identity, and the concealed origin 
is rediscovered under certain circumstances. In fact, Anju Bhatt sees Gogol’s struggle with 
his name, as the title of the novel suggests, as his struggle with identity (39–40), although he 
may not yet realize the influence of his Indian identity. Gogol hates his name, because it is 
neither Indian nor American but Russian, which makes him feel insecure about his identity. 
When he decides to change his name to Nikhil, he establishes a doppelgänger and “finds it 
difficult to acknowledge that Gogol and Nikhil are both a part of his ownself and torn be-
tween this struggle he feels as ‘[i]f he’s cast himself in a play acting the part of twins, indis-
tinguishable to the naked eye yet fundamentally different’” (Bhatt 40). Therefore, no matter 
how deep Gogol feels like an American, his Indian identity does not escape from him. Final-
ly, “Gogol’s acceptance of his Indian-American identity is reflected in his gradual acceptance 
of his name and its history” (Macwan), which indicates that it is inevitable that second-gener-
ation immigrants have to live with dual identity. 
Second-generation immigrants’ confusion over identity is likely to be derived from the 
gap between identity seen by themselves and by people of the host society, and possibly also 
by people from their country of origin. For example, although Gogol was born and raised in 
the United States and identifies himself to be American (as he constantly tells people that he 
is from Boston), he has to answer all India-related questions, and white Americans (e.g., his 
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neighbor Pamela) still tend to think that he is from India. At the same time, when Gogol visits 
India with his parents, his Indian relatives tend to consider him to be American rather than 
Indian. Therefore, Gogol is torn between two identities, and the difference of identification 
reinforces Gogol’s insecure feelings about his identity. Werner Sollors sees the identity of 
biracial individuals (in the context of black-white intermarriage) represented in literature as 
“neither black nor white yet both” (29), and this idea can be well transformed into the identity 
of second-generation immigrants — they are neither Indian/Chinese/Mexican (country of 
origin), nor American, yet both. 
Gish Jen’s novel Typical American (1991) shows a similar result. Although the Chinese 
were considered unassimilable in the United States for a long time, the novel demonstrates 
the opposite. The protagonist Ralph Chang comes to the United States as a student, and with-
out the intention of staying there at the beginning, he ends up starting a family in the United 
States due to political reform in China. The Changs are all Chinese immigrants, and they are 
quite skeptical about American society and people at first. They use the phrase “typical 
American” to describe anything that may look strange or uncomfortable to their Chinese 
eyes, but later they became “typical Americans” themselves. As Richard Eder states, each of 
them “had been Americanizing slowly and cautiously.” For example, Ralph gives up his ten-
ure at the university to run a fried chicken restaurant business. This career change demon-
strates that his American thinking has surpassed his Chinese thinking, for his high status in 
academia is what his father has hoped for, which symbolizes the Chinese tradition or think-
ing, while running a restaurant is a sign of his pursuit of the American dream (Zhang 1453). 
Furthermore, the restaurant does not offer Chinese cuisine. Instead, it is a typical American 
restaurant, because fried chicken can be seen as a symbol of American food. Therefore, 
Ralph’s choice of restaurant implies that he chooses American culture over Chinese culture. 
Ralph’s wife Helen and his sister Theresa also become the opposite of Chinese tradition. He-
len is gradually “conquered by American consumer culture. She like[s] American magazines, 
newspapers, radio and so on. She secretly read[s] the magazines about ladies’ clothing and 
[hides] the magazines on the mat. She [is] eager to purchase a house in the suburbs with a big 
dining room for the family” (Zhang 1453–54). Moreover, she has an affair with an American-
born Chinese, Grover Ding. Similarly, Theresa has an intimate relationship with a married 
man, Old Chao, which results in Old Chao’s divorce. These affairs, which might be criticized 
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as “typical American no-morals” (Jen 67) by themselves in the past, are in contradiction to 
their Chinese identity, because “Chinese people don’t do such things” (Jen 172; emphasis in 
original). 
However, although the Changs have gradually assimilated into the American culture, they 
start to rediscover their Chinese identity after a family tragedy. Ralph goes back to teaching 
after the restaurant closes due to construction failure; Theresa moves back to live with the 
family again after Ralph and Helen are almost broke; and Helen stops seeing Grover. In this 
sense, they are regaining their Chinese identity, and it coexists with their newly gained Amer-
ican identity. Minglan Zhang even argues that the Changs are doomed to fail, because they 
were born and raised in China, and by abandoning Chinese culture, they are losing the “spiri-
tual world,” which leads to “the disillusioned American dream” (1456). 
In Danticat’s story “Caroline’s Wedding,” the two daughters, Gracina and Caroline, are 
Americanized. As children, they “[reject] symbols of Haitian culture” (Danticat 214–15). Af-
ter their father passes away, they have to wear “nothing but black dresses” and red panties 
according to Haitian culture (Danticat 170), but they feel embarrassed, so they find “ways to 
make wearing black a fashion statement” (Danticat 170), and never wear red panties. The 
abandonment of Haitian culture is also shown in Caroline’s marriage to Eric. For one thing, 
Eric is not Haitian; and for another, they decide not to have a big formal wedding in a church 
as Haitians are supposed to do, but a small ceremony in Eric’s office. 
In contrast, the mother (Ma) in the story is still traditional. She always makes bone soup, 
which is a symbol of Haitian culture, and which Gracina and Caroline are already tired of. 
The reason why Ma makes bone soup every night since Caroline has announced her engage-
ment is that she “[attempts] to enforce the old ways upon the new — to take part in the gen-
erational and cultural clash that is particularly hard for her without her husband by her 
side” (Brotter). Moreover, she does not like Eric even though he is a nice person, solely be-
cause he is not Haitian and does not act like one either: 
Ma wanted Eric to officially come and ask her permission to marry her daughter. She wanted him to 
bring his family to our house and have his father ask her blessing. She wanted Eric to kiss up to her, 
escort her around, buy her gifts, and shower her with compliments. Ma wanted a full-blown church 
wedding. She wanted Eric to be Haitian. (Danticat 169) 
However, Eric has done nothing of what the mother imagines. Also because Eric is not Hait-
ian, the mother is embarrassed to pronounce his name, Eric Abrahams. She wants to say the 
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name in the Haitian way, but the name is not Haitian, and this makes her ashamed. The moth-
er’s dissatisfaction with Eric symbolizes her rejection of other cultures and the difficulty for 
her to assimilate into American society. 
Similar to the other immigrant narratives above, the daughter’s Americanization does not 
fully bury their origin. Gracina dreams about her father, and when she wakes up, she writes 
down what she remembers of him, because, as she writes, 
I had to remind myself, at least under my breath, that I did remember still. In the back of my mind, I 
could almost hear his voice saying these things to me, in the very same way that he had spoken over 
the years: “You have memory of walking in a mist at dawn in a banana jungle that no longer exists. 
You have lived this long in this strange world, so far from home, because you remember.” (Danticat 
177) 
The dream indicates that Gracina’s Haitian past only exists unconsciously, and her decision to 
write down her memory suggests that she is willing to remember her Haitian identity. When 
her mother shows Gracina her father’s proposal letter and asks Gracina to destroy it after she 
dies, Gracina admits that she wants to “hold on to things when [she] dies” and “hold on to 
[her mother]” (Danticat 213). This scene shows that Gracina is starting to accept her Haitian 
identity. At the end of the story, Gracina asks her mother if she can drop one bone in the soup, 
which symbolizes her embracement of Haitian culture and her Haitian identity. 
Because assimilation in the immigrant generation is never complete, scholars define the 
change in the cultural behaviors of these immigrants as acculturation. As I pointed out at the 
beginning of chapter 4.2, acculturation can be a type of assimilation, and it emphasizes a two-
way process. This two-way process is probably the reason why many scholars suggest that 
assimilation is dead in the United States. As a consequence of acculturation, the foreign ele-
ments in the United States are not necessarily derived from abroad. For example, the well-
known Chinese specialty “Chop-suey (based on the Cantonese word for miscellany) first saw 
light not in China but in San Francisco in the late 1800s,” and the famous “fortune cookie 
was invented in Los Angeles” in the 1920s (Bryson 269–70). Therefore, America’s multicul-
turalism might be a result of acculturation of immigrants, and the seemingly foreign elements 
in American culture indicate the two-way process of acculturation. Randolph S. Bourne de-
fines this phenomenon as “Trans-national America,” stating that in the United States there are 
“masses of people who are cultural half-breeds, neither assimilated Anglo-Saxons nor nation-
als of another culture.” Because of this fusion of cultures, he sees America not as “a national-
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ity but a trans-nationality,” and thus “it is spiritually impossible for [America] to pass into the 
orbit of any [nation].” Although Bourne’s article mainly aims to demonstrate that “it is im-
possible for Anglo-Saxon culture to fully assimilate other cultures in the United States, his 
view also indicates that non-Anglo-Saxon cultures have changed in the United States as im-
migrants have become ‘cultural half-breeds’” (Li 328). 
4.3.2. Citizenship and Naturalization in Germany 
Before the German reunification, the German citizenship law was based on the jus san-
guinis principle, which means that the main possible way to gain German citizenship was 
through German descent. The German Imperial and State Citizenship Law  of 1913 (Reichs- 27
und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, or RuStAG-1913 for short) “introduced for the first time a 
common German nationality for all the nationals of the various states constituting the ‘Ger-
man Reich’ of 1870” (Hailbronner 1), and it indicates that “German citizenship refers to a 
‘community of descent’, with little regard for birthplace and residence” (Marc Howard 42). 
This citizenship law allows ethnic Germans who resides outside of Germany to be naturalized 
if they can prove their German ancestry. However, the jus sanguinis principle of the RuStAG-
1913 did not close the door to naturalization for non-ethnic Germans, as opposed to the gen-
eral understanding of jus sanguinis. Alongside “[b]y birth [to a German parent],” “[b]y legit-
imatization,” “[b]y marriage,” and “[b]y assumption in the case of a German,” “[b]y natural-
ization in the case of a foreigner” is listed as a means of gaining German citizenship in the 
RuStAG-1913, and Article eight of this law explicitly states that 
A foreigner who has taken up his residence in Germany may on application be naturalized by the 
State within whose territory his residence lies. 
1. If he is legally competent in accordance with the laws of his former home or would be legally 
competent in accordance with the laws of Germany; or if the application is made by his legal represen-
tative or with the latter’s consent in accordance with the second sentence of paragraph 2 of § 7 [In the 
case of a person under parental tutelage or guardianship the application is made by his legal representa-
tive, if he has not completed his sixteenth year; if he has completed his sixteenth year, the application 
must have the consent of the legal representative]; 
2. If he has led a blameless life; 
3. If he has in the place of his residence his own dwelling or lodging; and 
4. If he is able there to support himself and his family. (“German Imperial” 218–19) 
 “Citizenship Law” is also translated as “Nationality Act” in some texts or references. Despite the difference in 27
terms, both translations are from the German word “Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz” and refer to the same law.
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Therefore, according to the Citizenship Law of 1913, Germany did not exclude non-ethnic 
Germans from naturalization theoretically. 
What made the jus sanguinis principle extreme was when the Nazi Party took power. The 
Nazi regime “cancelled the naturalisations that had taken place in the Weimar period, revoked 
the German citizenship of those viewed as ‘having violated a duty of loyalty to the German 
Empire or the “German Nation”’, and withdrew the citizenship rights of German 
Jews” (Marc Howard 42). The extreme blood-based citizenship restriction in the Nazi period 
was shown in the Reichsbürgergesetz (Reich’s Citizenship Law) of 1935 that “[o]nly Volk-
comrades can be citizens. And only persons of German blood, irrespective of confession, can 
be Volk-comrades. No Jew can be a Volk-comrade” (qtd. in Marc Howard 42). 
After the fall of Naziism, Germany continued to use the RuStAG-1913, but not-
withstanding the recognition of naturalization in the law, the jus sanguinis principle remained 
fundamental. The Alien Act (Ausländergesetz) was first introduced in 1965 (in the case of 
FRG) to “regulate the work and residence permit of guest workers” (Anil 454-55), but the act 
does not mention naturalization at all. Section 2.3 of the Naturalization Guidelines (Ein-
bürgerungsrichtlinien, or EbRichtl for short) of 1977 states that “[t]he Federal Republic of 
Germany is not a country of immigration; it does not strive to increase the number of German 
citizens by way of naturalization.”  28
In 1990, Germany (still FRG at the time) modified the Alien Act of 1965, starting a series 
of revolutionary changes in its citizenship law. Naturalization was explicitly instructed, and 
the Alien Act of 1990 allows application for naturalization for “foreigners between 16 and 23 
years of age with 8 or more years of residency” and six years of school attendance within 
German territory, of which at least four years in a general education school, and “foreigners 
above the age of 23 with a minimum of 15 years of residency” who file their application for 
naturalization before December 31, 1995 (Anil 455). In both cases the foreigner should not 
have been sentenced for any unlawful act. In 1993, the clause for naturalization was slightly 
modified, where the time limitation of application for foreigners above the age of 23 was 
scratched out. The change in 1999 standardized the minimum residency requirement to eight 
years and removed the age limitation. 
 The original text is: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland; sie strebt nicht an, die An28 -
zahl der deutschen Staatsangehörigen gezielt durch Einbürgerung zu vermehren.
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Due to these changes, “the naturalization rate of foreigners went up from 0.4 to 2.5%” 
from 1990 to 2000 (Anil 455). The increase in naturalization rate demonstrates that the 
changes in naturalization requirements have a practical impact on the state’s acceptance of 
foreigners to be citizens, and it also indicates the existing willingness of immigrants to be-
come German citizens. However, compared to the naturalization rate in the United States, 
which was 56 percent in 2000 excluding undocumented immigrants (Passel), the naturaliza-
tion rate in Germany was still extremely low. 
The modification of the Alien Act in 1999 was not the only change in regard to citizen-
ship and naturalization. The Citizenship Law of 1913 was also renewed in the same year, and 
it came into force on January 1, 2000. Many scholars consider the reform in the new law rev-
olutionary and fundamental, because it breaches the jus sanguinis principle to some degree 
and brings in the jus soli principle. The Citizenship Law of 1999 allows children born in 
Germany to gain German citizenship automatically if one of the parents “has legally been 
normally resident in the domestic territory for eight years and possesses a right of residence 
or has possessed for three years a residence permit for an unlimited period” (Nationality Act 
[1913, As Amended 1999]). In 2005, this clause was amended by stating that the parent 
should have legally resided in the German territory for eight years and is a European Union 
citizen who is entitled to freedom of movement or a citizen of an EEA-state (European Eco-
nomic Area) who has the same entitlement or possesses a residence permit of the EU or a 
right of residence in Germany. 
The 2014 version and also the current Citizenship Law regulates German citizenship for 
German-born children to foreign parents and naturalization as follows: 
Section 4 
[Acquisition by birth] 
… 
(3) A child of foreign parents shall acquire German citizenship by birth in Germany if one parent  
1. has been legally ordinarily resident in Germany for eight years and 
2. has been granted a permanent right of residence or as a national of Switzerland or as a family mem-
ber of a national of Switzerland possesses a residence permit on the basis of the Agreement of 21 June 
1999 between the European Community and its Member States on the one hand and the Swiss Confed-
eration on the other hand on the free movement of persons (Federal Law Gazette 2001 II p. 810). 
… 
Section 10 
[Entitlement to naturalization; derivative naturalization of spouses and minor children] 
(1) A foreigner who has been legally ordinarily resident in Germany for eight years and possesses legal 
capacity pursuant to Section 80 of the Residence Act or has a legal representative shall be naturalized 
upon application if he or she 
 141
1. confirms his or her commitment to the free democratic constitutional system enshrined in the Basic 
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and declares that he or she does not pursue or support and has 
never pursued or supported any activities 
a) aimed at subverting the free democratic constitutional system, the existence or security of the Feder-
ation or a Land or 
b) aimed at illegally impeding the constitutional bodies of the Federation or a Land or the members of 
said bodies in discharging their duties or 
c) any activities which jeopardize foreign interests of the Federal Republic of Germany through the use 
of violence or preparatory actions for the use of violence, 
or credibly asserts that he or she has distanced himself or herself from the former pursuit or support of 
such activities, 
2. has been granted a permanent right of residence or as a national of Switzerland or as a family mem-
ber of a national of Switzerland possesses a residence permit on the basis of the Agreement of 21 June 
1999 between the European Community and its Member States on the one hand and the Swiss Confed-
eration on the other hand on the free movement of persons or possesses an EU Blue Card or a residence 
permit for purposes other than those specified in Sections 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, sub-section 1, Section 23a, 
24 and Section 25, sub-sections 3 to 5 of the Residence Act. 
3. is able to ensure his or her own subsistence and the subsistence of his or her dependents without re-
course to benefits in accordance with Book Two or Book Twelve of the Social Code or recourse to such 
benefits is due to conditions beyond his or her control, 
4. gives up or loses his or her previous citizenship, 
5. has not been sentenced for an unlawful act and is not subject to any court order imposing a measure 
of reform and prevention due to a lack of criminal capacity, 
6. possesses an adequate knowledge of German and 
7. possesses knowledge of the legal system, society and living conditions in Germany. 
The conditions under sentence 1, numbers 1 and 7 do not apply to foreigners who do not have legal 
capacity pursuant to Section 80, sub-section 1 of the Residence Act [concerning minors above 16 years 
of age]. 
(2) The foreigner’s spouse and minor children may be naturalized together with the foreigner in accor-
dance with sub-section (1), irrespective of whether they have been lawfully resident in Germany for 
eight years. 
(3) Upon a foreigner confirming successful attendance of an integration course by presenting a certifi-
cate issued by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BMAF), the qualifying period stipulated 
in sub-section 1 shall be reduced to seven years. This qualifying period may be reduced to six years if 
the foreigner has made outstanding efforts at integration exceeding the requirements under sub-section 
1, sentence 1, no. 6, especially if he or she can demonstrate his or her command of the German lan-
guage. (Nationality Act 2–3 and 5–6) 
Compared to the former version of the law, the jus soli principle becomes more restricted, for 
one of the parents has to have become a permanent resident before the newborn child gains 
German citizenship automatically, and approximately 55.7 percent of all non-EU residents in 
Germany possess a residence permit for an unlimited period in 2014 (Statistisches Bunde-
samt). Since the current Citizenship Law follows a principle between jus sanguinis and jus 
soli, I call it the semi jus soli principle. 
The semi jus soli principle can indicate Germany’s intent of relaxing the restrictions of its 
immigration policy on the one hand and its caution and concern about the consequences after 
the relaxation on the other hand. There are three main reasons for liberalizing citizenship reg-
ulation. One important reason is to “attract highly skilled workers” (Anil 460). As Merih Anil 
notes, 
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[w]hen the German government initiated a pilot program in 2000 to “hire” 20,000 highly qualified 
workers from abroad, but received only about 8000 applicants, the political elite began to argue that 
potential highly skilled immigrants were put off by Germany’s insistence on preserving its pure ethnic 
national identity. Compared to traditional immigrant-receiving countries, Germany’s exclusive citizen-
ship policy was a disadvantage in the highly competitive international labor market for skilled workers. 
A government commission’s report predicted that without immigration, the labor force would decrease 
from 41 to 26 million by 2050 and recommended that 50,000 qualified workers be admitted on a yearly 
basis. Germany also needs immigrants to offset a shrinking and aging population. (460) 
Therefore, the changes in Germany’s Citizenship Law were made to compete for skilled 
workers and fulfill the country’s economic needs. 
Another reason is that “Germany experienced significant domestic and international pres-
sures to liberalise its citizenship policy,” and the domestic pressure had been extremely 
strong (Marc Howard 43). Marc M. Howard points out that the embedded impact of the Nazi 
past on Germans raised the guilt that if Germany did not establish a more tolerant policy on 
immigration, the Federal Republic of Germany would be compared to Nazi Germany by 
long-term residents (43–44). Also, “international bodies such as the Council of Europe, the 
European Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human Rights” pressured Germany by 
suggesting that “Germany’s law stood out as antiquated, inhumane, and in need of ‘moderni-
sation’” (Marc Howard 44). Therefore, the relaxation of the Citizenship Law is also caused 
by political and moral pressures. 
The third reason can be seen as a passive acceptance of immigration. Because of the large 
number of foreign population in the country, Germany was obliged to amend laws to avoid 
the possibility of immigrant-state conflict. As Halfmann notes, Germany needed to find a way 
to “accommodate the heritage of an ethno-cultural definition of nationhood with the modern 
need to define citizenship exclusively in legal and political terms,” because “[w]ithout such 
accommodation the gap between those residents who enjoy political and social inclusion in 
the state and those who are excluded from one or the other form of membership cannot be 
closed” (267). 
However, the relaxation of citizenship policy does not make naturalization easier, largely 
due to the accommodation I pointed out above. On the one hand, Germany needs to natural-
ize foreigners out of economic and political interests; and on the other hand, Germany still 
has reservations about naturalization’s impact on the ethnocultural definition of nationhood. 
As I quoted Anil earlier in this chapter, the naturalization rate increased from 0.4 to 2.5 per-
cent from 1990 to 2000. What Anil did not mention is that after 2000, the naturalization rate 
decreased again. Based on the naturalization statistics (Einbürgerungsstatistik) by the Federal 
 143
Ministry of the Interior (das Bundesministerium des Innern) and the population of foreigners 
each year (“Zahl”), I calculated the naturalization rates from 2000 to 2013, shown in figure 
4.7. The bar chart shows a tendency of a decreasing naturalization rate from 2000 to 2008, 
and the naturalization rate remains around 1.5 percent from 2008 to 2013, which means that 
the naturalization rate has decreased by one-third since 2000. In stark contrast, the naturaliza-
tion rate of the United States nearly reached 47 percent in 2013, and the other 53 percent 
“included lawful permanent residents, unauthorized immigrants, and legal residents on tem-
porary visas, such as students and temporary workers” (Zong and Batalova). Based on these 
statistics, Germany has been very careful and selective in naturalization. 
Section 10 of the Citizenship Law (concerning naturalization) demonstrates an indispens-
able requirement for integration. As the Federal Ministry of the Interior suggests, “[n]atural-
ization is a major step on the way to successful integration because it gives immigrants nu-
merous possibilities to participate in society, from political engagement to equal status under 
the law” (“Naturalization”; my italics). For example, section 10.(1).1 requests all applicants 
to obey, accept, and commit to Germany’s democratic political system, which is a value that 
Germany holds dear after the Second World War as a consequence of Nazi Germany. In a 
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way, the commitment to Germany’s democratic political system is also a commitment to 
German political values. 
Section 10.(1).4 suggests that applicants have to renounce their previous citizenship if 
German citizenship is granted. The renunciation of a previous citizenship indicates that appli-
cants need to cut the bond to their country of origin and also cease allegiance to it. Therefore, 
full allegiance to Germany is required for gaining German citizenship, and it symbolizes 
Germany’s intent to ensure applicants’ full integration. In 2007, Germany first introduced a 
naturalization ceremony, which contains speeches from newly naturalized citizens and ad-
ministration officials, and in some cases also “an obligatory pledge of allegiance to the con-
stitution” (Jakob 298). 
Only under few circumstances are applicants allowed to maintain their previous citizen-
ship. One circumstance is that the applicant’s country of origin does not release him or her 
from citizenship, or the loss of previous citizenship will cause grave disadvantages beyond 
the loss of civic rights. Another circumstance is that if the applicant is a national of another 
EU state or Switzerland. Moreover, children who gained German citizenship according to 
section 4 of the Citizenship Law are allowed to hold dual citizenship, but between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty-three, they have to choose between German citizenship and their other 
non-German nationality. This option model can be seen as granting the child a democratic 
free will to choose his or her own nationality, and it also implies that long-term dual citizen-
ship is not possible. From these examples of dual citizenship, one may conclude that dual cit-
izenship is usually not possible, but under certain circumstances, it is acceptable due to moral 
reasons, and Germany treats EU and Swiss nationals somewhat differently due to their eco-
nomic and political partnerships. 
The ability to speak and write German is also a sign of integration. As shown in section 
10.(1).6, applicants need to demonstrate adequate knowledge of the German language, which 
often means level B1 of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages. The 
Federal Ministry of the Interior explains that “[t]he ability to speak German . . . is essential 
for social and economic integration” (“Becoming”), and Şenocak notes that homelessness 
begins when languages do not have a home. For example, the Turkish language is often 
homeless in Germany (Deutschsein 15). Therefore, the adoption of the German language by 
immigrants symbolizes immigrants’ attempt to integrate into German society and gain Ger-
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man identity. Şenocak also criticizes immigrants’ integration process in Germany, saying that 
integration in Germany is a one-way street of assimilation, and there is no cultural exchange 
(Atlas 93). He points out that Turkish is the mother tongue of 1.7 million people in Germany 
(by 1992), which makes it the second most-spoken language in Germany. Yet Germany fears 
bilingualism, for there is no state-run program or concepts for the maintenance and develop-
ment of the Turkish language in Germany (Atlas 91), only trifling Turkish courses in schools 
taught by native speakers (Atlas 92). The reluctance of promoting a second language indi-
cates Germany’s intent to assimilate immigrants, because the loss or “defamiliarization” of a 
language can result in the loss of the related identity. 
Possessing civic knowledge as section 10.(1).7 requires helps immigrants, or in this case, 
applicants for naturalization, integrate into German society. It is also a necessity, because 
once applicants are granted German citizenship, they are expected to participate in political 
activities such as voting. To assure that applicants have adequate civic knowledge, applicants 
need to pass a naturalization test. The test consists of thirty-three questions, from which thirty 
“relate to the subject areas of ‘Living in a democracy’, ‘History and responsibility[,]’ and 
‘People and society,’” and three are “about the Federal Land [state] in which [applicants] are 
registered as having [their] main place of residence” (“Naturalisation Test”). Applicants have 
to answer at least seventeen questions correctly to pass the test. 
The possibilities to reduce the length of residence before naturalization as section 10.(3) 
stipulates indicate that applicants can be rewarded for successful integration, which further 
emphasizes the importance of integration. The attempt to make every applicant for naturaliza-
tion adopt German culture may also suggest that Germany is eager to maintain Germanness 
in the country, and as Şenocak observes, immigrants and their cultures are only tolerated as 
guests, they are condoned, but not accepted (Atlas 25). 
Even the public thinks that long-term immigrants should accept and follow core German 
values (fig. 4.8). The percentage of respondents who support this kind of integration in-
creased rapidly between 2001 and 2008, and in mid 2008, the percentage reached ninety-sev-
en percent, which is to say, nearly everyone favored that immigrants should adhere to core 
German values. 
However, Germany’s attempt to make immigrants integrate has not been very successful. 
Şenocak explains that it is because people in Germany speak about integration when they 
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mean assimilation. The consequence is that the integration result cannot be satisfactory 
(Deutschsein 121). Millions of immigrants who were born and raised in Germany and who 
are already German citizens are still deemed to be foreigners by ethnic Germans, and they 
become German on the one hand but stay foreign on the other (Şenocak, Deutschsein 117–
18). For example, in a naturalization speech in Dresden, the speaker “tells the new citizens: 
‘Maybe more people from your home countries will soon come to Saxony. Maybe you will 
have the chance to assist your fellow countrymen’” (Jakob 303). Here, it is implied that these 
naturalized citizens are not fellow Germans, because their “fellow countrymen” are “the citi-
zens of the country they have emigrated from” (Jakob 303). In the naturalization of a boy 
who was born and raised in Germany, the boy was described as knowing his “home” from 
visiting (Jakob 304). In this case, although the boy was born and raised in Germany, might 
have the same education as natives, and knows Germany much better than his country of ori-
gin, his country of origin is still his “home” in the eyes of a native. Therefore, these speeches 
alienate naturalized citizens from natives, which suggests that Germany still has not fully ac-
cepted naturalized citizens as its own people. Also, the German sense of “native-born” is dif-
Fig. 4.8. Public Opinion on Whether Immigrants Should Adhere to and Accept Core German Values, 1998 to 
2008
Note: Answers were in response to the following question: “If an immigrant who has been a long-term resi-
dent of Germany or who was born here wants to be naturalized, should he or she accept and adhere to the 
principles and core values of our society, or is that not necessary?” 
Fig. 4.8. Oya S. Abalı, “German Public Opinion on Immigration and Integration” (Migration Policy Institute, 
2009; 7; Web; 23 Jul. 2015; PDF file).
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ferent from the American sense of “native-born,” because native-born Germans are ethnic 
Germans, while native-born Americans are citizens born in the United States. This alienation 
of naturalized citizens in Germany can be a cause of the identity problem of naturalized citi-
zens. Lale Yalçın-Heckmann points out the “difficulty felt by . . . the [second-generation 
Turkish immigrants] in finding a single common name for their identity” — “[s]ome say they 
are Turks living in Germany, some say they are Turks who happen to live in Germany, some 
say they are Turks and Berliners and the like, but hardly any say they are Germans” (312). In 
addition, origin is still very important to them. As Yalçın-Heckmann notes, 
[e]ven the second-generation Turks, born in Germany, when they meet someone perhaps older than 
themselves, asks ‘nerelisiniz?’ (‘where are you from?’) expecting the answer to be some town or region 
in Turkey. Nicknames with associations of hemşeri (‘compatriot’) and ethnic / regional ties, such as 
‘Sıvas’lı Ahmet’ (Ahmet from Sıvas, a province in Turkey) or ‘Laz Mehmet’ (Mehmet of the ethnic 
group of Laz from the Black Sea region of Turkey) are used as frequently among the second generation 
as among the first. (313) 
Moreover, even third-generation immigrants are considered to be immigrants by German so-
ciety, and their ethnic and religious origin is put before their characters, their education, their 
ideology, and their lifestyle (Şenocak, Deutschsein 125). Therefore, immigrants remain for-
eign despite their willingness of integration or integration level (Şenocak, Deutschsein 133). 
In other words, however well immigrants have already integrated, they are treated as foreign-
ers. 
Similar phenomena are also shown in Franco Biondi’s novella Abschied der zerschellten 
Jahre (1984, Farewell to the Shattered Years). The protagonist, Mamo, is a second-generation 
immigrant in Germany, or even a 2.5-generation immigrant, for his parents have come to 
Germany at a young age. He is struggling with an identity problem, because he regards Ger-
many as his home, but he is deemed to be a foreigner in the eyes of ethnic Germans and is 
required to leave Germany by the immigration office after he loses his job. Mamo does not 
want to think about his nationality or identity, but he is forced to do so, because he encounters 
such questions from ethnic Germans very often. Once he attempts to avoid a question about 
his nationality by answering that he is American “just because” (Biondi 26). But when he is 
asked again, he says that he is American, because Americans defend their freedom with guns 
(Biondi 26). This answer indicates Mamo’s resentment and frustration that he cannot make 
people see that he is German inside, and although he was born and raised in Germany, he 
cannot be German. Another time, Mamo is irritated by this question, because he speaks exact-
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ly like ethnic Germans, but Germans still question his nationality just because he does not 
look German. He believes that they want to know his nationality, because in doing so, they 
can position clichés on him and alienate him (Biondi 82). This time, Mamo answers that it 
does not matter what his nationality is, but if people must know, he is German (Biondi 82–
83). However, although Mamo seems to be sure that he is German, the questions from ethnic 
Germans make him doubt his identity gradually and affect his confidence. Mamo cannot stop 
thinking about his foreign identity, and there are nights when he dreams that he finds himself 
standing in front of a mirror and studies his face to be sure who he is (Biondi 46). Yet, his ap-
pearance can only confuse him more, for his look is probably the main reason why he is 
treated as a foreigner. At the end of the novella, Mamo shoots a German officer, because he 
“refuses to return to his parents’ country, a no man’s land to him” (Fachinger 25). Petra 
Fachinger notes that 
[d]efending [Mamo’s] territory, he kills an official representative of the country that refuses to function 
as his “fatherland.” By denying renewal of a residence permit to Mamo, who was born and raised in 
Germany and does not speak any language other than German, the authorities also deny him the right 
to speak his mother tongue. Metaphorically, when Mamo takes aim at the heart of the police officer, he 
fires at the “heart” of the German language. (25) 
If the German language is a representation of German identity, then Mamo also kills his 
German identity. Therefore, Mamo, a representative of second-generation immigrants, does 
not feel foreign at first, but he is forced to feel foreign by ethnic Germans, and consequently, 
loses his German identity. 
This alienation may also result in the lack of willingness to naturalize, which is another 
reason for the low naturalization rate in Germany. When naturalization is not able to offer 
immigrants enough social, political, and legal advantages, or in other words, when immi-
grants do not see a benefit in the cost-benefit distribution, immigrants are unlikely to choose 
naturalization. For example, immigrants from the EU and the former Yugoslavia “see a pos-
sibility for steady upward mobility and social assimilation from generation to 
generation” (Diehl and Blohm 138), and being foreign does not hinder their economic pur-
suance. Therefore, these immigrants barely feel inferior to German citizens. As a result, “the 
possibility of changing formal group membership through naturalization is no longer appeal-
ing to [them]” (Diehl and Blohm 139). 
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As I pointed out in chapter 3.2, German national identity mainly consists of the German 
Kultur and Volk; thus it is possible that the intolerance to foreign cultures Şenocak observes is 
a result of protecting German identity. Consequently, hyphenated Germans are likely to have 
a double identity, because, on the one hand, they are born and raised in Germany, attend 
German schools, and know Germany better than their country of origin; but on the other 
hand, they are constantly reminded of their foreign origin, and continue to be considered as 
foreigners and labeled as immigrants. In Şenocak’s essay “Dialog über die dritte Sprache: 
Deutsche, Türken und ihre Zukunft” (“Dialogue about the Third Language: Germans, Turks, 
and Their Future”) in his book Atlas des tropischen Deutschland (1992, Atlas of the Tropical 
Germany), he tells a story about the struggle of a Turkish German’s self-identification. A 
newspaper girl asks the protagonist, a Turkish German who travels in Turkey, if he is German 
or Turkish. As he hesitates, the girl answers for him that he is neither nor, but the protagonist 
corrects her that he can also be both (85). Then the girl asks him where his home (Heimat) is, 
which makes him hesitate again (85). Later the protagonist explains that depending on the 
“game plan,” Turkish Germans are sometimes more German than the Germans, and some 
other time more Turkish than the Turks (89). This essay demonstrates a clear double identity, 
in which neither identity is stronger than the other. In a naturalization speech of a Zambia 
woman, the woman said: “Today, two hearts are beating in my chest. The Zambian one and 
the German one” (qtd. in Jakob 301). In another naturalization ceremony, the mayor of 
Berlin’s Mitte acknowledged this double identity, stating: 
Unfortunately, there is no plural for Heimat in German. Heimat only exists in the singular. Actually, 
this word doesn’t describe the attitude towards life of many of our people. Because they generally 
have, many of those who immigrated, two “Heimate,” if I may say so, however grammatically incor-
rect. (qtd. in Jakob 305) 
The mayor’s speech not only suggests that naturalized citizens often have a double identity, 
but also naturalization is still a very new concept in Germany, because the plural sense of 
home does not exist in the German language or German culture, as the German language is 
an essential part of German culture. Therefore, naturalization also challenges German culture 
to some extent. 
However, other literary works do demonstrate a “neither/nor” self-identification. For ex-
ample, in Terézia Mora’s novel Day In Day Out (2007, original title Alle Tage [2004]), the 
protagonist Abel Nema, a Yugoslavian refugee in Germany, loses his identity completely in 
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the end. Although Abel is only a refugee, he falls into the categorization of permanent immi-
grant, for he is highly educated, and he has to stay in Germany permanently due to his coun-
try’s disintegration. During his residence in Germany, Abel has not gained any German iden-
tity, and he has lost his Yugoslavian identity, for his former country does not exist anymore. 
Even Abel’s name suggests that he has no home — “Nema, the mute, related etymologically 
to the modern Slav word for German, though originally for any non-Slav language or people, 
for the mute neighbors or, to put it differently, the barbarians” (Mora 10). Therefore, the pro-
tagonist’s name can be read as “Abel the Barbarian,” a person with no sense of belonging. 
Abel’s lifestyle in Germany also demonstrates that he has no identity. He seldom speaks, 
although he is a genius who masters ten or twelve languages. As the novel describes his lan-
guage skills, “to such perfection that you’d never believe he’d acquired most of his knowl-
edge in the language lab, from tapes . . . . That’s why everything he says is so . . . placeless, 
so uniquely clear — no accent, no dialect, nothing: he speaks like a person who comes from 
nowhere” (Mora 10; emphasis in original). His lack of communication and connection with 
other people results in his almost non-existence: he has no friends (Kinga, probably the only 
person who sees Abel as a friend, commits suicide in the end), has no job (or freelanced, as 
he himself describes it), has moved five times, and is constantly lost in the city or has no des-
tination of where he wants to go. In this sense, Abel lives in a vacuum where no one or noth-
ing could result in his Germanization. Moreover, Abel does not have valid papers in Ger-
many. His passport has expired and the country no longer exists, and his student visa for 
Germany has expired as well. As a result, there is no way to prove his existence. In his and 
Mercedes’s first attempt to divorce, the judge decides that she cannot divorce a person who 
does not exist. 
The only time Abel speaks much and acts “[p]olite,” “friendly,” “charming,” and not “dis-
tant” (Mora 316) is when the police comes to investigate if the marriage between him and 
Mercedes is fictive. Since Abel in fact only marries Mercedes for the papers, he has to pre-
tend and persuade the police that their marriage is real in order to stay legal. In the perfor-
mance, Abel becomes a completely different person — he calls Mercedes darling, walks con-
fidently, speaks in a nonchalant tone, and tells sweet details of their married life. Everything 
he does in the pretense gives Mercedes the impression that “something [is] not quite right 
about him,” for “[h]e’s plausible to the point of implausibility” (Mora 316; emphasis in origi-
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nal). Abel’s performance can be read as a demonstration that he has no identity of his own; 
thus he can only act out an identity in pretense. In other words, only in a performance does he 
know who he is. 
At the end of the novel, Abel and Mercedes are finally divorced, which means Abel has 
no legal status in Germany anymore. In addition, Abel has lost his ten or twelve languages 
(probably the only thing he has ever had), and he has forgotten his own name. In a way, Abel 
has become nothing after years of residence in Germany — he is not a German or a Yugoslav 
(for there is no Yugoslavia); he has no job, no friends, and no abilities. 
Although the interpretations of immigrants’ identity are quite different in Şenocak and 
Mora’s works (“both” and “neither/nor”), they have something in common, namely, that their 
newly gained German identity (if at all) does not prevail over their original identity. Also, 
immigrants show doubts about their identity. Therefore, absolute assimilation is not possible 
in Germany. 
4.3.3. Comparison and Reflection 
The main difference between the U.S. and German citizenship policies is that U.S. citi-
zenship follows the jus soli principle, while German citizenship follows the jus sanguinis 
principle. Because of economic needs and both domestic and international pressures, Ger-
many has gradually adopted a semi jus soli principle, which demonstrates Germany’s attempt 
to relax its citizenship regulations but at the same time its concerns for the consequences, as 
Germany, regardless of the high immigrant ratio, is still not willing to be an immigration 
country. 
Despite the difference in principle, the naturalization policies of the two countries are 
similar, with Germany being slightly stricter. Table 4.8 shows a comparison of the two coun-
tries’ naturalization requirements for an adult foreign-born immigrant who is not the spouse 
of a national. From the table, the only visible differences are the length of residence before 
naturalization and the renunciation of former citizenship, which make the German naturaliza-
tion policy only three years stricter in theory if the applicant is willing to renounce his or her 
former citizenship. However, the ratio of the naturalization rate in the United States to that in 
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Germany in 2013 is 31.3 to 1 (47% to 1.5%), which demonstrates that naturalization in Ger-
many is much more difficult in practice. This difference in naturalization rate demonstrates 
that although the United States and Germany have similar naturalization policies, different 
immigration policy models may lead to different results in practice. 
Apart from the practical difficulty to naturalize in Germany, another possible reason for 
the grave contrast in naturalization rate is immigrants’ willingness to be naturalized. Although 
both countries have the intention to make immigrants adopt the culture of the host society, 
which may lead to the process of assimilation, assimilation in the United States goes both 
ways (as in the sense of acculturation), while it is only one-way in Germany (as a conse-
quence of Germany’s ethnocultural concern). In other words, Anglo-American culture highly 
influences immigrants’ lifestyles, but at the same time, foreign cultures have a strong impact 
on American society as well. In addition to a strong political sense in American national iden-
tity, immigrants in the United States are more likely to have a feeling of belonging and 
choose to be naturalized. In comparison, the strong cultural sense in German national identity 
makes the integration process only a one-way street to Germanization, which makes immi-
grants remain foreign regardless of the length of their residence, and this may weaken their 
willingness to be naturalized. The difference in assimilation outcomes between the United 
States and Germany suggests that even the same attempt of the country can have different 
outcomes in different societies, and in this particular case, the assimilation outcomes in the 
United States Germany
Residence Length 5 years 8 years
Permanent Resident Yes Yes
Language Requirement Yes Yes
Naturalization Test Yes Yes
Law-Abidingness Yes Yes
Renunciation of Former 
Citizenship Not specified (read as no) Yes (with exceptions)
Table 4.8 
Comparison of Naturalization Requirements between the United States and Germany
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United States and Germany are different because of the difference in the cognition of national 
identity between the two countries. Moreover, the acquiescence of keeping their former citi-
zenship in the United States may also help immigrants decide to be naturalized. 
Also because of the different perceptions of national identity, Americans and Germans 
have different perceptions of who “we” are and who “they” are. In other words, the term na-
tive-born Americans means those who were born in the United States, while the term native-
born Germans has the connotation of having German origin or blood. As a result, second- and 
third-generation immigrants in the United States are starting to be regarded as Americans by 
native-born Americans, which accelerates their Americanization, whereas second- and third-
generation immigrants in Germany are still considered to be foreigners, which creates their 
double identity or no identity at all. 
First-generation immigrants of both countries show similar signs of double identity as 
literary works such as The Namesake (Lahiri), Typical American (Jen), “Caroline’s 
Wedding” (Danticat), Atlas des tropischen Deutschland (Şenocak), and Deutschsein (Being 
German, Şenocak, 2011) describe. They gradually adopt the new culture, but the culture of 
their country of origin remains. In other cases, as Day In Day Out (Mora) shows, the confu-
sion over their identity overwhelms immigrants’ self-identification. Consequently, immi-
grants may lose their identity completely. However, second-generation immigrants in the two 
countries have different feelings of belonging, largely due to the identification by natives as I 
explained above. Second-generation immigrants in the United States demonstrate a strong 
sense of Americanization, for they are likely to identify themselves as Americans rather than 
descendants of their country of origin, notwithstanding what others identify them to be. Un-
der certain circumstances, second-generation immigrants also show the potential to rediscov-
er their other identity (identity of their country of origin). This means that although second-
generation immigrants are almost fully assimilated and Americanized, identity of their coun-
try of origin is not lost but concealed. On the contrary, second- and even third-generation 
immigrants in Germany still tend to hold on to their foreign identity while gaining their Ger-
man identity, and thus creating a double identity. These two identities coexist, and one identi-
ty is not stronger than the other. In this sense, second-generation immigrants in the United 
States are in a higher state of integration. This, again, may relate to the understanding of na-
tional identity among citizens with immigrant background and the acceptance of citizens with 
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immigrant background in the society based on the understanding of national identity, which 
suggests that the same immigrant situation has different consequences.  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5. Return to Sender?: Illegal Immigration 
“Everything we eat today is picked and created by undoc-
umented immigrants, to a large extent. Every time we go 
and move into a building, a lot of those buildings are built 
by undocumented immigrants’ hands.” 
— Arnold Schwarzenegger (qtd. in Schrag 186) 
According to Frank D. Bean and B. Lindsay Lowell, the term “immigration” has a legal 
sense (70). Therefore, people should not be identified as immigrants if they enter a foreign 
country without the approval of the national government or if they overstay their visas in a 
foreign country. Rather, they are to be identified as “international migrant[s]” (Bean and 
Lowell 70). However, an international migrant can be regarded as an immigrant through 
“processes of settlement” (Bean and Lowell 70) even when the settlement is illegal. In this 
sense, the term “international migrant” can be replaced by the term “illegal immigrant.” Since 
“illegal” and “immigrant” seem to be contradictory, this term, to a large extent, highlights the 
ambivalence of the role of this population. 
The term “illegal immigrant” also raised a terminology debate in the United States some 
years ago, especially among the Latino population. Jose Antonio Vargas, a Pulitzer Prize-
winning journalist, restarted the debate in 2011 when he published an article in The New York 
Times Magazine, revealing his status as an undocumented immigrant. He “pushed for media 
to drop the term ‘illegal immigrant’ . . . arguing that the modifier is offensive and inaccurate 
because it criminalizes people rather than their actions” (Planas, “Jose”). Vargas asked The 
New York Times and The Associated Press to change their policies of using the term “illegal 
immigrant” (Planas, “Jose”). In response, Margret Sullivan, The Times’s public editor, wrote 
a blog and quoted Philip B. Corbett, the associate managing editor for standards at The Times, 
that 
in referring in general terms to the issue of people living in the United States without legal papers, we 
do think the phrases “illegal immigrants” and “illegal immigration” are accurate, factual and as neutral 
as we can manage under the circumstances. It is, in fact, illegal to enter, live or work in this country 
without valid documents. Some people worry that we are labeling immigrants as “criminals” — but 
we’re not. “Illegal” is not a synonym for “criminal.” (One can even park “illegally,” though it’s not a 
criminal offense.) 
Proposed alternatives like “undocumented” seem really to be euphemisms — as though this were 
just a bureaucratic mix-up that can easily be remedied. Often those phrases seem deliberately chosen to 
try to soften or minimize the significance of the lack of legal status. We avoid those euphemisms just as 
we avoid phrases that tend to cast a more pejorative light on immigrants. For example, we steer clear of 
the shorthand “illegals” and also the word “aliens,” both of which we think have needlessly negative 
connotations. (“Is ‘Illegal’”) 
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As for herself, Sullivan explained that “I’ve said I would be happy to hear him out. I should 
note that, as public editor, I don’t make Times policy on such things. However, I could, at 
some point, take a stand. At this point, I don’t know enough” (“Is ‘Illegal’”). However, after 
some weeks, she posted another blog and decided not to support Vargas’s stand. She wrote: 
After all the buildup, my weighing in may seem anticlimactic, because I see no advantage for 
Times readers in a move away from the paper’s use of the phrase “illegal immigrant.” 
It is clear and accurate; it gets its job done in two words that are easily understood. The same can-
not be said of the most frequently suggested alternatives – “unauthorized,” “immigrants without legal 
status,” “undocumented.” Undocumented, as the immigration reporter Julia Preston noted in an inter-
view with me, has “a new currency” because of a federal policy change involving immigrants who 
came here as children 15 and under, so the word may be useful in that context. 
Just as “illegal tenant” in a real estate story (another phrase you could have seen in Times articles 
or headlines) is brief and descriptive, so is “illegal immigrant.” In neither case is there an implication 
that those described that way necessarily have committed a crime, although in some cases they may 
have. The Times rightly forbids the expressions “illegals” and “illegal aliens.” (“Readers”) 
On the other hand, Lawrence Downes, who is also a member of The New York Times edi-
torial board, empathized with Vargas. He wrote in his blog: 
I use “illegal” somewhat interchangeably with “undocumented,” recognizing that both words are 
imperfect. I also use “unauthorized,” which is unfamiliar and a little clunky, but has a distinct advan-
tage: while it acknowledges the unlawfulness of someone’s immigration status, it also recognizes that 
this status can be fixed. 
This is where “illegal” causes the most trouble, and where I find myself empathizing with Mr. Var-
gas. What bothers both of us is the way “illegal” in “illegal immigrant” defines an entire person, not 
merely an unlawful act. It taints everything that person does, and suggests an irreparable offense. How 
do you legalize an illegal person? 
. . . 
And if immigrants are “illegal,” then it follows that they don’t deserve legal protections. You can 
do anything you want to them — abuse them, insult and berate them, arrest and detain them, split up 
their families — because their “illegality” severs them from any rights. That’s the argument used in 
Arizona and Alabama,  and it has the advantage of being easy to understand. 29
In addition, many media outlets have stopped using the term “illegal immigrant.” For exam-
ple, Huffington Post standards editor Adam Rose notes that 
HuffPost generally uses “undocumented immigrant” and hasn’t been using “illegal immigrant” since at 
least 2008, when we decided to avoid the term because it carried an unnecessary political charge. . . . 
Our editors realized that there are other good and concise phrases that describe the same group of peo-
ple. In fact, “undocumented immigrant” is more concise than using what most people really mean: 
“alleged illegal immigrant.” It’s also more precise because it indicates the specific issue with their im-
migration status. We wouldn’t call an unlicensed driver an “illegal driver,” as that could mean any 
number of things. (qtd. in Costantini) 
Director of public relations of CNN, Bridget Leininger, also states that “CNN has been dis-
cussing this matter for some time and we have been evolving our style. CNN generally 
 I will elaborate on the two acts against illegal immigration introduced in Arizona and Alabama in 5.1.29
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prefers the term ‘undocumented immigrant’ when referring to a [sic] individual. The terms 
‘illegal or illegals’ are not used as nouns. As a general term for the issue, however, illegal 
immigration is used” (qtd. in Costantini). 
To reach Latino audiences, it is also necessary to avoid the term “illegal immigrant.” 
Cristina Costantini points out that 
[i]n many newsrooms where Latinos have a seat at the table, the term “illegal immigrant” has been 
dropped. NBC, which started NBC Latino this year, dropped the term. ABC, which is part of our new 
partnership with Univision, dropped the term. CNN, after making recent Latino hires, announced that 
they prefer to use “undocumented.” The Miami Herald and the San Antonio Express-News, which both 
have a large Hispanic readership, have dropped the term. Even Fox News, a cable channel viewed by 
the public to be the most conservative network in a 2009 Pew survey, took a step in the same direction 
when it dropped illegal in favor of “undocumented” on their Fox News Latino site. 
The demand for changing the term “illegal immigrant” into “undocumented immigrant” is 
also supported by Schuck’s theory. Schuck points out that illegal immigration “may reason-
ably be regarded by citizens as a socially efficient offense (i.e., one whose aggregate social 
benefits exceed its social costs) or even a Pareto-superior offense (i.e., one that makes at least 
some people better off and no one worse off)” (“Law” 250). Therefore, illegal immigration, 
to a large extent, is a “victimless offense” (Schuck, “Law” 251). Consequently, illegal immi-
gration is ambiguous, because “[m]ost undocumented immigrants are . . . law-abiding, future-
oriented individuals who work hard, attend church, raise strong families, surmount daunting 
obstacles, love their new country, and exemplify many of our cherished social 
ideals” (Schuck, “Law” 251), which makes “any punishment” or “strict enforcement” of im-
migration control policy “pointless, oppressive, [or] even inhumane” (Schuck, “Law” 251). 
The use of the term “illegal immigrant” has even become a symbol to show that the per-
son using it is against illegal immigration. During the 2012 presidential campaign, President 
Obama, who was promoting his immigration reform to offer a pathway to citizenship for the 
eleven million undocumented immigrants, avoided the term “illegal immigrant” and “referred 
to immigrants without legal residency as ‘undocumented workers’” (Planas, “Illegal”). In 
contrast, his opponent, Mitt Romney, who was strongly against illegal immigration, used the 
term “illegals” to refer to undocumented immigrants “as he defended the concept of ‘self-de-
poration’ [sic, self-deportation ]” (Planas, “Illegal”). 30
 By self-deportation Romney meant that if undocumented immigrants could not obtain the benefits they 30
thought they would in the United States, they would choose to leave and go somewhere else to pursue the bene-
fits.
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The debate over whether the term “illegal immigrant” is the proper term to describe this 
population, similar to Bean and Lowell’s argument, mirrors the ambivalence of illegal immi-
gration. Also due to the possible ambiguity of the term, I will use the term “undocumented 
immigrant” to refer to this population. However, the references I use may include the term 
“illegal immigrant.” Authors of these articles or books do not necessarily intend to send a 
negative connotation unless otherwise specified. 
Despite most undocumented immigrants’ law-abidingness, it is possible that some undoc-
umented immigrants are related to crimes or terrorism. Since these people are undocumented, 
the government has no record of them. Consequently, they are difficult to detect and they 
pose a grave danger to the country’s security. In addition, undocumented immigrants are di-
rectly or indirectly responsible for crimes such as tax evasion of their employers, even though 
they are usually the victims in this equation. 
Friedrich Heckmann summarizes three basic forms of illegal immigration (fig. 5.1). The 
first form (illegal crossing of a border) is the easiest for the police to detect, while the latter 
two forms are very hard to control. 
Illegal Immigration
Illegal crossing 
of a Border
Crossing of a border in a seem-
ingly legal way, using falsified 
documents one is not entitled to, 
or using legal documents for 
illegal purposes.
Staying after expira-
tion of legal status
Fig. 5.1. Basic Forms of Illegal Immigration
Fig. 5.1. Friedrich Heckmann, “Illegal Migration: What Can We Know and What Can We Explain? The Case 
of Germany”; International Migration Review 38.3 (2004; 1106; Web; 19 Nov. 2012; PDF file).
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5.1. Illegal Immigration in the United States 
The problem of illegal immigration in the United States is quite severe. An obvious con-
flict illegal immigration results in is the assumption that undocumented immigrants take over 
jobs that could have been given to U.S. citizens. However, this assumption might as well only 
be a stereotype or a right-wing argument. The Federation for American Immigration Reform 
(FAIR) points out that almost eight million jobs are offered to undocumented immigrants, 
because they are willing to receive lower wages due to their illegal status (“Illegal Aliens”). 
As a result, U.S. citizens lose a great number of jobs, many of which are wanted positions by 
U.S. citizens, because undocumented immigrants “are working in jobs in which U.S. workers 
are also employed — whether in construction, agricultural harvesting or service 
professions” (“Illegal Aliens”). Furthermore, FAIR states that “illegal immigrants are a sig-
nificant fiscal burden on local communities” (“The Cost”), because they drag the wages of 
U.S. workers down, and their dependents, who do not contribute to the U.S. economy, also 
use public resources such as education, medical services, and incarceration. 
FAIR is indeed a right-wing organization aiming at “[ending] illegal immigration” and 
“[setting] legal immigration at the lowest feasible levels consistent with the demographic, 
economic, social, and environmental realities” (Anti-Defamation League 2). The Anti-
Defamation League (ADL) accuses FAIR of promoting nativism and xenophobia and being 
extremely hostile to immigrants (15). However, FAIR’s view is supported by some scholars. 
Peter Morici, economist at the University of Maryland claims that immigrants “have captured 
all of the nearly 9 million jobs created since 2000 [, and] [i]llegal immigrants hold many of 
these positions” (qtd. in Greenberg). In addition, the director of research at the Center for 
Immigration Studies, Steven A. Camarota, points out that the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
“shows that, as of November [2014], there were 1.5 million fewer native-born Americans 
working than in November 2007, while 2 million more immigrants (legal and illegal) were 
working. Thus, all net employment gains since November 2007 have gone to immigrants.” 
There are also counterarguments to FAIR’s statements. Maria E. Enchautegui, senior re-
search associate at the Urban Institute, argues that “larger employment gains don’t necessari-
ly mean that immigrants are displacing U.S.-born workers,” because they might not compete 
for the same job. She further explains that “many of these immigrants are unauthorized and 
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do not speak English well. As such, they tend to work in different occupations than U.S.-born 
workers — often, occupations that require little interaction with the public, that do not re-
quire licensing, and that do not require supervisory skills.” The Center for American Progress 
even suggests that if undocumented immigrants are granted legal status, they can drive the 
economy and create jobs (Lynch and Oakford). A study by the Center for American Progress 
in 2013 sets up three reform scenarios (fig. 5.2) and concludes that the faster undocumented 
immigrants gain citizenship, the more the country will benefit. The reasons for this economic 
benefit can be that 
[p]roviding a road map to citizenship to undocumented immigrants gives them legal protections that 
raise their wages. It also promotes investment in the education and training of immigrants that eventu-
ally pays off in the form of higher wages and output; grants access to a broader range of higher-paying 
jobs; encourages labor mobility which increases the returns on the labor skills of immigrants by im-
proving the efficiency of the labor market such that the skillsets of immigrants more closely match the 
jobs that they perform; and makes it more possible for immigrants to start businesses and create jobs. 
(Lynch and Oakford) 
The debates on whether undocumented immigrants are a burden and whether they take 
away jobs suggest that illegal immigration per se does not necessarily create a problem for 
Fig. 5.2. The Nature and Timing of Immigration Reform Matters
Fig. 5.2. Robert Lynch and Patrick Oakford, “The Economic Effects of Granting Legal Status and Citizenship 
to Undocumented Immigrants” (Center for American Progress, 20 Mar. 2013; Web; 20 Aug. 2015).
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the country (for they might not be a burden and might not take away citizens’ jobs), but it 
does result in a conflict between the two sides holding different opinions and a conflict be-
tween people who are against illegal immigration and undocumented immigrants themselves. 
Therefore, it is still valid to say that illegal immigration is a “problem” in the United States. 
An estimate in 2011 shows that there are roughly 11.5 million undocumented immigrants 
in the United States (Hoefer et al. 1), most of whom entered the country from Mexico, and 
approximately 60 percent of all undocumented immigrants are Mexicans (Bean and Lowell 
71). Therefore, the U.S.-Mexico border becomes the focus of the U.S. Border Patrol, and the 
word “Mexican” becomes almost a synonym of undocumented immigrant (Schrag 195), 
which is unfair to legal Mexican immigrants. The connection between “Mexican” and “ille-
gal” negatively influences the life of Mexican immigrants, because the police often judge 
people’s immigration status by the color of their skin, and they are likely to interrogate peo-
ple who look Mexican. Also, Bean and Lowell criticize that “policymakers often focus on . . . 
unauthorized Mexican migration in particular but pay little heed to legal Mexican immigra-
tion” (72). 
There was “a tremendous increase of illegal migration” (“Border”) to the United States in 
the 1980s and 1990s, because industrialization gradually eroded “the economic viability of 
small-scale agriculture in Mexico” (Bean and Lowell 74). Moreover, despite an increase in 
the gross domestic product, “those who shared only marginally in the overall [Mexican] eco-
nomic growth” had “inadequate opportunities” to change their poverty situation, for income 
distribution was highly inequitable since it favored “upper-income families” (Bean and Low-
ell 74). In response to this increase in illegal immigration, the U.S. Border Patrol continually 
increased “manpower and the implementation of modern technology” (“Border”) — the 
“number of Border Patrol agents rose from 3,965 in September 1993 to 12,349 in September 
2006” (Cornelius and Salehyan 142), and “[a]pproximately 70 miles of the border were 
fenced” (Cornelius and Salehyan 142), accompanied by “remote video surveillance systems, 
infrared monitors, [and] seismic sensors” (Cornelius and Salehyan 142). The United States 
also raised the annual budget for the Border Patrol at the U.S.-Mexico border — “it leapt 
from about $250 million a year in the early 1990s to $1.6 billion a year in the early 
2000s” (Martell-Gámez). In 2006, the Bush administration tried to install a “virtual fence” 
which consists of surveillance technology along the 1,979-mile border (Aradas), but after 
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spending $1 billion, which is only adequate to cover 53 miles of border (Aradas), the project 
was dropped. 
Not all undocumented immigrants through irregular crossing of the U.S.-Mexico border 
are Mexican nationals. According to Robin Reineke and Daniel E. Martínez, “[f]rom 2000 till 
2011, Mexican nationals accounted for 86 to 98 per cent of all Border Patrol apprehensions 
along the south-western [U.S.-Mexico] border. In 2012, however, 27 per cent of the Border 
Patrol’s apprehensions were non-Mexicans, and in 2013 that percentage rose to 36” (48). 
Figure 5.3 shows the migratory flows from Central America through Mexico to the United 
States. Because of the clash between migratory flows and the United States’ enforcement of 
border patrol, irregular crossing of the U.S.-Mexico border has become extremely risky. 
Reineke and Martínez note that 
Fig. 5.3. Migratory Flows from and through Mexico to the United States South-Western Border
Fig. 5.3. Robin Reineke and Daniel E. Martínez, “Migrant Deaths in the Americas (United States and 
Mexico)”; Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration (Geneva: International Organization for Mi-
gration, 2014; Web; 48; 21 Aug. 2015; PDF file).
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[these migrants] suffocate in cargo compartments of commercial trucks; they drown in irrigation canals 
or rivers; they die in motor vehicle accidents or are struck by vehicles as they attempt to cross busy 
highways on foot; they fall to their deaths from mountain cliffs, and they freeze to death in the moun-
tains of Arizona and California. Some are likely killed by human or drug smugglers . . . . A small but 
concerning number have died at the hands of the United States Border Patrol in isolated incidents . . . . 
The vast majority of migrants who have died on the US side of the border with Mexico perish from 
heat stroke and dehydration in the deserts of the south-west. (52) 
Figure 5.4 shows the number of south-western apprehensions and the number of migrant 
deaths across the south-western border between 1998 and 2013. Although the number of ap-
prehensions has the tendency to decrease, the number of deaths remains. Therefore, illegal 
immigration not only causes conflict in the receiving country, but the journey to illegal immi-
gration can be fatal to migrants themselves. 
It is arguable whether the enforcement of border control is effective. The Center for Im-
migration Studies (CIS) once claimed that “a significant drop in apprehensions of illegal im-
migrants” has taken place since Operation Hold the Line in El Paso started in 1993 and Oper-
ation Gatekeeper in San Diego were introduced in 1994 (Clayton). However, statistics of ille-
Fig. 5.4. Migrant Deaths Recorded by the United States Border Patrol Relative to Apprehensions on the 
South-Western Border, Fiscal Year 1998–2003
Fig. 5.4. Robin Reineke and Daniel E. Martínez, “Migrant Deaths in the Americas (United States and 
Mexico)”; Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration (Geneva: International Organization for Mi-
gration, 2014; Web; 54; 21 Aug. 2015; PDF file).
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gal immigration show that border enforcement seems to have failed to limit illegal immigra-
tion, because notwithstanding an increase in Border Patrol personnel and annual budget, the 
number of undocumented immigrants increased rapidly — from 2.5 million in 1990 to 11.1 
million in 2005 (Bean and Lowell 71). Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano 
once described the problem of border control: “You show me a 50-foot wall and I’ll show 
you a 51-foot ladder at the border. That’s the way the border works” (qtd. in Lacey). Yet, 
Bean and Lowell argue that border enforcement might be effective, though people do not feel 
this way, because many of the undocumented immigrants entered the country “through legal 
means (subsequently overstaying their visas) or by using counterfeit document” (80). 
Besides the U.S. government’s efforts spent on U.S.-Mexico border control, various acts 
against illegal immigration were also enacted. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 (IRCA), also known as the Simpson-Mazzoli Act, amended the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (INA), providing for “tighter border enforcement and criminal penalties for em-
ployers who knowingly hired undocumented workers” (Schrag 166). Section 1324a of the 
current INA states that “[i]t is unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or to recruit or re-
fer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unautho-
rized alien,” and it is also unlawful to “continue to employ the alien in the United States 
knowing the alien is (or has become) an unauthorized alien with respect to such employment” 
(8 USC. Sec. 1324a). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA) not only included stricter border patrol methods and “tougher deportation 
procedures” (Schrag 174), but it also prohibited “illegal aliens from getting in-state tuition 
breaks to state colleges and universities not also granted to legal residents of other 
states” (Schrag 174). After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration passed the REAL ID Act 
in 2005 out of fear of terrorism. Statute 313 prohibited states from issuing driver’s licenses, 
the de facto ID card of the United States, to undocumented immigrants (Schrag 175). 
At the state level, California enacted Proposition 187 in 1994, which prohibited undocu-
mented immigrants from receiving public social services and publicly funded health care, ex-
cluded them from public elementary and secondary schools and public postsecondary educa-
tional institutions, and reinforced deportation policies. This proposition was so conservative 
that it was criticized by journalists who held a more liberal view. The Los Angeles Times pub-
lished an article titled “Kemp’s Prop. 187 Stance a Courageous ‘Act of Stupidity,’” and it 
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contains phrases such as “unfashionable,” “potentially embarrassing,” “fool,” “bad idea,” and 
“fundamentally flawed” to describe Proposition 187 (Parsons), and The New York Times also 
saw Proposition 187 negatively, publishing an article named “Why Proposition 187 Won’t 
Work” on November 20, 1994. In Oklahoma, the “Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection 
Act of 2007 made it a felony to ‘harbor, transport, conceal or shelter unauthorized immi-
grants” (Schrag 181). In Arizona, the state denied businesses the license of enterprise which 
employ undocumented immigrants (Schrag 181), and the harsh Arizona Senate Bill 1070 
(Arizona SB 1070), enacted in 2010, “expanded the powers of state police officers to ask 
about the immigration status of anyone they stop, and to hold those suspected of being illegal 
immigrants” (“Arizona”). In addition, the law made it illegal to “not carry immigration pa-
pers” (“Arizona”). Alabama passed an even tougher act than the Arizona SB 1070. The 
Hammon-Beason Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (Alabama HB 56) included a 
similar provision to the one in the Arizona SB 1070, “authorizing state and local police offi-
cers to ask about the immigration status of anyone they stop based on a ‘reasonable suspi-
cion’ the person is an illegal immigrant” (Preston, “In Alabama”). However, “reasonable sus-
picion” is not always reasonable. In other words, this law gives authorities the right to judge 
people by their skin colors and discriminate against anyone who looks Mexican. Moreover, 
“[i]t bar[red] illegal immigrants from enrolling in any public college after high school [, and] 
[i]t oblige[d] public schools to determine the immigration status of all students, requiring 
parents of foreign-born students to report the immigration status of their children” (Preston, 
“In Alabama”). The New York Times called the Alabama HB 56 “Alabama’s Shame” in its 
editorial on October 3, 2011, and The Christian Science Monitor questioned this act, asking 
whether it created a “humanitarian crisis” (Jonsson). 
Despite a series of acts aiming at dealing with undocumented immigrants, the United 
States is still quite tolerant of illegal immigration. Because the United States is a jus soli 
country, U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants automatically gain U.S. citizenship 
and become U.S. citizens. These children are referred to as “anchor babies”  among people 31
who are against illegal immigration, and they “may instantly qualify for welfare and other 
 The Latino population in the United States tends to reject the term “anchor baby,” because, like “illegal immi31 -
grant,” they think this term is not a description of the action, but rather a discrimination against these people. 
Donald Trump, 2016 Republican presidential campaign front-runner, used the term “anchor baby” and refused 
to drop the term when an ABC news reporter reminded him of its offensiveness. Trump was strongly against 
illegal immigration in the campaign, and he even intended to reject citizenship of children born in the United 
States to undocumented immigrants.
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state and local benefit programs” (“Birthright”). In addition, “with the passage of the 1965 
Immigration and Nationality Act, the child may sponsor other family members for entry into 
the United States when he or she reaches the age of twenty-one” (“Birthright”). Also, even 
children with illegal status in the United States have the possibility to acquire equal public 
services as U.S. children and foreign children with legal status. For example, in the case of 
Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court overruled a Texas statute which denies public educational 
funding for children who could not prove their legal status in the country and allows public 
school districts to charge them $1,000 annual tuition fee, because, “the Court ruled, all resi-
dents of the United States were entitled to equal protection of the law” under the Fourteenth 
Amendment (Schrag 165). Furthermore, the IRCA of 1986 “extended amnesty . . . to illegal 
residents who could document that they had been working in the United States for at least 
five years, [and] pressure from agriculture opened amnesty to anyone who could show he or 
she had done ninety days of farm work in the year before May 1, 1986” (Schrag 166). In late 
2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit blocked portions of the Alabama HB 
56 (Belczyk), and in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected most of the Arizona SB 1070 
(“Arizona”). In 2013, Barack Obama proposed an immigration reform plan that offers a 
pathway for the eleven million undocumented immigrants to earn citizenship. This proposal, 
similar to the IRCA of 1986, gives an opportunity to those who have contributed to the coun-
try’s development to gain their legal status. 
At the state level, California’s Proposition 187 is considered to be a discrimination 
against Mexican immigrants in particular, because the number of undocumented immigrants 
from Mexico in California is larger than that from any other country. Some scholars argue 
that “Proposition 187 turned persons who ‘look Mexican’ because of the color of their skin 
into potential victims of racial discrimination” (Bustamante 10). After some hearings, a court-
approved mediation ended Proposition 187 (“CA’s”). Eleven states (Maryland, California, 
Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wiscon-
sin) enacted their own versions of the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors 
Act, commonly known as the DREAM Act, which “would give students who grew up in the 
United States a chance to contribute to [the] country’s well-being by serving in the U.S. 
armed forces or pursuing a higher education” (Miranda). The target group also includes un-
documented immigrants who were brought to the United States as little children. The differ-
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ence between the DREAM Act and amnesty is that the DREAM Act requires undocumented 
immigrants to meet certain qualifications. The New York Times saw the DREAM Act enacted 
in California as “a sensible path” and considered it “humane” (“A Sensible”), and The Los 
Angeles Times explained that the California DREAM Act is not “a drain on the state’s coffers 
but an investment in its future” (“Yes”). 
At the local level, about “fifty jurisdictions . . . declared themselves sanctuary cities or 
cities of refuge and/or ordered their employees not to cooperate with the feds in enforcing 
federal immigration laws” (Schrag 182); some cities “created ‘no-hassle’ zones for [undocu-
mented] day laborers” (Schrag 182), and Detroit prevented the police and “other city em-
ployees from questioning people on the basis of a whole range of characteristics including 
immigration status” (Schrag 182). These rules can reduce the risks of undocumented immi-
grants searching for jobs or already employed. In New Haven, Connecticut, a new identifica-
tion card, known as the Elm City Resident Card, was designed in 2007 to help “illegal immi-
grants open bank accounts and use city resources like the library, pools and beaches” (Holtz). 
Anyone residing in New Haven, whether legal or unauthorized, is eligible to apply for the 
card. In a way, the Elm City Resident Card offers undocumented immigrants legal status, be-
cause this identification card becomes their legal document in the United States. 
There were other unsuccessful attempts to help undocumented immigrants gain access to 
public services. Despite the IIRIRA of 1996, ten states tried to pass laws “making illegal im-
migrants who graduated from their high schools and who had gone to in-state high schools 
during the prior three years eligible for in-state tuition in their public universities,” which 
even U.S. citizens from out-of-state do not receive (Schrag 184). In violation of the REAL ID 
Act, former governor of New York, Eliot Spitzer, “decided to allow illegal residents to get 
driver’s licenses” in 2007 (Schrag 183). Although the attempts failed in the end, it still indi-
cates that some states quite tolerate undocumented immigrants, and they try to make it possi-
ble for undocumented immigrants to obtain the same public services and fundings as U.S. 
citizens and foreigners legally admitted to the United States do. 
One of the many reasons for the toleration of undocumented immigrants in the United 
States is that the government wants to prevent undocumented immigrants from committing 
crimes by providing them with education and jobs. Many argue that this toleration lets un-
documented immigrants who do not contribute to the country’s economy take away public 
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services from U.S. citizens and legal immigrants, and a great amount of taxpayer’s money is 
wasted on undocumented immigrants. However, counterarguments suggest that many undoc-
umented immigrants were brought to the United States by their parents at a very young age 
(Schrag 184), and they hardly know their home country. If the United States does not accept 
them, they would have no home at all, and they are likely to go on the streets and commit 
crimes. Policies that provide undocumented immigrants with education and job opportunities 
mean to guide them from the streets to schools and job markets, and thus crimes committed 
by undocumented immigrants can be reduced. However, there might be a counter-effect if the 
United States attempts to reduce the problems of illegal immigration through pardoning un-
documented immigrants already in the United States, because more people would dare enter 
the country illegally when they do not see a severe negative consequence for being an undoc-
umented immigrant. In addition, since the United States reinforces border control at the same 
time, more visa overstayers might emerge, because studies show that “higher enforcement 
may reduce the number of migrations while increasing their length” (Angelucci 3). 
Another reason for the toleration of illegal immigration is that many undocumented im-
migrants have contributed to the economy of the United States. As the quotation at the begin-
ning of this chapter indicates, undocumented immigrants have integrated into the U.S. labor 
market and filled labor shortage when the economy is growing, and states are able to benefit 
from the contribution of undocumented immigrants. For example, a study in Texas shows that 
undocumented immigrants “contribute some $400 million a year more in revenues than they 
cost the state in services,” and they “add roughly $17.7 billion a year to the state’s 
economy” (Schrag 209). Arizona, Florida, Nevada, and New York have similar findings 
(Schrag 209). More importantly, the United States has already spent billions of dollars on the 
education of undocumented immigrants, and it has come to a time when U.S. citizens of the 
baby boomer generation have retired or will soon retire and thus leave a vast vacancy on the 
labor market. Therefore, “deporting [undocumented immigrants] seems as self-defeating as it 
is cruel” (Schrag 187). The New York Times published an opinion suggesting that it would be 
proper if the United States makes a deal with undocumented immigrants — if the United 
States issues undocumented immigrants visas and requires, in return, that they “pay fines, 
learn English, . . . and . . . get back to work,” the country could obtain enormous economic 
benefits (“So Much”). 
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However, the relatively tolerant policies toward illegal immigration do not mean that un-
documented immigrants are equally treated as legal immigrants. Undocumented immigrants 
will face difficulties in various fields in society. A study published by the Harvard Educa-
tional Review finds that over “five million children in the United States are ‘at risk of lower 
educational performance, economic stagnation, blocked mobility and ambiguous belonging’ 
because they are growing up in immigrant families affected by illegal status” (Preston, 
“Risks”). Even though children of undocumented immigrants have the same educational 
rights as those of U.S. citizens or legal immigrants, their “parents’ fear of deportation” usual-
ly prevents them from enrolling in public programs, even when the children are already U.S. 
citizens (Preston, “Risks”). Undocumented immigrants growing up in the United States are 
also affected psychologically by their illegal status. They start realizing their “legal limita-
tions” when they “apply for jobs, driver’s licenses or financial aid for college and discover 
they are not legally qualified for any of them” (Preston, “Risks”), and they will feel that 
“their worlds turn completely upside down” (qtd. in Preston, “Risks”). Consequently, many 
of these people have to continue to work low-wage jobs like their parents (Preston, “Risks”). 
In addition, in states which intend to restrain illegal immigration by harsh bills, nonwhite res-
idents, whether legal or undocumented, can be the targets of government’s investigation into 
their immigration status. For example, although most of the statutes of the Arizona SB 1070 
were blocked by the Supreme Court, one “key provision,” which allows police officers to 
“check the immigration status of people they detain,” was left standing (“Arizona”). Despite 
the criticism of racism, people who look Mexican are still more likely to be detained because 
of the large number of undocumented Mexican immigrants. 
Moreover, in the 2016 presidential primary, Donald Trump, at that time candidate in the 
GOP field, strongly proposed that the United States should control illegal immigration by 
tripling the number of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers, deporting “all 
criminal aliens” (a very politically incorrect term, as I explained at the beginning of this 
chapter), defunding sanctuary cities, enhancing penalties for overstaying a visa, and even 
ending birthright citizenship (“Immigration Reform”). In addition, he advocated to make 
Mexico pay for the “wall,” where he accused Mexicans of committing “horrific crimes 
against Americans” (“Immigration Reform”). After the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 
2015 and in San Bernardino, CA, in December 2015, Trump suggested a ban on all Muslims 
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from entering the United States “until we can figure out what’s going on” (Holpuch). Trump’s 
immigration reform proposal sounds very harsh, especially for immigrants of Mexican de-
scent and Muslims, and ending birthright citizenship is even subversive to the jus soli princi-
ple which the United States has practiced since the founding of the nation. Although Trump’s 
immigration reform is criticized by many politicians and left-wing media, the fact that he was 
elected President in November 2016 suggests that his radical immigration reform proposal 
finds support in public. 
As I noted in the first paragraph of this chapter, the role of undocumented immigrants in 
the United States is ambivalent. On the one hand, they contribute to the U.S. economy, and 
the government has implemented several policies to tolerate their illegal status; on the other 
hand, the government also wants to prevent further illegal immigration, so policymakers set 
legal limitations for undocumented immigrants to hinder their employment, education, and 
obtainment of public services. National polls validated the ambivalence: In 2007, while 69 
percent of U.S. adults wanted a reduction in undocumented resident population and 75 per-
cent believed that states should not issue driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants, 55 
percent thought that undocumented immigrants who have committed no crime should not be 
arrested, and 58 percent supported “a program giving illegal immigrants now living in the 
United States the right to live here legally if they pay a fine and meet other 
requirements” (Schrag 186). 
The ambivalence of the Americans’ attitudes toward undocumented immigrants is well 
depicted in literature. Since literature can mirror some phenomena in reality, it can be deemed 
as a means to understand the consequences of immigration policies in society. Therefore, I 
have chosen a novel to show how illegal status affects the lives of undocumented immigrants 
and how Americans think of them. Francine Prose’s novel My New American Life (2012) tells 
the story of a former undocumented immigrant in the United States, intertwined with her en-
counter with Americans and other undocumented or former undocumented immigrants from 
her home country. Therefore, this novel is almost a precise reflection of what I introduced 
earlier in this chapter. 
The protagonist is a well-educated twenty-six-year-old Albanian woman named Lula who 
travels to the United States with a tourist visa. She becomes undocumented from the moment 
she starts working at a restaurant. When her visa is about to expire, she finds a job at the Wall 
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Street white-collar worker Mister Stanley’s house to look after his teenage son Zeke. This job 
opportunity changes her life, for Mister Stanley’s good friend Don is an immigration lawyer, 
and he helps Lula become legal by successfully getting her a working visa, and he is then 
working on her Green Card application. Lula is aware that there are two voices among the 
Americans. On the one hand, “some Americans cheered every time INS agents raided facto-
ries and shoved dark little chicken-packagers into the backs of trucks. She’d seen the guys on 
Fox News calling for every immigrant except German supermodels and Japanese baseball 
players to be deported, no questions asked” (Prose 17). These people are the ones Lula should 
pay special attention to, because she might get into trouble if she does not act cautiously in 
front of them. On the other hand, there are some Americans who tend to support immigration. 
Mister Stanley and Don stand for those Americans who sympathize with undocumented im-
migrants. They believe that undocumented immigrants, especially those who are well-educat-
ed, do not mean to harm the United States, and they are the weak who should be protected. 
Moreover, for Americans like Mister Stanley and Don, undocumented immigrants show 
strong personalities such as bravery and resilience which the United States needs. As Prose 
writes, 
others, like Mister Stanley and Don Settebello, acted as if coming from somewhere else was like hav-
ing a handicap or surviving cancer. It meant you were brave and resilient. And being able to help you 
made them feel better about themselves and their melting-pot country. (17) 
From this quote, Mister Stanley and Don may seem to have a stereotypical view toward the 
so-called Third World, thinking that people there only live to survive. However, this stereo-
type is likely to be the reason why they sympathize with undocumented immigrants. 
The story of Lula’s Albanian friend, Dunia, makes the process of becoming legal in the 
United States seem extremely easy. Dunia, like Lula, has been working illegally in the United 
States with a tourist visa. Right before Dunia’s visa expires, she meets an American doctor, 
Steve, at the airport, and they spend the night together. Dunia marries Steve eventually, and 
because Steve is a rich American doctor, he knows people who are able to make Dunia legal. 
Therefore, even better than Lula’s situation, Dunia will become an American citizen soon. 
The dramatic change in Dunia’s status can be read as Prose’s ironic way of showing how be-
coming legal is sometimes only a matter of luck. 
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However, My New American Life also shows that the immigration policy is not so friend-
ly to undocumented immigrants in contrast to some Americans such as Mister Stanley, Don, 
and Steve. Undocumented immigrants, even after they have already gained their legal status, 
live in the shadow and suffer the fear that someday they might be deported. Lula is paranoid 
every time something slightly unusual happens, and she constantly fears that someone will 
report her to the INS even after she has received her working visa. In one scene, Lula sudden-
ly feels scared when a college professor recognizes her as Zeke’s Albanian friend. She makes 
up a story in her mind: 
This was how it happened. They knew who you were. They were waiting for you. You thought it was a 
college tea, but it was an INS sting, the kind where they promised illegals anything from amnesty to a 
pair of free tickets to a baseball game. And when you showed up, they nabbed you. (Prose 248) 
Lula’s thoughts demonstrate her insecure feeling about her legal status and her doubt about 
the credibility of the United States in regard to its tolerance of illegal immigration. Moreover, 
even Don reminds Lula that she should be very careful. He tells her that “you can think any-
thing you want. But just to be on the safe side, you should probably watch your mouth. Do I 
sound paranoid? I am paranoid. We’d be insane if we weren’t” (Prose 71; emphasis in origi-
nal). This reminder suggests that Don, portrayed as an expert in immigration laws, acknowl-
edges the instability of an immigrant’s status. 
Furthermore, there are three bizarre deportation stories in the novel that illustrate the in-
stability of the immigrants’ status in the United States. The first one is a Salvadoran man who 
“just got his green card” (Prose 62). He gets deported because he “has no health insurance . . . 
[and] no facility will take him [when a driver injures his foot]” (Prose 63). The second story 
is about a Bangladeshi contractor who also has a Green Card. He gets deported because of 
“[i]llegal weapons possession [, to be precise,] [u]nregistered handgun” (Prose 120). Howev-
er, according to Don, the area the Bangladeshi man lives in is so dangerous that everyone 
should have the right to possess a gun to protect his family, “permit or no permit” (Prose 
120). The third story is about Alvo, an Albanian man whom Lula has a crush on. Alvo is ar-
rested for a crime he did not commit. In court, Lula finds out that Alvo has dyed his red hair 
black, because “[h]is lawyer told him redheads always lose. Statistics. Hair color is every-
thing. Natural blonds are the winners. After that comes gray” (Prose 267). Ironically, Alvo’s 
friend Genti is delighted when the judge decides to deport Alvo, because he will not be 
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spending fifteen years in jail. This is a win-win situation for both Alvo and the state, as the 
story explains, “[deportation is] a better alternative to the American taxpayer housing and 
feeding a big strong Albanian boy for the next fifteen years. For the first time since [Lula 
had] been in this country, everyone was overjoyed about someone being deported” (Prose 
299). All three stories seem bizarre and exaggerated, but they can be the literary representa-
tion of the double standard the United States has toward immigrants — on the one hand, the 
United States has a fairly tolerant policy on (illegal) immigration; on the other hand, even 
though there are several ways for immigrants to legally stay in the United States, any minor 
mistake can trigger a serious problem with their legal status. The incident of hair color in 
Alvo’s story may also imply that race still affects the judges’ decision whether an immigrant 
can stay in the United States. 
The novel also suggests that the United States’ paranoid foreign policy is the cause that 
many immigrants lie, especially after the 9/11 attacks. Lula lies a lot, including the time that 
she lies to the immigration officer to convince him that she is only in the United States for 
pleasure. However, as the novel describes, “[s]he’d almost never lied at all until she’d applied 
for her U.S. tourist visa. But ever since she got [to the United States], she couldn’t seem to 
stop” (Prose 6). Lula thinks that “[e]veryone lied to the embassy. It didn’t count as a lie. 
Since 9/11 they made you lie, but that hadn’t stopped one Albanian girl or boy from wanting 
to come to New York” (Prose 8). The hostility of the United States to any “un-American” be-
lief makes people who are connected to those “un-American” communities lie about their 
background. Therefore, the United States itself is to blame for these people’s continuous lies. 
As Prose writes in the novel, 
[a]n Albanian without a family was a walking contradiction. Of course [Lula] hadn’t said this to the 
embassy officer in Tirana who’d approved her tourist visa. She’d brought in pictures of neighbor kids, 
whom she’d claimed were nephews and nieces she could hardly bear to leave for that last-fling vaca-
tion before she came home and married her childhood sweetheart. She said “Christmas wedding” a 
dozen times so the guy wouldn’t suspect she was half Muslim. Dad’s mom, her granny, was Christian. 
Wasn’t that enough? Anyway, Muslim meant nothing in Communist post-Communist Albania. An 
American wouldn’t know that. Muslim meant Muslim to him. (7) 
Prose further criticizes the (sometimes unconscious) hostility of the United States to im-
migrants in the scene where Mister Stanley’s mentally ill wife, Ginger, sneaks into Lula’s 
room and points a knife at Lula and Alvo. Out of self-defense, Lula takes Alvo’s gun and 
shoots at Ginger. Although Ginger should be the one that poses danger to the family, Lula is 
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eventually blamed by Mister Stanley for bringing Alvo home, “endangering the welfare of 
the innocent boy [Zeke] he’d hired her and paid her generously to protect” (Prose 283), be-
cause Alvo is arrested later in the novel for a crime he did not commit. The scene implies that 
immigrants sometimes seem dangerous because of some necessary but unharmful lies they 
tell to protect their legal status, but these lies are always enlarged and used as evidence of se-
rious accusations against them. Americans have been blaming innocuous immigrants for their 
own problems, overlooking the real cause. As the novel unfolds, 
she could confess. The gun was Alvo’s. Lula had lied when she’d said it was Ginger’s. She’d been 
afraid the truth might involve police and trouble with immigration. But Alvo wasn’t a killer. Zeke was 
never in danger. Ginger had been the danger, sneaking around the house. And Lula had been so forgiv-
ing after Mister Stanley’s wife had threatened them with a knife. How could Mister Stanley reduce 
Lula’s loving relationship with Zeke to the cheap materialism of a service he’d paid for? (Prose 284) 
Lula and Alvo symbolize immigrants in the United States; the gun can be read as the immi-
grants’ trivial mistakes; Ginger embodies the real cause of the danger which is, ironically, 
domestic; and Mister Stanley can signify the American majority who blames immigrants in-
stead of the real domestic cause of the danger. These Americans might be unaware that they 
sometimes act hostile to immigrants, because, like Mister Stanley, they might identify them-
selves as immigrant sympathizers and even help them at times. Moreover, in contrast to Mis-
ter Stanley’s former sympathy for Lula, he blames Lula when danger is present. Therefore, 
Americans’ trust of (undocumented) immigrants is vulnerable, and they are likely to change 
their mind and blame immigrants when a problem or danger occurs. 
5.2. Illegal Immigration in Germany 
There is no official record or estimate on the total number of undocumented immigrants 
in Germany, but Germany is certainly facing an illegal immigration crisis, for the German 
police “had arrested 57,000 illegal immigrants in 2014, an increase of 75 per cent compared 
to 2013,” which has reached its record high (Huggler). Admin Huhn, Chip Lockwood, and 
Kathleen Semanski conclude that there are mainly four types of illegal immigration in Ger-
many: 
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(1) “over-stayers” who have entered legally on temporary visas and have not sought, or were not grant-
ed, a legal extension of stay; (2) persons, including many seasonal workers and commuters, who have 
permission to be in the country but are breaching their conditions of stay by working illegally; (3) asy-
lum seekers whose applications and appeals for reconsideration have been rejected; and, finally, (4) 
persons who have not been granted permission to enter and have, therefore, entered clandestinely by 
evading inspection or using means of deception, such as false papers. 
Germany “has taken an official zero-tolerance policy toward illegal immigration, emphasiz-
ing the need to deport current illegal residents and illegal workers as well as criminalizing aid 
to such illegal persons” (Huhn, Lockwood, and Semanski), and “Germany has not had and 
will most probably not have [amnesty] programs” (Heckmann 1106). Therefore, undocu-
mented immigrants tend to stay in Germany only temporarily or have “a kind of pendulum 
movement” (Heckmann 1110), and they face serious problems in regard to their living condi-
tions. 
Some main problems are as follows. First, undocumented immigrants do not receive 
proper medical treatment. The reasons can be that undocumented immigrants do not have 
health insurance, and thus they cannot afford medical treatment. Moreover, they do not want 
to risk to be caught, for medical institutions have the responsibility to report undocumented 
immigrants to officials. In addition, doctors and medical personnel are uncertain if their med-
ical treatment would fall into the category of assisting undocumented immigrants and if they 
themselves would also get punished for helping undocumented immigrants according to arti-
cle 96, section 1, number 2 of the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz) even though their treat-
ment is solely out of humanitarian interest (“Illegal aufhältige” 11). Even after undocumented 
immigrants gain their legal status, they still fear to be arrested (Schmidt). An example is that 
Frida, an African undocumented immigrant in Germany before she gained her residence per-
mit by marrying a German citizen (one of the only two means to gain legal status, the other 
being having a child with a German), did not go see a doctor even though she felt grave pain 
in her stomach. One day she collapsed on the street and was sent to the hospital. Although 
doctors diagnosed her with cholelithiasis, she refused to have an operation. Finally, an aid 
organization arranged an operation for her, and doctors explained that “had she let any more 
time pass, she would have died” (Schmidt). 
Second, children of undocumented immigrants usually do not have the chance to receive 
education. The reason is that the parents fear that their illegal status would be exposed, for 
educational institutions, like medical institutions, are also obliged to report illegal immigra-
tion to the police. In contrast to the United States, children of undocumented immigrants do 
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not have birthright citizenship, which means that even if an undocumented immigrant gives 
birth to a child in Germany, the child does not gain legal status. As a result, these children in 
Germany are more likely to miss public education than those in the United States. Apart from 
low education, not being able to attend school also affects these children’s social behavior, 
because they lack contact with their peers (“Illegal aufhältige” 12). To guarantee education 
for these children, there is a demand for abolishing educational institutions’ obligation to re-
port illegal immigration (“Illegal aufhältige” 12). 
Third, undocumented immigrants are often exploited at work. Employers are only attract-
ed to undocumented labor because they can profit from it by “[saving] money on production” 
— undocumented immigrants are very likely to accept “wages below the standard market 
rate,” so employers can “expand [their] workforce and increase [their] overall production” 
with the money saved on wages, and employers do not have to “pay social security” for un-
documented immigrant laborers, “which in Germany could amount to as much as half of total 
wages” (Huhn, Lockwood, and Semanski). In a sense, these advantages by employing un-
documented foreign laborers put employers “who do not use illegal labor . . . at a competitive 
disadvantage” (Huhn, Lockwood, and Semanski). Moreover, undocumented immigrant la-
borers cannot fight against exploitation without exposing their illegal status. Therefore, un-
documented immigrants have no other way than working in the shadows for extremely low 
wages. Also due to undocumented immigrants’ low profile, Holk Stöbbe claims that “undoc-
umented migrants are just the opposite of what the term ‘illegal alien’ tries to imply — i.e. 
they are the most law abiding residents and try to become virtually invisible in order to evade 
detection by the authorities.” Because of the advantages undocumented labor provides, some 
argue that undocumented immigrants are taking away jobs from German citizens (Huhn, 
Lockwood, and Semanski). However, Thomas Strobl, Christian Democratic Union member 
of the Bundestag, points out that undocumented immigrants usually work in poorly-paid 
fields where Germans do not wish to work (Huhn, Lockwood, and Semanski), which means 
that they are filling up the vacancy rather than taking away jobs. Therefore, high unemploy-
ment in Germany has little to do with illegal immigration. Thomas Straubhaar of the Ham-
burg Institute of International Economics admits that “Germany is dependent on illegal em-
ployment of foreign laborers” (Schmidt). 
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Fourth, undocumented immigrants face poor housing conditions. “Landlords are required 
to ensure that all their tenants are registered” at the local residence registration office 
(Stöbbe), and the registration assures that the tenants are legal. Due to this residence registra-
tion regulation, undocumented immigrants cannot buy or rent a house; thus, in order to have a 
place to live, they might use forged papers, live with relatives or acquaintances who are legal 
in Germany, share a small apartment with many other immigrants, or obtain housing from 
employers (Stöbbe). Either way, undocumented immigrants need to adapt to any uncomfort-
able condition, because they do not have many housing choices. If possible, undocumented 
immigrants tend to choose “areas with a dense immigrant population in order not to stand 
out” (Stöbbe). 
If caught, undocumented immigrants will face deportation. Only deportation barriers can 
prolong their stay (Schmidt), but these barriers do not necessarily prevent them from being 
deported once the barriers are overcome. Legal deportation barriers include, for instance, 
“protection for internally displaced persons or asylum-seekers or protection from threats to 
immigrants’ lives, such as torture, should they face it in their home countries,” and illness or 
pregnancy, which makes it “inadvisable to deport that person due to health 
reasons” (Schmidt). Because of these barriers, the deportation process is very challenging. 
Huhn, Lockwood, and Semanski note that 
[m]any illegal residents have destroyed their passports and ID cards, and even if their identity can be 
established, their countries of origin are not always willing to allow their readmission or repatriation. 
This is in addition to the numerous other legal obstacles to deportation, such as the threat of torture or 
the unlikelihood of receiving a fair trial in the home country.  
Although Germany has a zero-tolerance policy on illegal immigration, illegal immigra-
tion is very difficult to control. Due to bilateral and international agreements, Germany’s bor-
derline has been expanded beyond a national sense. For example, the bilateral agreements 
between Germany and Poland (before Poland became a Schengen country) allowed both 
countries to return unauthorized migrants and refugees. That is to say, “[a]ny undocumented 
migrant who apparently entered through Poland can be deported to there and vice 
versa” (Stöbbe). Moreover, 
[t]he Polish government agreed to adopt a border surveillance program similar to that being carried out 
by the German Border Patrol. In return, the German government [provided] the money and training for 
the Polish Border Patrol. The Polish government also [allowed] German police forces to operate on the 
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Polish side of the border. And last but not least, . . . , citizens of both countries [were] allowed to travel 
to the other state as a tourist or businessperson without a visa. (Stöbbe) 
According to these agreements, it was very easy for Polish citizens to enter Germany legally. 
However, if they started to work, they became undocumented workers. Huhn, Lockwood, and 
Semanski note that people who enter Germany without a visa due to bilateral agreements 
(especially Poles) “constitute a large percentage of the undocumented seasonal labor force.” 
Similarly, the Schengen Agreement eliminates border control between two Schengen 
countries, which means that “Germany has no border controls on the internal borders within 
the Schengen area” (Palmer, “Citizenship”), and undocumented immigrants who enter from 
other Schengen countries can enter Germany without being checked. The Schengen Area is 
expanding, and currently (December 2016), it consists of twenty-six European countries, in-
cluding every neighbor country of Germany. As a result, Germany “relies largely on the bor-
der controls exercised by the Schengen members having an external border. The only external 
borders for which Germany is responsible are the maritime border on the North Sea and the 
Baltic Sea, and international airports” (Palmer, “Citizenship”). In other words, Germany’s 
borders are beyond Germany’s control. According to the German police, “there are illegal 
migrants who are being saved by the Italian navy from small boats trying to cross the 
Mediterranean, ‘but are then found in Germany’” (Synon), and Germany accuses southern 
European countries such as Italy of “doing nothing to stop asylum-seekers using the Schen-
gen border free area to travel on to Germany” (Huggler). Germany also blames Austria for 
not controlling asylum-seekers who travel on to Germany (Lohse, Staib, and Löwenstein). 
However, Austria claims that it is not true that Austria does not control them, but it is practi-
cally impossible, because the Schengen Agreement forbids strict border control (Lohse, Staib, 
and Löwenstein). 
Human traffickers very often use sea routes to smuggle migrants. Figure 5.5 shows the 
number of migrants smuggled by sea to the EU from 1998 to 2014, and figure 5.6 shows the 
usual sea routes undocumented migrants or refugees take. According to these figures, south-
ern European countries face serious problems to control illegal immigration, and Italy has 
become the most popular destination for undocumented immigrants and refugees to enter Eu-
rope. Germany, as a result of the Schengen Agreement, also faces problems of illegal immi-
gration because it cannot keep undocumented immigrants who entered from southern Eu-
ropean countries from traveling to Germany. 
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These sea routes are dangerous for refugees and migrants. In April 2015 alone there were 
at least five refugee shipwreck incidents in the Mediterranean Sea with an estimate of 1,200 
casualties. Although European countries claim that they will do their utmost to rescue the vic-
tims every time boats overloaded with refugees or undocumented immigrants capsize, they 
have been reluctant to participate in the search and rescue operation Mare Nostrum or even 
Operation Triton which focuses more on border protection than search and rescue, because 
theses operations are costly and “[serve] as a safety net for the human traffickers” (Bershid-
sky). These shipwreck incidents caused a debate over Europe’s refugee policies. Human 
rights activists argue that these shipwreck tragedies were caused by Europe’s intolerant policy 
on refugees. Elias Bierdel, a human rights activist, claims that “[m]any, many people are dy-
ing because Europe offers them no legal way of getting here,” “people are turned away en 
masse at the borders,” and there is a necessity for refugees to enter Europe illegally, for “peo-
ple seeking protection can only apply for asylum within the EU” (qtd. in Popp and 
Schindler). Therefore, Germany should be more tolerant toward refugees and asylum-seekers 
for humanitarian reasons. However, other politicians argue that Germany is already tolerant 
enough. Bavarian Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann points out that “[t]he legal framework 
for asylum-seekers in Germany is more generously worded than that of most other countries 
Fig. 5.5. Migrants Smuggled by Sea to the EU 1998–2004
Fig. 5.5. Philippe Fargues and Sara Bonfanti, “When the Best Option Is A Leaky Boat: Why Migrants Risk 
Their Lives Crossing the Mediterranean and What Europe Is Doing about It” (Migration Policy Center, Oct. 
2014; Web; 3; 21 Jul. 2015; PDF file).
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in the world. And Germany takes in more asylum-seekers than any other EU member 
state” (qtd. in Popp and Schindler). Furthermore, Europe is not responsible for their ship-
wreck incidents, and it is human traffickers who are to blame. Also, asylum-seekers pose a 
danger to the nation’s security, for “Islamist terrorists could also be among [them]” (qtd. in 
Popp and Schindler). Although Bierdel and Herrmann have completely different opinions to-
ward Germany’s political reaction to refugees and asylum-seekers after the shipwreck inci-
dents, they both agree that borders should not be opened just because tragedies happen in the 
Mediterranean Sea (Popp and Schindler). 
Fig. 5.6. Sea Routes to Europe 1990s–2014
Fig. 5.6. Philippe Fargues and Sara Bonfanti, “When the Best Option Is A Leaky Boat: Why Migrants Risk 
Their Lives Crossing the Mediterranean and What Europe Is Doing about It” (Migration Policy Center, Oct. 
2014; Web; 4; 21 Jul. 2015; PDF file).
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The shipwreck incidents are part of the refugee problem the EU is facing now. Since 
2015, asylum has been a frequently debated topic in Europe, because a great number of peo-
ple are seeking asylum in Europe, and many of the EU countries have announced that they 
cannot take any more refugees.  Sea routes are a popular way to enter the EU, but they are 32
not the only way. Figure 5.7 shows the main asylum routes into the EU. The border between 
Hungary and Serbia is on the western Balkan route. Therefore, to control the number of 
refugees and undocumented immigrants, Hungary is building a 175-kilometer long  (“Wir”) 
and four-meter high (Kálnoky) razor wire fence on the Hungary-Serbia border. However, due 
to the lack of patrol personnel, eighteen migrants managed to cut the wire and enter Hungary 
in a single week at the beginning of August 2015 (“Wir”). A great number of the asylum-
seekers who entered the EU through Hungary will travel further to Germany (“Wir”), because 
 Since the issue is still going on and the situation is changing, I cannot include every aspect, nor its end game.32
Fig. 5.7. Main Asylum Routes into the EU
Fig. 5.7. Stratfor Glabal Intelligence, “Tracking and Reacting to Europe’s Asylum Seekers” (Stratfor Enter-
prises, LLC, 30 Apr. 2015; Web; 25 Aug. 2015).
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as shown in figure 5.7, Germany is the number one destination for asylum-seekers. The Hun-
garian officials report that Germany, Austria, and other EU countries will return 16,000 asy-
lum-seekers to Hungary as soon as possible (Kálnoky). 
The public opinion on refugees has two poles. “The opinion poll conducted for ARD pub-
lic television . . . found that 50 percent of the Germans questioned were in favor of the coun-
try accepting more refugees. Forty-four percent of those asked in the survey, conducted by 
the Infratest dimap polling company, said they were opposed to the idea” (“Survey”). Differ-
ent parties also have different opinions on this issue. For example, a survey shows that seven-
ty-four percent of the supporters of the Green Party are in favor of taking in more refugees, 
while eighty-two percent of the Alternative for Germany Party voters oppose this idea (“Sur-
vey”). These polls verify a very controversial situation of refuge in Germany. 
Unlike the divergence in the topic of refuge, the public tends to agree that the term “ille-
gal immigrant” is “closely linked with criminal activities” (Stöbbe). Consciously or uncon-
sciously, citizens might have negative or even discriminative remarks against undocumented 
immigrants. This attitude toward undocumented immigrants is also embedded in literary 
works. I will clarify this attitude using the same novel I analyzed in chapter 4.3.2, because the 
protagonist in Mora’s novel Day In Day Out (2007), Abel, is an undocumented immigrant in 
Germany. 
Day In Day Out demonstrates people’s suspicion of Abel even though he has done noth-
ing illegal except for his illegal residency. For example, Abel does not finish his dissertation 
because Danko, a boy whom Abel used to like, steals his laptop and he has no backup file. 
However, Erik, a friend of Mercedes’s, expresses his doubt: 
[T]here was that fishy story about a certain work with no backup on a stolen laptop. Well, I didn’t want 
to go on about it at the time, but in a situation like that (???) you can’t help wondering: How could it 
have happened? What is it? Hard luck, incompetence, fatalism, lies? What does experience tell us? 
Experience tells us that most texts which are not backed up never existed in the first place and disap-
pear through outside intervention. Did anyone ever read a single line of the work? Was the laptop really 
stolen? Did he even own a laptop? Where did he buy it? How much did it cost? Does he actually know 
all those languages? Who can test him? . . . True, I can’t prove he didn’t write a dissertation on whatev-
er topic it was. But he never got a degree, did he? 
??? 
Triumphant: University Library, Dissertation Catalogue, Foreign Languages — nothing. (Mora 
306; emphasis in original) 
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Erik’s doubt indicates that citizens (here portrayed as Erik) tend to think that undocumented 
immigrants (portrayed as Abel) are not reliable. Although Abel himself is a victim of theft, he 
is suspicious in Erik’s eyes, and his true story becomes “fishy.” 
As I already pointed out in chapter 4.3.2, Abel is a genius who masters ten or twelve lan-
guages. However, people do not seem to believe his ability, so experts have his brain tested. 
After the test is finished and experts have proven his language abilities, Abel gives his step-
son, Omar, a colored printout of the result, and Omar falls asleep with it. To this, Miriam, 
Omar’s maternal grandmother, reacts: “My grandson falls asleep under the gaze of his stepfa-
ther’s brain . . . . I can’t explain why, but there’s something eerie about it” (Mora 307). Read-
ers may notice nothing “eerie” about falling asleep with a brain result, and even Alegria, 
Omar’s maternal grandfather, finds Miriam’s reaction strange: “[e]erie? Really?” Therefore, 
Miriam’s reaction represents her attitude toward Abel — she finds him strange and dangerous 
for no other reason than him being an undocumented immigrant. Furthermore, Miriam may 
not be aware of her negative impression of Abel, because she has never openly expressed her 
disapproval of Abel or his illegal status. 
In contrast to Erik and Miriam’s impression of Abel, Abel is in fact a very peaceable per-
son. As Mercedes describes Abel when she first saw him — “[a] smooth, white face, sober, 
innocent, clear, aged twenty-four. Wouldn’t hurt a fly, wouldn’t upset the apple cart, butter 
wouldn’t melt in his mouth” (Mora 309). Also, the school secretary discovers that the reason 
why she could not find Abel’s file at first is that Abel was an auditor at the time, and “[t]he 
auditors are in a separate file” (Mora 308; emphasis in original). Being an auditor is also the 
reason why Abel cannot get a degree, because “[a]uditors don’t get degrees” (Mora 308). 
Therefore, Abel should not be a fraud as Erik thinks he is. This contrast demonstrates that 
citizens have a negative impression of undocumented immigrants, and that they tend to relate 
undocumented immigrants to unlawful acts regardless of undocumented immigrants’ behav-
ior. 
Citizens’ impression of undocumented immigrants may also influence their impression of 
immigrants in general regardless of their legal status. This may also “lead to wide spread [sic] 
discrimination against anybody who looks different than what many Germans think a Ger-
man should look like” (Stöbbe). Surveys show that fifty-seven percent of German citizens are 
against immigrants from non-EU countries (Tost), forty-four percent think that Germany 
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should allow fewer immigrants, and forty-eight percent agree that immigrants in Germany are 
more to blame for crime in the country than other groups (Poushter). 
Also because of the immigrant resentment, racism occurs. An anti-Islam organization, 
PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, Patriotic Euro-
peans Against the Islamisation of the Occident/West in English) was founded in Dresden in 
October 2014 to organize weekly demonstrations against the Islamization of the Western 
world from October 2014 to February 2015, and PEGIDA’s marches are gaining support 
rapidly (“Racism”). In the first half of the year 2015 alone, “some 150 arson or other attacks 
were recorded on refugee shelters,” and in a violent protest against asylum-seekers in the 
eastern German town Heidenau, some protesters even shouted “Heil Hitler” (“Germany”). 
Some other protesters denied that they were right-wing or Nazis; they were just worried for 
their country and children (“Anti-Islam”). Also, German human rights groups criticized the 
German police in a two-day hearing that they usually conduct “racial profiling” in routine 
checks on trains (“Racism”). “[T]he German government admitted to the UN Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Geneva” that “[r]acism in Germany is not only 
found in extreme right-wing circles, but in all parts of society” (“Racism”). To fight racism, 
the German government declared zero-tolerance toward xenophobic and racist actions after 
the riot in Heidenau (“Germany”), and Chancellor Angela Merkel warned the protesters “‘not 
to be exploited’ by radical elements trying to tap into fears of a foreigner takeover in Ger-
many” (Connolly). 
Although I pointed out earlier in this chapter that Germany was not ready to open its 
gates to refugees after shipwreck tragedies happened in the Mediterranean Sea, Chancellor 
Merkel decided in September 2015 that Germany would allow “tens of thousands of 
refugees” to “enter Germany via Austria,” suspending “European asylum rules” (“Merkel”), 
and in 2015 alone, Germany would admit 800,000 refugees, while France and Britain “have 
agreed only to take in a combined 44,000 refugees” (Lennard and Hermsmeier). Merkel even 
stated “repeatedly that the right to asylum has ‘no upper limit’” (“Merkel”). However, Presi-
dent Joachim Gauck “responded that ‘our reception capacity is limited even when it has not 
yet been worked out where these limits lie,’” implying an objection to Merkel’s decision 
(“Merkel”). 
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Because of this decision, Merkel is facing fierce criticisms, especially “from within her 
own conservative bloc — the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which she leads, and the 
Christian Social Union (CSU), which exists only in Bavaria and usually supports 
her” (“Merkel”). Moreover, the public’s fear of refugee influx rose, and “[a]pproval of Mrs 
Merkel dropped by 9 points to her lowest level since 2011” (“Merkel”). With the high admis-
sion of refugees, the number of unregistered refugees in Germany has increased. Armin 
Schuster, “a member of Parliament for the Christian Democrats who was a federal police of-
ficer and border guard patrolling Germany’s frontiers for 29 years before switching to politics 
in 2009,” worried about Germany’s national security after the refugee influx and stated that 
“[i]t’s not acceptable that people are coming uncontrolled across Germany’s borders,” and 
“[a] country has to be able to keep control of its borders. Politically, [Germany has] given 
that up far too easily. That’s not anyone’s idea of national security” (Kirschbaum). He further 
noted that the “police estimate there could be as many as 200,000 to 300,000 undocumented 
and unregistered refugees in Germany now [end of 2015], far more than a year 
ago” (Kirschbaum). 
Also, Germany’s radical right party AfD (Alternative for Germany) gained support rapid-
ly — “[s]upport for the AfD has risen amid deepening public unease over Chancellor Angela 
Merkel’s open-door policy for refugees . . . . The party is now represented in eight of 18 re-
gional state assemblies, and has about 15 percent support in national opinion polls” (Copley). 
AfD claimed that “the influx of mainly Muslims fleeing conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Af-
ghanistan makes the ‘Islamisation of Germany’ a real threat” and “backed a manifesto pledge 
that says Islam is not compatible with the German constitution and calls for a ban on minarets 
and the burqa” (Copley). AfD promoted its policies with the idea of German nationhood, as a 
leading politician of the party Alexander Gauland told a reporter of Die Zeit: “The Nazis had 
touched many things which are no longer speakable through this contact. The national pride 
that every Englishman, every Frenchman feels, is largely questioned among us according to 
the motto: Are we allowed to say it at all?”  (qtd. in “Hitler”; my translation). He further ex33 -
plained that the reason for his anti-Islamic sentiments is that “the current form of Islam can-
 The original text reads: 33
Die Nazis haben viele Dinge berührt, die durch diese Berührung plötzlich nicht mehr sagbar wurden. Der Na-
tionalstolz, den jeder Engländer, jeder Franzose empfindet, ist doch bei uns enorm hinterfragt, nach dem Motto: 
Dürfen wir das eigentlich noch sagen?
 186
not integrate into Western society”  (qtd. in “Hitler”; my translation). Here, the ethnocultural 34
sense of Germanness is put forward, and the “real threat” AfD sees is the threat to this kind of 
Germanness. 
Under pressure, Merkel promised in December 2015 that “the number [of refugees enter-
ing Germany] would drop and that refugees had to respect German law and customs” (Smale 
and Homola). On New Year’s Eve 2015, sexual assaults and robberies on scores of women 
happened in Cologne. By January 5, 2016, “[a]t least 90 criminal complaints have been made 
to police about the harassment by gangs at the city’s main railway station,” and “[t]he attacks 
were said to involve groups of drunk and aggressive young men which witnesses and police 
said were of Arab or North African appearance” (“Shock”). This triggered violent protest 
against refugees and Germany’s admission of refugees, for suspects of the attacks included 
refugees and asylum-seekers. In response, Merkel proposed to tighten deportation laws — 
“[e]ven refugees sentenced to probation by German courts could face deportation. In addi-
tion, the party called for new random identity checks of refugees and asylum seekers and 
tougher sexual-assault laws” (Faiola, “German”). Finally on March 18, 2016, Merkel fulfilled 
her promise, signing a deal with Turkey to keep out refugees — “in exchange for cash and 
concessions to Turkey, [Germany] would send back virtually all migrants crossing the 
Aegean Sea to find shelter in Europe” (Faiola, “New”). This deal will strengthen Merkel’s 
position in the federal elections in the second half of 2017 if this deal holds (Nixon), although 
Merkel’s deal was immediately criticized by human rights groups, saying that she was “com-
promising on European values that she herself had championed regarding the protection of 
refugees” (Smale), and other critics “questioned a partnership with Turkey” (Smale), arguing 
that the deal “would amount to an imperfect, immoral and potentially illegal solution that 
would corral refugees in Turkey, a nation plunging deeper into instability and 
violence” (Faiola, “New”). The reinforcement of Merkel’s position through this deal suggests 
that the public supports a reduction of refugees despite a contradiction to humanitarian as-
sistance. 
The changes in Germany’s policies toward refugees elucidate how public opinions influ-
ence policymaking, and humanitarian interest in immigration policy is quite vulnerable com-
pared to political interest. Also, the changes in public attitudes toward refugees indicate that 
 The original text is: 34
Ich glaube einfach, dass der Islam in seiner heutigen Form nicht integrierbar ist in eine westliche Gesellschaft.
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the influx of immigrants/refugees will result in insecure feelings of citizens regardless of the 
activities of these immigrants/refugees in the country, and individual negative behavior of 
immigrants/refugees can affect the general impression of this population. 
5.3. Comparison and Reflection 
Both the United States and Germany face serious problems of illegal immigration, and 
the number of undocumented immigrants in both countries is increasing. Therefore, both 
countries put an effort on border control. The United States focuses on tightening the U.S.-
Mexico border, building fences and strengthening border patrol. However, Germany’s bor-
ders are beyond its national borders due to the Schengen Agreement, and Germany’s border 
control is not Germany’s task alone. 
Although illegal immigration is not desirable in either country, undocumented immigrants 
do contribute to the country in fields such as construction and agriculture, and both countries 
are to some extent dependent on them. The reason is that undocumented immigrants fill in the 
vacancy in undesirable labor. Also, some employers risk to hire undocumented immigrants, 
because they can minimize their spent on wages and taxes and thus expand their production 
with this money. 
Even if border control is successful, it can only reduce the number of undocumented im-
migrants to a very limited extent, because many undocumented immigrants in both the Unit-
ed States and Germany are visa over-stayers or undocumented workers on a temporary visitor 
visa. This type of illegal immigration is very difficult to control, and the United States and 
Germany have a somewhat different policy toward undocumented immigrants already in the 
country. There have been amnesty programs in the United States, and in the past few years 
President Obama’s immigration reform offered undocumented immigrants a way to gain citi-
zenship. There had also been attempts to convert undocumented immigrants into legal tempo-
rary workers, as I discussed in chapter four. In addition, some jurisdictions protect undocu-
mented immigrants by declaring themselves sanctuary cities, creating “no-hassle” zones for 
undocumented laborers, or issuing even undocumented immigrants a city resident card. There 
had also been attempts to control illegal immigration in a very extreme way such as the en-
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actments of California’s Proposition 187 and Alabama HB 56. However, most of the provi-
sions in these acts were abolished in the end. Furthermore, deportation is a means to control 
illegal immigration, but it is only used as a relatively symbolic gesture to warn undocumented 
immigrants. Anti-illegal-immigration voices also exist, (an extreme case is Trump’s immigra-
tion reform plan), but they have not managed to change the policy thus far (December 2016). 
On the contrary, Germany takes a zero-tolerance policy toward undocumented immigrants, 
where amnesty had never been and probably will never be a possibility. Therefore, the United 
States has a much more generous policy on illegal immigration than Germany. This differ-
ence mirrors two different models of immigration policies of the two nation-states (nation of 
immigrants vs. country of immigration, as explained in chapter four), for it is possible that 
the United States tends to tolerate anyone who can make great contribution to the country’s 
development, while Germany is more conservative and concerned about the cultural influ-
ence and consequences — illegal immigration is not acceptable in Germany, for undocu-
mented immigrants do not go through a selection process. 
Debates on illegal immigration in the United States are mainly about whether undocu-
mented immigrants deserve to gain their legal status for the contributions they have done for 
the country, while debates in Germany usually focus on whether Germany should open its 
gates to refugees for humanitarian reasons (and the answer has changed from no to yes and 
finally a limit). This suggests that the United States intends to convert illegal immigration to 
a practical and beneficial situation for the country’s economy if it cannot control illegal im-
migration in an effective way. Like any change in the U.S. immigration policy, changes in 
policy on illegal immigration (e.g., amnesty) are driven by the country’s economic and politi-
cal needs. Germany, on the other hand, does not compromise on a more generous policy to-
ward undocumented immigrants, and it has also been very cautious about any assistance to 
undocumented immigrants. If it was not for humanitarian reasons, Germany is not likely to 
consider a deed that would result in increasing the number of undocumented immigrants. The 
fear of refugees that radical right parties promote indicates that the ethnocultural sense of na-
tionhood is still essential in German national identity, because by accepting large numbers of 
Muslim refugees, this identity is challenged. It is possible that Germany’s strict policy on il-
legal immigration will not change in the near future, because if undocumented immigrants 
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have a pathway to gain legal status, they will have an opportunity to gain citizenship, which 
challenges German identity to a great extent. 
Despite the difference in policies between the United States and Germany, undocumented 
immigrants face the same hardships. They are likely to be exploited at work, have very poor 
dwelling conditions, and fear to see a doctor when sick. Even for undocumented immigrants 
who have gained their legal status (e.g., children born in the United States of undocumented 
immigrants and undocumented immigrants in Germany who have married a German citizen), 
their living conditions very often stay the same. The same hardships in the two countries sug-
gest that differences in policies do not necessarily affect the quality of life of undocumented 
immigrants. That is to say, a more generous policy toward undocumented immigrants does 
not necessarily improve their living conditions; it is only a possibility for the country to gain 
economic benefits. 
Illegal immigration in both countries also influences the public’s attitude toward immi-
grants in general and creates discrimination against immigrants, legal or undocumented. Sim-
ilar to undocumented immigrants’ living conditions, the public’s attitude does not seem to be 
related to the type of immigration policies — a more generous policy does not make the pub-
lic tolerate illegal immigration more. Moreover, the attitude is not likely to change as long as 
illegal immigration exists and is associated with illegality as the term suggests.  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6. Conclusion and Prospect 
Immigration policies of the United States and Germany are derived from different mod-
els, and this difference is basically due to citizens’ perceptions of their national identity. Table 
6.1 shows a brief comparison of the two immigration models. American values (the American 
Creed) are the most essential element in gaining American identity, while the embodiment of 
German Kultur symbolizes German identity. The different perceptions of national identity are 
what make the United States adopt the jus soli principle and Germany the jus sanguinis prin-
ciple in the citizenship law, and accordingly, the United States becomes a racially and ethni-
cally heterogeneous society, while Germany stays homogeneous. Moreover, different percep-
tions of national identity also result in the differences in immigrants’ assimilation levels and 
their self-identification of who they are. While first-generation immigrants in both countries 
show signs of low assimilation level and tend to hold on to their foreign identity, second-gen-
eration immigrants in the two countries are different — second-generation immigrants in the 
United States largely adopt American culture and are likely to identify themselves as Ameri-
cans rather than foreigners, whereas second- or even third-generation immigrants in Germany 
still hold on to their foreign identity and tend to have a double identity (or as some literary 
works suggest, no identity at all). The reason is that a politically based national identity 
makes it easier for an immigrant to integrate and feel that he or she belongs, because an im-
migrant is considered to be integrated when he or she fully accepts American values. Fur-
thermore, racial or ethnic diversity in the country does not make a non-Anglo-American im-
United States Germany
Understanding of National 
Identity Political Cultural
Immigration Category Nation of Immigrants Country of Immigration
Citizenship jus soli jus sanguinis ￫ semi jus soli
Race/Ethnicity (Based on the 
Understanding of National 
Identity)
Heterogeneous Homogeneous
Table 6.1 
Comparison of Immigration Models between the United States and Germany
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migrant feel less American, and this diversity also creates acculturation — a two-way cultural 
influence between Anglo-American culture and other cultures — though not necessarily in-
tended. However, a culturally based national identity makes race and ethnicity indispensable 
to people’s identification of national belonging, and thus creates a gap between natives and 
immigrants. Even second- or third-generation immigrants (who are already citizens) are 
treated as foreigners instead of citizens by ethnic Germans, which further prevents immi-
grants from feeling German. This mental alienation of immigrants, in contrast to accultura-
tion in the United States, leads to a one-way assimilation situation, where foreign cultures 
seldom change the notion of German culture. Although assimilation is not a necessity in the 
process of immigration, it is inevitable due to education in the host society, contact with na-
tives, and defamiliarization of the country of origin. 
Because of this difference in the perception of national identity, the U.S. immigration pol-
icy is more flexible than the German immigration policy. To a great extent, the U.S. immigra-
tion policy is profit-oriented, and the change in its immigration policy is usually caused by 
the country’s economic and political needs. In contrast, Germany has to balance between its 
economic and political needs and the ethnocultural perception of national identity, which lim-
its the flexibility of the German immigration policy. The difference in the flexibility of immi-
gration policy is shown especially in policies on illegal immigration. The United States in-
tends to control illegal immigration, but it tolerates undocumented immigrants when there is 
labor shortage in the country, and amnesty is granted when undocumented immigrants con-
tribute a great deal to the country. However, Germany adopts a zero-tolerance policy toward 
illegal immigration, although undocumented immigrants also contribute to the country’s 
economy. Compared to the United States, Germany admits many more refugees and asylum-
seekers during the current refugee crisis, which shows that the United States is more profit-
oriented, for admitting refugees does not bring profit for the country, and thus it is a deed 
purely out of humanitarian interest. Refugees pose a danger to Germany’s idea of a zero-tol-
erance policy toward illegal immigration, because many of them need to enter the country 
illegally to seek protection, and a number of them remain unregistered. The fact that Ger-
many’s debates on illegal immigration focus more on refugees and asylum-seekers than on 
guestworkers suggests that Germany’s policy on illegal immigration is not likely to be bent 
for greater profit. From the policies on illegal immigration, we see that the United States and 
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Germany carry out different immigration policies to deal with the same situation (illegal im-
migration). 
The difference in flexibility is also shown in guestworker programs. The reason that the 
Bracero Program in the United States was strongly related to illegal immigration is that the 
program went from a government controlled deal to a direct grower-bracero program, hence 
the program became less organized, and more migrants crossed the U.S.-Mexico border ille-
gally to seek job opportunities. The U.S. government was not eager to deport undocumented 
workers, because growers needed them to fill labor shortage, and the government compro-
mised immigration control for economic profit. Germany’s guestworker programs, on the 
other hand, did not have a strong connection with illegal immigration, which indicates that 
Germany does not bend its immigration policy for greater profit. 
Guestworker programs in the two countries are of different significance also due to the 
two different models of immigration policy. Guestworker programs in the United States are 
not the main reason why the United States became a nation of immigrants, but rather only a 
component of its whole immigration history. However, Germany’s guestworker programs 
started an immigration influx to Germany, which has shaken German culture by changing the 
country’s racial and ethnic demography and adding Gastarbeiterdeutsch and Gastarbeiter- 
literatur to its culture. To a large extent, the increase in foreign population caused by Ger-
many’s guestworker programs led to the revolutionary reform of the German immigration 
policy starting at the turn of the twenty-first century. 
As I stated in table 6.1, Germany’s citizenship principle changed from jus sanguinis to 
semi jus soli. Germany changed its immigration policy from an exclusive focus to an inclu-
sive one, and it gave birthright citizenship to foreign children born in Germany whose parent 
is a permanent resident. By comparing the U.S. and German immigration policies, people 
find that many provisions are similar or even the same. One could say that immigration poli-
cies in the United States and Germany are becoming more and more similar. The reasons for 
Germany to reform its immigration policy are, for one thing, to minimize potential immi-
grant-state conflict caused by the large number of immigrants living in the country by giving 
immigrants the opportunity to gain more political rights (e.g., naturalization), and for another, 
to achieve economic development by competing for skilled foreign workers (e.g., employ-
ment-based permanent residency) and promoting business opportunities (e.g., permanent res-
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idency through investment). The possibility to gain permanent residency through family and 
refugee status in both countries represents both countries’ obligation to admit immigrants out 
of family and humanitarian interests. Also, the prerequisites of naturalization in both coun-
tries are similar, and they represent a selection process of an ideal citizen. For example, natu-
ralization requirements in both countries suggest that integration is necessary, because inte-
grated immigrants are less likely to cause cultural conflict, and the United States and Ger-
many have no intention to change their mainstream cultural values. Therefore, similar situa-
tions and needs in the United States and Germany result in similar immigration policies in the 
two countries. 
Although the United States and Germany have different immigration models, public opin-
ions on immigration and immigrants in the two countries are similar. Nativism has been exist-
ing in both countries throughout history, and there are still a considerable number of people 
who think that immigrants are a burden to the country because they drag wages down and 
take away jobs from native workers, even though policies already give priority to native 
workers when both native and foreign workers are qualified, and many low-skilled immi-
grants only work in fields where native workers do not wish to work. Also, prejudice against 
immigrants is a very common phenomenon in both countries despite the fact that there are no 
discriminating laws against them. The public tends to believe that immigrants make crime 
worse and immigration should not be increased. 
To answer the questions in my introduction: the national identity approach of immigration 
policy is fundamental in policymaking in regard to immigration, because the different percep-
tions of national identity separate immigration policies in the United States and Germany into 
two different immigration models. Similar economic and political needs in the two countries 
mostly result in similar immigration policies, but with some exceptions. Similar immigration 
policies are, for example, guestworker programs, permanent residency requirements, and nat-
uralization requirements. Exceptions include, for instance, policies on illegal immigration. 
However, similar immigration policies do not necessarily mean similar receptions in public 
or similar impacts on society. For example, although naturalization requirements are similar 
in the two countries, native Germans (with German blood connotation) tend to treat second- 
and even third-generation immigrants as foreigners, while anyone born in the United States is 
treated as a native-born American. This results in different levels of assimilation and self-
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identification of second- and third-generation immigrants, and the difference is again derived 
from the national identity approach. Another example is that although both countries em-
ployed guestworker programs, they had different results. Guestworker programs in the United 
States were/are strongly linked with illegal immigration, while programs in Germany barely 
had/have this connection. From this point of view, immigration policy is associated with cul-
ture (perception of national identity) and at the same time has an impact on culture (accultur-
ation and the concepts of assimilation and integration), which more or less influences the 
immigrants’ sense of belonging. In other words, from a cultural perspective, immigration 
policies and their associated consequences in the United States and Germany have different 
impacts on immigrants. 
It is also important to note that even different immigration policies may have similar re-
ceptions in public or similar impact on immigrants themselves. For example, although the 
United States and Germany are of different immigration models and have different percep-
tions of national identity, public attitudes toward immigration and immigrants are similar. 
This may suggest that public attitudes toward immigration are independent of a country’s 
immigration policy model, but they are related to its resource availability (e.g., housing, jobs, 
education, etc.) and security (e.g., crimes, terrorist attacks, etc.). Another example is that un-
documented immigrants in both the United States and Germany face similar hardships re-
gardless of the state’s policy on illegal immigration. A more profit-oriented and tolerant poli-
cy of the United States does not necessarily improve the living and working conditions of un-
documented immigrants, nor does it make the public tolerate illegal immigration. In this 
sense, immigration policy alone does not seem to be able to solve immigrant-native conflict 
or steer public attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. More precisely, immigration 
control policy can only set a framework for legal immigration, but it does not necessarily cre-
ate a secure feeling for the public. Immigrant policy can only provide basic legal protections 
for immigrants, but it does not reduce nativism or anti-immigration sentiments. In other 
words, from a political perspective, the government needs to combine immigration policy 
with other policies (e.g., economic) in order to solve immigrant-native conflict, because im-
migration policies alone do not have much effect on public attitudes toward immigration and 
immigrants. For example, people who support Trump’s immigration reform are not necessari-
ly nativists who are against immigration per se. Anti-Mexican sentiments may only be a re-
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direction of fear for job scarcity and a decrease in social welfare, because Mexicans are 
stereotyped as undocumented immigrants by many Americans, and a number of Americans 
believe that undocumented immigrants take away jobs and their children take away social 
welfare. Anti-Muslim sentiments may only be caused by the fear of terrorist attacks, and 
again, based on their stereotypes. 
For future studies, it is worth seeing if German national identity will gradually change as 
the population of non-ethnic Germans (in a political sense of German citizenship) grows. It is 
possible that the change in ethnic demography will affect the perception of German national 
identity in the long run in the same way that American national identity changed. The notion 
of German blood as part of the national identity will hinder this process, and thus I do not ex-
pect the change in the perception of German national identity to happen in the near future. If 
this perception ever changes, the German immigration policy might change accordingly, 
which will further demonstrate the national identity approach.  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